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Introduction 
The Detroit Public Sector after World War II, 1947-1967:  
An Overview of its History and Historiography 
 
The rise of the labor movement in the public service to a 
position of growing significance has now made imperative 
a fresh appraisal of programs, which aspire to create a 
measure of employee participation in personnel 
management.1 
 
The rise of public employee unionism...is important in its 
own right as a significant transformation in U.S. Labor 
relations, and as one aspect of recent changes in the U.S. 
Workforce and in the labor movement. It emerged in part 
because of the baby boom, and forms part of the upsurge of 
social movements of the 1960s.2 
 
Power to the Public Worker. These are the words that are emblazoned in the title 
of a book of the same name.3 They embody an idea that public sector workers relentlessly 
pursued during the immediate post World War II era. Deploying this power, public 
workers, like those in the private sector following the enactment of the National Labor 
Relations Act, wanted the power to bargain collectively for wages, benefits, and working 
conditions. It was a power embodied in the spirit of a Civil Rights movement that 
elevated the Fourteenth Amendment to heights never before achieved. These rights did 
not come easily and in some instances not at all. Like other epic struggles for rights, the 
struggle for public sector unionism had many passionate advocates. A core group of them 
                                                 
1Morton Robert Godine, The Labor Problem in the Public Service: A Study in 
Political Pluralism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), 2-3. 
2Robert Shaffer, “Where Are the Organized Public Employees? The Absence of 
Public Employee Unionism from U.S. History Textbooks, and Why It Matters,” Labor 
History, 43 (2002): 323. 
3Richard N. Billings and John Greenya, Power to the Public Worker (New York: 
Robert B. Luce, Inc., 1974). 
2 
 
resided in Detroit. They did not rest until they made progress in achieving those rights 
and the power that came with them. 
 Detroit's legacy as a city with a strong and enduring union movement is one about 
which few could argue. Historian Steve Babson uses the term, “union town,” to describe 
the city. Fellow historian Robert Zieger would agree. Writing about the history of the 
Congress of Industrial Organizations, he refers to it as “the quintessential CIO city.”4 The 
AFL and various employee associations contributed to the strength of organized labor in 
Detroit, which led Babson to argue that “[f]ew places in America boasted a more self-
confident, combative working class than the Motor City.”5 In 1965, Detroit News 
journalist Peter R. Lochbiler referred to Detroit as “the labor capital of the nation,”6 a 
fitting moniker for a city that many saw as just that.  
 One area that has not received the scholarly attention that it deserves is public 
sector workers in Detroit. In his historiographical article on labor history in the city, labor 
historian and archivist Michael Smith noted that there is a dearth of literature on the 
public sector that demands attention by historians.7 The purpose of this dissertation is to 
fill this void. Following World War II, the public sector began to play an increasingly 
important role in the life of Detroit. Like workers in the private sector, Detroit-based 
public employees sought the benefits of union representation to advance their economic 
standing. Inspired by the Civil Rights movement, Detroit's public sector followed a path 
                                                 
4Robert H. Zieger, The CIO, 1935-1955 (Chapel Hill: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 1995), 242. 
5Steve Babson, Working Detroit: The Making of a Union Town (Detroit: Wayne 
State University Press, 1986), IX. 
6Peter R. Lochbiler, “Labor Writer Dies,” Detroit News, 6 August 1965, 1. 
7Mike Smith, “'Let's Make Detroit a Union Town': The History of Labor and the 
Working Class in the Motor City,” Michigan Historical Review 27 (Fall 2001): 169. 
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from relative weakness in the mid-1940s and before to increasing empowerment in the 
mid-1960s and beyond. The narrative that follows illustrates how public sector unions 
emerged and began to acquire political and economic power after World War II. 
 While organized labor plays a vital role in Detroit, much of it is overshadowed by 
the presence of the United Automobile Workers (UAW). To be sure, the UAW plays a 
uniquely important role in the life and history of Detroit. Given the significance of cars in 
American society, it understandable that a union representing auto workers would enjoy a 
good deal of attention. However, an examination of public sector unionism provides an 
opportunity to observe how another part of organized labor influences and is influenced 
by the forces of history. Because of the differences between public sector workers and 
those represented by the UAW, research about them can only contribute to a fuller 
understanding of Detroit’s working class of which they are an important part. 
 This study hinges on two pieces of legislation. The first is Public Act 336, better 
known as the Hutchinson Act. Enacted by the Michigan legislature in 1947, this law 
prohibited strikes among public sector workers and applied punitive consequences to 
those who did. It criminalized the act of encouraging or coercing members of the public 
sector to strike. In 1965, the second law, Public Act 379, referred to as the Public 
Employees Relations Act, significantly amended the Hutchinson Act. Indeed, two 
scholars have likened the second act to the 1935 National Labor Relations Act, in that it 
required state and local agencies in Michigan to engage in collective bargaining with its 
employees or their representatives. Advocates of the Public Employees Relations Act 
considered the Hutchinson Act overly punitive. The contrast between the two laws could 
not be more stark. The prohibition against striking remained intact in the second act, but 
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lawmakers limited the penalties for engaging in strikes in the amended law. The 1965 law 
eliminated the provision requiring criminal prosecution of those who encouraged or 
coerced public sector employees to strike.8 
 After World War II, organized labor in the public sector in Detroit was 
empowered by the enactment of the 1965 Public Employee Relations Act. The public 
sector welcomed the changes made in the 1965 law. In many ways, the public sector of 
the mid-1960s followed the historical trajectory experienced by organized labor within 
the private sector thirty years before. After all, the 1935 National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA) empowering private sector employees paralleled state laws empowering public 
sector workers during the 1960s. In both cases, legislators bestowed collective bargaining 
rights upon these workers in response to oppressive laws enacted previously. Then, too, 
public sector union membership grew exponentially after city and state laws nationally 
allowed for collective bargaining in the same way that union membership grew in the 
private sector following the enactment of the Wagner Act. For both private sector 
workers following NLRA and public sector workers in the 1960s, collective bargaining 
agreements followed the passage of laws and union growth. At least one union 
representing public sector employees advanced the cause of public sector unions by 
                                                 
8
 Michigan, “Hutchinson Act,” Public and Local Acts of the Legislature of the 
State of Michigan (1947), 633-634; Michigan, “Public Employees Relations Act,” Public 
and Local Acts of the Legislature of the State of Michigan (1965), 745-750; Russell A. 
Smith, “State and Local Advisory Reports on Public Employment Labor Relations: A 
Comparative Analysis,” Michigan Law Review 67 (March, 1969):  891-918; Gregory M. 
Saltzman and Shlomo Sperka, “Public Sector Collective Bargaining in Michigan: Law 
and Recent Developments,” in Joyce M. Najita and James L. Stern, eds., Collective 
Bargaining in the Public Sector: The Experience of Eight States (New York: M.E. 
Sharpe, 2001),  106-108 and 132-133; Doris B. McLaughlin, Michigan Labor: A Brief 
History from 1818 to the Present (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan and Wayne 
State University, 1970), 164. 
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evoking the name of President John F. Kennedy and his 1962 Executive Order 10988 in 
the same way union activists evoked Franklin Delano Roosevelt's name during union 
organizing of private sector employees following NLRA. Indeed, in the same way that 
the Wagner Act owes its enactment to the New Deal, the Public Employee Relations Act 
owes much of its success to the Civil Right movement.9 Speaking of this latter period, 
historian Nelson Lichtenstein argues that, “Rights consciousness transcended most of the 
usual demographic and occupational barriers, it spread to almost every segment of 
society, to just about every interest group and faction.”10 The public sector represents one 
such element shaped by the Civil Rights movement. 
 One key component differentiated Executive Order 10988 from the National 
Labor Relations Act: the provision allowing for strikes, which was clearly outlined in the 
latter measure. Indeed, many argued that in the absence of a strike provision, the mere 
collective bargaining provision fell far short of what was needed.11 There is some truth to 
this outlook. Yet, Michigan's 1965 public sector collective bargaining law and those 
elsewhere clearly spurred organizing efforts, transformed labor relations, and prompted 
strikes that the law presumed to prohibit. 
 Public sector workers represent a wide range of occupations. During the postwar 
                                                 
9Sara U. Douglas, Labor's New Voice: Unions and the Mass Media (Norwood, 
N.J.: Ablex Publishing Corporation, 1986), 21; Irwin Ross, “Those Newly Militant 
Government Workers,” Fortune, August 1968, 107 and 131; Saltzman and Sperka, 
“Public Sector Collective Bargaining in Michigan,” 106-108 and 132-133. 
10Nelson Lichtenstein, State of the Union: A Century of American Labor 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 199; Flyer regarding “Executive Order 
10988,” ca. 1962, box 56, folder 12, accessioned May 2009, unprocessed collection of 
the Service Employees International, ALUA. 
11Joseph A. McCartin, “Unexpected Convergence: Values, Assumptions, and the 
Right to Strike in Public and Private Sectors, 1945-2005,” Buffalo Law Review 57 (2009): 
742-744. 
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era in Detroit, they hauled garbage into trucks, taught public school children, served 
meals in public lunch rooms, guarded public sites, worked as social workers, provided 
landscaping on the sides of roads and buildings, worked as steam fitters, maintained 
traffic signals for the Public Lighting Commission, maintained x-ray and other equipment 
as electricians for Detroit Receiving Hospital, drove and repaired buses and streetcars, 
mopped floors and cleaned bathrooms in public agencies, and provided a plethora of 
administrative services within city and state government.12 Public workers differed 
dramatically in what they did, the skills and education that their duties required, and even 
the class status they held. The contrast between school teachers and librarians on the one 
hand and garbage workers and plumbers on the other brings into sharp relief the social 
gulf that sometimes separates public sector workers. At the same time, public employees 
have several related characteristics in common. They provide essential public services 
where neither a profit motive nor competition exist and they derive their income from the 
tax base of the governmental jurisdictions for which they work. 
 The following dissertation excludes some categories of Detroit-area public sector 
workers.  Federal workers and classified state civil service workers are among these, 
although a few reference are made to them. The study is tailored in this way to reflect the 
centrality of the proposed and enacted laws in Michigan upon which this study is 
focused. More specifically, the two main laws upon which the following is based do not 
have any bearing on either federal public sector workers or classified state civil service 
workers.  
Labor Historians and Public Sector Unionism 
                                                 
12Gordine, The Labor Problem in the Public Service, 14, 17. 
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 Though a growing number of historians have come to understand and appreciate 
the significance of the public sector, public sector unionism has not received the 
historical attention that it deserves. Its general neglect has inspired the ire of at least two 
historians seeking to shame their colleagues into fully integrating the public sector into 
historical scholarship.13 In his review essay on the subject, Robert Shaffer refers to the 
sheer growth of public sector workers and their unions beginning in the 1950s as a main 
reason why historians should devote more research to them. With a public work force of 
400,000 in 1955, employment in the public sector climbed to 4,000,000 by the 1970s. 
The activism public employees demonstrated in their unionization, Shaffer argues, drew 
from and contributed to the  “civil rights movement, the student movement, the feminist 
movement, and the questioning of the established order normally associated with the 
1960s.”14 Even as manufacturing employment has declined significantly, historians 
continue to write extensively and primarily about organized labor in the manufacturing 
sector, at the same time public sector unions experienced their near-exponential growth. 
Some of the growth in government employment, Shaffer shows, was due to Lyndon 
Johnson's Great Society programs, whose resources expanded the public sector and 
prompted public employee unionization. The Civil Rights movement, he argues, 
prompted a flurry of strikes by teachers and postal workers in the 1960s and 1970s. The 
Civil Rights movement also inspired AFSCME and other unions representing public 
sector workers to adopt a more militant stance. Shaffer argues that the study of the Civil 
Rights and anti-war movements overshadowed many other developments of that era, but 
                                                 
13Shaffer, “Where Are the Organized Public Employees?” 315-334; Joseph A. 
McCartin, “Bringing the State's Workers in: Time to Rectify an Imbalanced US Labor 
Historiography,” Labor History, 47 (February 2006): 73-94. 
14Shaffer, Where Are the Organized Public Employees? 321. 
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he stresses that the public sector played an important part of those movements, as 
evidenced by the Memphis sanitation strike of 1968. This latter event, during which 
Martin Luther King, Jr. was assassinated, should have been a signal to historians that a 
fuller examination of public sector unions is in order.15 
 Shaffer reminds us, too, that the rise of the public sector has seen conflict between 
the Democratic and Republican parties. The former has argued that government plays an 
important role in American life while Republicans have maintained that the growth of 
government has caused some of the nation's problems. Needless to say, the enduring 
debate over taxes has been central to the discussion of public sector unions. Prominent in 
Shaffer's analysis is the strike by air traffic controllers, who Ronald Reagan fired in 1981. 
It hastened a retreat from and decline in unionization, which had already begun in the 
private sector in the 1950s. That public sector unions have continued to grow despite the 
overall decline of union membership warrants attention by historians. JFK's executive 
order 10988 was, Shaffer argues, an important factor in the growth of public sector 
unionization generally, noting that his executive order not only gave federal workers 
limited rights to collective bargaining but inspired unions representing state and local 
workers to do likewise.16 These individual and collective reasons reveal the basis of 
Shaffer's argument: that public sector unionism demands more attention from historians 
than it has received. 
 In his review essay, historian Joseph McCartin exhibits little concern about the 
lack of attention public sector workers receive in textbooks, noting that there are not 
currently enough secondary sources from which textbook authors can draw. Like Shaffer, 
                                                 
15Ibid., 315-334. 
16Ibid., 315-334. 
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however, McCartin notes the growth of the public sector, the importance of Kennedy's 
Executive Order 10988, its association with the anti-government tax revolt of the 1970s, 
and the association that public sector unions had with the Civil Rights movement. In 
contrast to Shaffer, McCartin attributes the lack of attention of public sector unionism to 
five issues. McCartin convincingly argues that the purge of communists and other 
radicals from organized labor during the Cold War, the uneven relationship between 
organized labor and the Democratic Party, and the bureaucratization and increasing 
passivity of organized labor constitute reasons why historians have dismissed public 
sector unions. Other reasons include the debilitating affects of the law and state on labor 
and the inability of the labor movement to form cohesive relationships with the civil and 
women's rights movements.17  
 None of these issues take on much importance when public sector unionism is 
placed in the context of history. While the Cold War had a chilling affect on organized 
labor in general, many public sector workers did become militant before its thaw. As to 
the betrayal of organized labor by the Democratic Party, it was a Democratic president 
and big city Democratic mayors and governors that signed executive orders, ordinances 
and legislation permitting collective bargaining for public sector workers. According to 
McCartin, the general bureaucratization of unions did not affect public sector unions 
during the 1960s and 1970s either, although some may disagree. During this period they 
                                                 
17Ibid.; for articles mentioning the relationship between the anti tax revolt and 
public sector see Joseph McCartin, “'A Wagner Act for Public Employees': Labor's 
Deferred Dream and the Rise of Conservatism, 1970-1976,” Journal  of American 
History, 95 (June 2008), 123-148; Joseph McCartin, “Turnabout Years: Public Sector 
Unionism and the Fiscal Crisis,” in Bruce J. Schulman and Julian E. Zelizer, eds. 
Rightward Bound: Making America Conservative (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2008), 210-226. 
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did not shy away from militant activities, including strikes. Unlike what we observe in 
the private sector, moreover, McCartin argues, “public workers witnessed the distinct 
liberalization of the labor laws that affected them between 1947 and the mid-1970s,” 
which labor historians who focus on the decline in organized labor after the Taft-Hartley 
Act largely ignore. Finally, public sector unions did form coalitions with the civil rights 
and feminist movements, which runs counter to what unions representing those in the 
private sector did during this period, a point Robert Shaffer makes as well. Like Shaffer's 
essay, McCartin's essay lays the groundwork for this dissertation and reveals why it is 
important. 
 Any serious discussion of public sector unionism’s history must take note of the 
important contribution that historian and attorney Joseph Slater has made to the literature. 
While his 2002 monograph, Public Workers, does not say much about Detroit, it is the 
first full-length book in recent years to discuss the subject from a historical perspective in 
a range of different unions. It has a breadth not found in the two histories of American 
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees and the biography of former 
AFSCME President Jerry Wurf. In Public Workers, Slater addresses the 1919 Boston 
police strike that had implications for the public sector for many subsequent decades, the 
importance of law and politics in the establishment of wages, working conditions and 
benefits, and the unfavorable construction and application of the term, “union,” by the 
courts. Because Slater’s book ends in 1961, it corresponds to the decades of this 
dissertation while providing a meaningful backdrop. Slater’s last main chapter focuses on 
the Wisconsin public sector law, which paved the way for subsequent state laws for 
public sector collective bargaining. Michigan Public Employee Relations Act was among 
11 
 
these.18 
Like Shaffer and McCartin, Slater posits reasons why labor historians have been 
slow to see the public sector as a viable area of research. Much of labor history operates 
out of a Marxist framework that ascribes importance to the owners of the means of 
production on the one hand and workers on the other. This relationship provides an 
important key to the understanding of capitalism and the profit motive. The reality, 
however, is that the public sector does not fit into this framework. The profit motive does 
not play a clear and discernible role within public sector labor relations, even while taxes 
derived from profits secured from capitalist endeavors does determine the extent and 
nature of public sector work. As Slater notes, “public sector unions did not contest the 
distribution of profits within private businesses...[C]ollective action by public employees 
were thought not to be battles against capitalists and capitalism, but rather merely 
disputes over how to provide services to the public.”19 In the introduction, Slater also 
notes the dearth of literature by historians on public sector unionism.20 Educational 
historian James Earl Clarke agrees. In his dissertation on the history of the American 
Federation of Teachers, he argues that, “Teachers had to negotiate with a public body 
unable to increase revenues by increasing prices, because in teaching no commodity was 
sold.”21 As a result of this framework, there may not be much of a desire to pursue 
                                                 
18Joseph Slater, Public Workers: Government Employee Unions, the Law and the 
State, 1900-1962 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), 1-12; Billings and Greenya, 
Power to the Public Worker (New York: Robert B. Luce, Inc.); Leo Kramer, Labor’s 
Paradox: The American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (New 
York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.); Joseph C. Goulden, Jerry Wurf: Labor’s Last Angry 
Man (New York: Atheneum, 1982).  
19
 Slater, Public Workers, 4. 
20Ibid., 1-12. 
21James Earl Clarke, “American Federation of Teachers: Origins and History” 
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elements of labor history that operate on the fringes of capitalist labor relations.  
 In addition to these reasons for the dearth of studies by labor historians on public 
sector unionism, there is another. For the better part of the twentieth century, the National 
Labor Relations Act has played a major role in labor relations. Issues concerning the right 
to organize, collective bargaining, and the right to strike are codified within this law and 
its amendments. As a result, much of the historiography in labor is similarly concerned 
with this law and its amendments. Neither the NLRA nor the NLR Board apply to public 
sector workers,22 and labor historians of the period have been more inclined to study 
subjects closely linked to this law and its amendments. The importance of the NLRA as a 
point of departure for labor historians aside, it has not prevented them from writing about 
private sector labor relations before the NLRA. As Slater remarks,  “While public sector 
unions had few if any statutory rights before the 1960s, the analogous dearth in the 
private sector before the New Deal has not deterred historians.”23 The relatively small 
size of the public sector prior to the New Deal may also account for why historians 
refrained from in-depth studies of it. 
 A final reason for the dearth of studies on the public sector concerns the nature of 
the work conducted by public sector workers. Public sector unions often organize 
professionals like public school teachers, librarians and social workers. Such workers do 
not fit the image of blue collar workers, who often are imagined manufacturing cars, 
working in steel mills, or digging coal. To be sure, these private sector occupations are 
                                                                                                                                                 
(Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1966), 388; “Should Teachers Strike,” The Detroit 
Teacher, January 20, 1947, 7. 
22
 Godine, The Labor Problem in the Public Service, 3; William Edward Eaton, 
The American Federation of Teachers, 1916-1961 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois 
University Press, 1975), 43; Douglas, Labor's New Voice, 90. 
23Slater, Public Workers, 3. 
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important and deserve scholarly attention. The public sector, however, has been a major 
employer and the site of labor struggles for over a century.24 No other indicator says this 
more than the growth it has experienced in the last sixty years, a growth that parallels the 
private sector's decline. 
 Public sector workers represent an important element of social history. The steam 
fitters, plumbers, social workers, teachers, janitors, health care workers and 
administrative staff associated with local and state government represent an important 
growth sector in the economy and in politics.  For that reason, they deserve the attention 
of historians. In speaking of the 1960s in a book review, historian Kevin Boyle writes 
that, “...there were millions of other Americans – children, parents, retirees, factory 
workers, secretaries, school teachers, and sales clerks, the disabled and the mentally ill – 
about whom we know very little.25 Moreover, the prominence of African Americans and 
women in public sector work and unions during the period calls for their consideration 
beyond labor history.26 This dissertation hopes to contribute to that historiography.  
Primary Sources Documenting Public Sector Unionism 
 Labor historians can no longer claim that there is a dearth of available sources on 
the public sector. Wayne State University’s Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs possess 
extensive and available holdings on the public sector located in the collections of the 
American Federation of State, County, Municipal Employees, the American Federation 
                                                 
24David Ziskind, One Thousand Strikes of Government Employees (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1940). 
25Kevin Boyle, “The Times They Aren't A-changing,” Reviews in American 
History 29 (2001), 308; see also Shaffer, “Where Are the Organized Public Employees?”  
333. 
26Joseph Slater, “Down By: Public Sector Unions and the State in America, World 
War I to World War II” (Ph.D. diss., Georgetown University, 1998), 7-8. 
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of Teachers and the Service Employees International Union, as well as the papers and 
records of lawmakers and other public officials. The records of public officials are 
located in numerous other repositories as well.  The Meany Center in Silver Springs, 
Maryland possess the records of the AFL-CIO Public Employees Department, which 
provides rich resources for research. The Wagner Archives at New York University has a 
number of collections concerning AFSCME that are available for research as well.27 
Similarly, the records of the National Association of Letter Carriers, located at Wayne 
State University, will be a source for the research of the public sector once they are made 
available in the coming months.28  
 In many instances, sources are easily accessible in public records as well as the 
records of unions located in any number of archival repositories. Indeed, the narrative 
that follows draws from union records as well as the records of such public figures as 
Michigan governors G. Mennen Williams, and George Romney, located at the University 
of Michigan's Bentley Historical Library, and those of Detroit mayors Edward Jeffries 
and Albert Cobo, held at the Detroit Public Library's Burton Historical Collections, and 
Jerome Cavanagh's records, in the holdings of the Walter P. Reuther Library. 
 In the last fifty years, unions representing public sector workers experienced 
significant growth, and many of the people responsible for that growth are living. As a 
result, many of them are available to be interviewed. Indeed, one can argue that now is an 
ideal time to study public sector unions and the people they represented, simply because 
                                                 
27Meredith Kolodner, “To Feature 50 Years of History: DC 37 Archiving Its 
Growth,” The Chief, 17 August 2007. 
28See for example, the Web site of the Walter Reuther Library accessed on 
October 16, 2009 at: http://www.reuther.wayne.edu/ and the Web site of the Robert 
Wagner Archives accessed on October 16, 2009 at: 
http://www.nyu.edu/library/bobst/research/tam/ 
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further delay might mean that we will not have the opportunity to collect their oral 
histories. Taken individually or collectively, these archival sources and potential for oral 
history interviews will help to tell a story thus far treated as something of a stepchild in 
the historiography of organized labor. 
 Both the 1947 Hutchinson Act and the 1965 Public Employee Relations Act are 
provided some context by the Michigan Manual. As an official government source, the 
Michigan Manual provides useful information, including biographical information on 
individual Michigan legislators, the districts they represented and the session in which 
they served. Given that the following hinges on two major pieces of legislation in 
addition to other legislative measures, the Michigan House and Senate Journals also are 
important. They follow the detailed process through which bills move through the 
legislature.  This information is vital to understanding the details of what happened, when 
it occurred, and the positions of elected officials. Given the historian's concern with 
process, any such source is useful.29 
 While the above-mentioned sources provide a range of information, they are not 
always useful sources for illustrating the human side of issues. George F. Montgomery's 
Backbencher: A Legislative Memoir helps fill that gap. This personal account of a 
freshman legislator during the 1965-1966 legislative session accomplishes two useful 
things. First, it illustrates exactly how the legislature works without bogging its readers 
down in the waters of a legalese that are difficult to navigate. After all, the legislature was 
and is comprised of real people with a culture and unwritten protocols that play a role in 
                                                 
29See, for example, Michigan, Michigan Manual (Lansing: State of Michigan, 
1953, 1963 and 1965) and Michigan, Journal of the House of Representatives (Lansing: 
State of Michigan, 1947, 1965 and 1967). 
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dictating the business of that institution. Montgomery's memoir sheds light on these 
matters. Needless to say, the political party that dominates either chamber of the 
legislature plays a significant role in dictating the direction and thrust of that body. 
Backbencher, however, moves beyond the obvious and provides its readers with insights 
that help them to read between the lines of official accounts.  Most importantly, though, 
Montgomery's account concerns the specific legislature that passed the 1965 Public 
Employee Relations Act, which is a key part of this dissertation.30 
 Duddley Buffa's Union Power & American Democracy: The UAW and the 
Democratic Party: 1935-1972, and Margaret Nowak's Two Who Were There: A 
Biography of Stanley Nowak also provide some insight into the workings of the 
legislature, but neither mentions either the Hutchinson Act nor the Public Employees 
Relations Act. In Buffa's account, the UAW maintained a stranglehold on the Michigan 
Democratic Party. Buffa, however, does not provide a sense as to the climate in which 
they both operated. As a result, Buffa completely ignores the extent to which the 
Republican Party exercised a stranglehold on democracy itself through malapportioned 
legislative districts. This arrangement, as revealed in chapter three, allowed for a 
disproportionate number of Republican legislators in a state where Democrats often 
outvoted Republicans.31 
 Newspaper accounts are another important source of information and perspective 
                                                 
30I would like to thank Joseph Patrick Swallow for informing me of this book. 
George F. Montgomery, Backbencher: A Legislative Memoir (Waterford, Michigan: 
Sunshine Publications, 2002). 
31Dudley W. Buffa, Union Power & American Democracy: The UAW and the 
Democratic Party, 1935-1972 (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1984), vi; 
Margaret Collingwood Nowak, Two Who Were There: A Biography of Stanley Nowak 
(Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1989), 142-222.  
17 
 
for what follows. The Detroit Labor News and the Public Employee are two of the chief 
sources of labor-controlled newspapers utilized for this dissertation. The use of these and 
other labor organs have their limitations. As Sara Douglas tells us in her book, Labor's 
New Voice: Unions and the Mass Media, their intention is to “provide labor leaders with 
outlets for their opinions and to reach the rank and file.” As a result, “rarely were two 
sides of any issue printed.”32 For all of their claims, Detroit daily newspapers did not 
always render a particularly objective view of the news either. Douglas speaks to this fact 
as well.  As she argues, “[i]t is against the inherent interests of newspapers to champion 
the cause of labor because they are constantly engaged in their own internal labor 
management issues with which to contend.”33 Indeed, this is why those news organs 
published for and by organized labor often went to great lengths to counter the often 
biased assertions within the “mainstream” press. This idea was revealed in the reporting 
and editorials found in the Detroit News, Detroit Free Press, and the Detroit Times 
regarding labor-related issues. Their perspective toward legislative reapportionment, 
clearly revealed their anti-labor bent. The assertions in the labor press are as much 
intended to report news unavailable in mass market publications as it is to advance and, 
sometimes, slant a position to move union members into action. When the Michigan 
AFL-CIO News – Detroit Labor News Edition maintains that, “50,000 AFSCME 
members will hold a special Leadership Conference at the Statler-Hilton Hotel to 
demonstrate the union's protest to agency heads 'dragging their feet' in implementing the 
Public Employees Act, passed in July 1965,” we should not be surprised to find the 
                                                 
32Douglas, Labor's News Voice, 18. 
33Ibid., 29. 
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absence of any sources corroborating this claim.34 
Scholars Outside of History Weigh in on the Public Sector 
 Beginning in the early 1970s, a number of scholars outside of history came to 
realize the importance of public sector labor relations. Written by those specializing in 
industrial relations and with titles like Public Workers and Public Unions, Public 
Employee Unionism, and Public Employee Unions, they addressed a number of the issues 
in the public sector.35 The authors clearly wrote the books in response to the groundswell 
of activity in public sector labor relations taking place in the 1960s. Morton Robert 
Godine's The Labor Problem in the Public Service is unique in this regard. Published in 
1951, this monograph provides important insights into public sector labor relations. 
Godine speaks to the political, economic, and social environment found in that era when 
the Michigan legislature enacted the Hutchinson Act and when that act was implemented 
during the strike of streetcar workers in 1952. Admittedly, there is nothing in the book 
that discusses specific events in Detroit or Michigan, but many of the concepts discussed 
provide meaningful context for the events in Detroit and the state.36 
 In the context of what follows, the book, The Urban Community and Its 
Unionized Bureaucracies: Pressure Politics in Local Government Labor Relations, 
                                                 
34
“AFSCME Board to Meet Here,” Michigan AFL-CIO News – Detroit Labor 
News Edition, 5 October 1966, 7; “Civic Center Local 1220,” Michigan AFL-CIO News – 
Detroit Labor News Edition,19 October 1966; “AFSCME Rally to Hear Scholle,” 
Michigan AFL-CIO News – Detroit Labor News Edition, 26 October 1966. 
35Sam Zagoria, ed. Public Workers and Public Unions (Englewood Cliffs, New 
Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972); Jack Stieber, Public Employee Unionism: Structure, 
Growth, Policy (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1973); A. Lawrence 
Chickering, Public Employee Unions: A Study of the Crisis in Public Sector Labor 
Relations, ed. (Lexington, Massachusetts, 1976); See also Joseph Slater, “Down By 
Law,” 18. 
36Godine, The Labor Problem in the Public Service, (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1951). 
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addresses a portion of public sector unionism in Detroit on which the following 
dissertation will elaborate. Its authors dedicate part of a chapter to a discussion of Detroit 
Ordinance 140-G, which established a bureau of labor relations and inspired conflicts 
within city government.  As a secondary source, it provides a useful context and 
backdrop to better understanding the primary sources that stand as the basis for part of a 
chapter in what follows.37 
 The importance of public sector unionism also was evident in the Academy of 
Political Science, which dedicated a 1970 proceedings volumes to an assessment of this 
phenomenon. With its 13 articles, covering topics illustrating how the public sector 
operated in particular cities and states as well as its growth, effects, etc., this volume 
covered centrally important issues. Similarly, the editors of the Michigan Law Review 
ascribed enough importance to the matter to dedicate a special issue to this subject. 
Indeed, the author of one article argued that “public employee 'unionism,' with its 
attendant problems, has emerged as the most significant development in American labor 
relations in the last decade.”38  
 To date, however, the periodicals that labor historians have authored have not 
ascribed much attention to the subject. Had the growth of the public sector been 
                                                 
37Sterling Spero and John M. Capozzola, The Urban Community and Its 
Unionized Bureaucracies: Pressure Politics in Local Government Labor Relations (New 
York: Dunellen, 1973), 44-50. 
38Robert H. Connery and William V. Farr, eds., Academy of Political Science, 
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negligible and its unionization followed a similar path, we could easily understand the 
neglect. However, this sector of the economy and the organizations that represented its 
work force grew exponentially beginning in the 1950s. In the same decade when the 
Michigan State legislature passed the 1965 Public Employees Relations Act, 
“[m]embership in the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees 
increased from 180,000 to 425,000 in one decade, making it the fastest-growing union in 
the country.”39 Long-time AFSCME President Jerry Wurf provided his own take on this 
growth when he referred to its implications as “revolutionary.”40 Some may argue that he 
had overstated the point, but few could argue that the growth and impact of public sector 
unions were negligible. 
Public Sector Unionism in Detroit: Scholars Weigh in on the Subject 
 Some scholars have addressed aspects of public sector unionism and the extent to 
which it has manifested itself in the Detroit metropolitan area. Jeffrey Mirel, Albert 
Schiff, Steve Babson, Doris McLaughlin, Robert Howlett and Richard Fleming have all 
addressed some elements of the subject, but I expand on what they wrote and make 
connections to and between various important developments in the history of Detroit's 
public sector during the post World War II period. As an education historian, Jeffrey 
Mirel’s The Rise and Fall of an Urban School System, for example, focuses on public 
school teachers. To this end, he did not delve into the histories of other Detroit-area 
public sector workers or teachers in Detroit’s suburbs. Given that his study is exclusive to 
Detroit, he does not extend his discussion to important strikes among public school 
                                                 
39Hugh O’Neill, “The Growth of Municipal Employee Unions,” Proceedings of 
the Academy of Political Science, 30, no. 2, (1970): 9. 
40Jerry Wurf, “The Revolution in Government Employment,” Proceedings of the 
Academy of Political Science, 30, no. 2, (1970): 134. 
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teachers in either East Detroit or Hamtramck, cities that shared borders with Detroit. 
When these school teachers engaged in a strike in 1947 and in April 1965 respectively, it 
prompted the Michigan legislature to enact the Hutchinson and Public Employee 
Relations Acts, the two laws that serve as book ends of sorts for what follows.  
 There is secondary literature that expands on Mirel's contribution. In his 
dissertation, “A Study and Evaluation of Teachers' Strikes in the United States,” Albert 
Schiff takes on the subject of a strike wave that hit many school districts in the United 
States. His study is important because he not only discusses the strike of East Detroit 
teachers in 1947, which precipitated the enactment of the Hutchinson Act, but he places it 
in the context of teacher strikes transpiring throughout the country during the same 
period.  Doris McLaughlin’s Michigan Labor, is another important study. Written in 
1970, the book does not cover the subject of Detroit-area public sector unionism in great 
detail, but McLaughlin dedicates an entire chapter on the subject as it relates to Michigan 
more generally. Steve Babson also has written on the subject. His contribution to the 
effort in Working Detroit: The Making of a Union Town, offers little on the use of the 
1951 strike of Detroit Street Railway workers, but Babson does mention the subject of 
the public sector in the context of the strike of Hamtramck school teachers in 1965. Like 
McLaughlin, Babson dedicates an entire chapter on public sector unionism, although his 
chapter focuses on Detroit.41 
 None of these historians noted the significance of the affiliations of public sector 
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unions.  The American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, Detroit-
area teachers affiliated with the American Federation of Teachers, Division 26 of the 
Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Railway & Motor Coach Employees of 
America, and the Service Employees International Union are some of the key unions 
discussed in this dissertation. They held affiliations with the American Federation of 
Labor before that organization merged with the Congress of Industrial Employees in 
1955. The pre-1955 affiliation with the AFL is an important one given that the AFL has 
been more conservative and less prone to strikes than the CIO. And yet, it was these AFL 
unions that were activists in seeking redress of grievances. As a result, we must 
reevaluate the limitations associated with blanketing AFL-affiliated unions with the 
charge of passivity and conservatism. After all, it was a teachers’ strike and threatened 
strike that prompted the Hutchinson Act in 1947. It was Division 26 representing Detroit 
streetcar workers that utilized the strike four years later. AFSCME Jerry Wurf, moreover, 
advocated the use of the strike when necessary during the mid-1960s. The Michigan CIO 
often supported Detroit-area AFL unions in their efforts to win wage gains and, 
indirectly, helped the AFL, with its advocacy of one man, one vote campaign that 
benefited most within organized labor. However, it was Detroit-area AFL unions 
operating within the sphere of the public sector that took on the activist disposition more 
closely associated with the CIO.  
 Scholars trained in law and political science have contributed to the understanding 
of the public sector and its changing role and implications in Detroit and beyond. Robert 
Howlett, a member of the Michigan Labor Mediation Board, authored a useful article on 
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the subject.42 In his short but insightful article, “Michigan's New Public Employment 
Relations Act,” Howlett outlines the basic tenets of the Public Employee Relations Act 
and illustrates how and the extent to which it differed from the 1947 Hutchinson Act. He 
paid particular attention to that aspect of the law that allowed for unfair labor practice 
charges against employers but not employees and argued that the legislature wrote the 
law in this way “on the theory that these are not necessary as a public employer may 
discipline or discharge a striking public employee.”43 Unlike other sources, Howlett 
reminds his audience that Lt. Governor William G. Millikin supported the new law, an 
important detail, because Millikin was a Republican. Richard Fleming's essay reinforces 
what other sources have said on the subject of collective bargaining in the public sector. 
He also reveals that, following the enactment of the Public Employee Relations Act, 
bargaining agents were determined by dues check off and elections conducted through 
the state, a process not revealed in other sources. The essay is one of the few sources that 
make reference to the 1965 city ordinance providing for a labor relations bureau. For 
these reasons, it is a useful secondary source.44 
 Taken together, existing studies provide a springboard from which to launch a 
larger study on the subject. They raise questions about the differences between public and 
private sector labor relations, the importance of the law, the role of teachers versus other 
public sector workers in determining changes in the law, the role of organized labor in 
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 Richard P. Fleming, “Municipal Collective Bargaining: A Review of Some of the 
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seeking empowerment for the public sector, and the role of the Civil Rights movement in 
empowering public sector workers, among other questions. In short, they help prepare the 
way for what follows. 
The Weight and Force of History in Shaping the Contours of Public Sector 
Unionism in Detroit 
 A number of forces shaped the development of the public sector and its 
unionization. Migration is one of the more important ones. Urban migration factors 
significantly into this dissertation and is intertwined in each chapter. The migration of 
large numbers of people from the rural South to the urban North as well as from 
elsewhere was coupled with a related issue: the rapid growth of the urban population.  As 
one commentator noted, “The 'population explosion’, which started shortly following the 
end of World War II, created a tremendous demand for public services which could be 
provided only by a greatly enlarged public work force.”45  This population growth had as 
much to do with the migration of people from the South to places like Detroit and its 
suburbs as it did with a the population increase occasioned by the post war baby boom.46  
  The role of migration on public education is one example of how it affected 
public sector unionism. Migration increased the number of children attending public 
schools and the demand for teachers. The concentration of teachers and their poor 
treatment resulted in labor activism as a way of seeking redress for inequities that had 
long been part of their jobs. Teacher activism inspired fear in the Michigan State 
                                                 
45Robert C. Grosvenor, “Labor Relations in the Public Services in Michigan: A 
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46Shaffer, “Where are the Organized Public Employees?” 316; Irving Bernstein, 
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Legislature, which enacted the Hutchinson Act. This phenomenon was not limited to 
Michigan. Indeed, a wave of teacher strikes provoked a number of state legislatures to 
enact similar legislation. 
 Migration also factors significantly into the problem of malapportionment. 
Known as the fight for 'one man, one vote,' this effort forced elected officials to redraw 
legislative districts so they would contain roughly equal numbers of people. Prior to the 
mid-1960s, large cities like Detroit had senatorial districts with populations far larger 
than districts in outstate Michigan, often by a ten to one ratio. This meant that rural 
districts, held significantly more legislative seats. Migration and urban population growth 
were largely responsible for these disparities, as over time more people moved to the 
cities from these rural areas.  As cities like Detroit grew, rural areas of the state desired to 
retain the legislative power they had established in previous years. They sought to retain 
their legislative power as a way to counter the power in places like Detroit where the 
population continued to increase. This situation did not begin to change until the U.S. 
Supreme Court ruled, in Baker v. Carr (1962), that legislative reapportionment was 
subject to judicial review. Two years later in Reynolds v. Sims (1964), the high court took 
a more definitive position on the matter when it ruled that malapportioned legislative 
districts violated the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment. Until that moment, 
Republicans dominated the state legislature.47 
 Legislative reapportionment is the subject of a large body of scholarly literature. 
Of the secondary studies on the topic, two merit comment and provide context for this 
study. The first, Apportionment and Representative Institutions: The Michigan 
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Experience, provides excellent background for the subject of legislative reapportionment. 
Indeed, James Pollock, who wrote the forward to the study, served as a Republican 
delegate to the 1961-1962 Michigan Constitutional Convention. That convention sought 
to address the issue of reapportionment before the U.S. Supreme Court ordered the state 
government to reapportion its legislative districts. The second study, Interest Groups, the 
Courts, and Legislative Reapportionment in Michigan by Judith Gething, includes an 
assessment of the reapportionment cases as they came to a conclusion.48 
 Written as if it were a brief poised to influence any subsequent rulings following 
the Supreme Court ruling in Baker v. Carr (1962), Apportionment and Representative 
Institutions, published in 1963, nonetheless gives a good sense of the major issues 
involved in the apportionment debate in Michigan. Because the U.S. Supreme Court had 
not yet handed down its ruling in Reynolds v. Sims (1964), the study stops short of 
providing meaningful conclusions.  Its authors could not tell the full history of cases that 
had immense bearing on the passage of the 1965 Public Employee Relations Act. In 
addition, its authors lacked the historical distance to consider the full implications of 
reapportionment. Then, too, the study gives scant attention to the role of organized labor 
in the reapportionment debates, initiative, litigation, and rulings. To that end, this current 
dissertation is poised to make a meaningful contribution to the literature.49 
 Political scientist Judith Gething provides historical context for the issue and 
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process of reapportionment. She discusses the major reapportionment cases that had been 
litigated in Michigan, the U.S. Supreme Court, and in a few other states. Gething’s work 
is important because she had the opportunity to interview labor leader August Scholle 
and attorney Theodore Sachs, two major figures in the efforts to reapportion Michigan's 
state legislature. As a result, Gething supplies insights from sources that are no longer 
available.50 
 Her dissertation, however, is not without shortcomings. Gething states as her 
primary argument “that the litigants [in Michigan reapportionment cases] acted primarily 
as individuals and not as members of interest groups or political parties…”51 As it relates 
to the case of Scholle v. Hare, this could not be further from the truth. Scholle was an 
individual who pursued litigation in this case, but he brought the case as the president of 
the Michigan AFL-CIO. That case aside, Scholle had, as president of that body and 
earlier of the state CIO, voiced loud criticisms of the malapportionment that characterized 
the state’s senatorial districts. Dating back to the 1940s, the voluminous records of the 
Michigan AFL-CIO52 provide significant evidence for labor's input into the debate over 
reapportionment. Most importantly, the Michigan CIO, beginning as early as 1951, and 
the Michigan AFL-CIO, beginning in 1958, provided substantial resources to the 
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reapportionment effort of legislative districts in Michigan. This dissertation will address 
the important role of organized labor in the fight for a reapportioned state legislature. 
 Part of Gething's argument is that the Michigan Democratic Party was 
antagonistic toward reapportioning legislative districts. That antagonism, however, was 
exhibited in the late 1950s, not in the earlier part of that decade. Indeed, the Michigan 
Democratic Party supported legislative reapportionment in 1952. It even sought the 
guidance and input of organized labor when crafting a suitable convention resolution 
endorsing reapportionment, ultimately modifying its draft resolution to include stronger 
language suggested by August Scholle.53 Gething also ascribes a larger role to the 
Michigan Farm Bureau in the 1952 ballot initiative against population-based 
reapportionment than the evidence indicates, as the Michigan Manufacturers Association 
played an equally prominent role. Finally, Gething argues too strongly that Scholle 
operated independently of organized labor in Michigan. The 1952 initiative contradicts 
this claim, as many members of organized labor played a role in the historical effort. Her 
argument misses the point that Scholle could never have pursued this fight if it were not 
for his position in the CIO until 1958 and the AFL-CIO thereafter. The force of Scholle's 
convictions aside, they would not have amounted to much outside the context of his 
affiliation with organized labor. 
 Also absent from Gething's discussion is any meaningful analysis of the impact of 
the Civil Rights movement on the changing direction of the idea of reapportionment. This 
dissertation, in contrast, examines the relationship between reapportionment and civil 
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rights at great length. Indeed, the Civil Rights movement, I argue, was responsible for 
how the state legislature came to significantly amend the Hutchinson Act eighteen years 
later. It is not surprising, then, that the Civil Rights movement would have a significant 
impact on numerous other developments, including legislative reapportionment and the 
empowerment of the public sector. While Gething did not make this argument, others 
have.54 
 While this dissertation will benefit from historical sources, earlier studies 
benefited from their access to contemporary events. Judith Gething, for example, 
interviewed August Scholle and Theodore Sachs, the plaintiff and attorney who litigated 
the reapportionment case of Scholle v. Hare. While Gething provides information and 
insights from those interviews, I could not interview these historical actors myself. The 
study on reapportionment edited by Lamb, Pierce and White similarly benefited from 
many first-hand witnesses to the reapportionment and, therefore, provide a scholarly 
account informed by the discussions during their research and writing.55 
 At the same time, this dissertation benefits from sources more recently accessible. 
Wayne State University’s Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs has made relevant 
records available more recently. In particular, this material provides insights into the 
Michigan ballot initiative concerning reapportionment. Indeed, evidence shows that the 
1952 effort played a significant role in how and why August Scholle and Theodore Sachs 
renewed their efforts to pursue reapportionment for Michigan seven years later.56 
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 The Civil Rights movement looms large in the following discussion as a 
motivating force for public sector workers who, like African Americans, sought equality. 
While the equality that public sector workers sought was with the private sector, the 
1960s revealed that the idea of equality was an idea that moved beyond the African 
American community and race relations. It likewise resonated deeply with public sector 
workers and those who represented them. In many respects, then, historian Sidney Fine's 
book, “Expanding the Frontiers of Civil Rights,” identifies an idea I hope to use in this 
dissertation. As the title suggests, the book “expands” beyond discussions of the rights of 
African Americans and race relations. To that end, it includes thoughtful discussions 
about women, migrant workers, Native Americans, and the disabled, groups that are not 
typically discussed in the context of the Civil Rights movement.57 For Fine, then, a 
number of otherwise marginalized groups benefited from the energy and momentum of 
the Civil Rights movement. In its own way, Fine's study has significance for what 
follows in that it suggests a transformation inspired by the Civil Rights movement, a 
transformation that included a movement empowering public sector workers. The 
connections are palpable even if Fine makes no mention of public sector workers in this 
context. 
 With this said, it is curious that a book dedicated to “expanding” the definition of 
civil rights, only makes passing references to issues of reapportionment. Because African 
Americans migrated to Detroit in large numbers beginning with World War I and became 
part of the underrepresented urban migrants, issues of reapportionment had substantial 
civil rights implications. By Fine's own admission, reapportionment was a significant 
                                                 
57Sidney Fine, “Expanding the Frontiers of Civil Rights” Michigan, 1948-1968 
Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2000), 10. 
31 
 
element of the deliberation during and results of the 1961-1962 Michigan Constitutional 
Convention. As he concedes, “It was not…civil rights concerns that provided the impetus 
for the drafting of a new constitution for Michigan to replace the 1908 constitution but 
rather the state’s fiscal problems and its legislative apportionment system (emphasis 
added).58 In refraining to draw meaningful attention to reapportionment, Fine missed an 
opportunity to discuss its implications for civil rights and show what, if any, relationship 
the Civil Rights movement had with the labor movement via the issue of 
reapportionment. As an example, the Fair Employment Practices Act that took several 
legislative sessions in Michigan to pass would have been signed into law quicker and as a 
stronger measure, had the senatorial districts been reapportioned sooner. Yet Fine 
neglects to mention this point by making these connections.59 
 Needless to say, Fine's book is just one of many publications that delve into the 
history of the Civil Rights movement in Detroit.60 Taken together, this literature 
demonstrates the transformative power of the Civil Rights movement, a power that 
helped to fuel the effort to seek legislation providing for collective bargaining rights 
among Detroit's public sector workers and fewer restrictions against their activism. The 
legislation, marches, court cases, boycotts that are most closely associated with the Civil 
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Rights movement both reflected and contributed to “an emerging black consciousness” 
that could not help but spill over into other areas of the social, political and economic life 
of Detroit and beyond. 
 States like Michigan resisted civil rights and sought to use their “sovereign rights” 
to control their citizens. Sovereignty, a term and idea imbued with legal implications, 
enters the current discussion from two opposing, yet relevant, angles. Both advocates and 
adversaries of public sector unionism used the term in order to advance their respective 
positions. First, the government is loathe to relinquish its sovereignty, but that is what it 
feels it is asked to do when public sector workers seek any form of mediation from what 
it considers third parties. Unions, arbitrators, and commissions established to mediate 
conflicts within public employee labor relations fall into this category. When the 
government and those who administer it are restricted from using their full authority over 
its employees, they take exception to this breach of authority, or so the argument goes. 
Primary sources from the era under discussion often reference issues of sovereignty in 
this way.61 Increasingly, the term fell out of as much use in the 1960s as it did in the 
1940s, indicating that the idea of sovereignty began to possess an archaic quality. 
 The sovereignty of states was likewise challenged when Republican legislators 
sought to superimpose the sovereign status of states on that of legislative districts. 
Theodore Sachs, the attorney who represented August Scholle and organized labor in 
reapportionment cases, argued that, 
it can hardly be said that the conflicting interests of 
sovereign states are in any way duplicated in Michigan or, 
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indeed, in any other state. There is no sovereign entity in 
Michigan other than Michigan itself. Neither counties nor 
the cities, nor the townships have sovereignty of themselves, 
but are merely...convenient administrative arms of the state 
itself.62 
 
The relevance of the above to the public sector or other union-related initiatives may not 
be readily apparent, but for those either advancing or impugning the above definition, 
sovereignty was a weighty issue. For a good portion of the twentieth century up to and 
into the 1960s, rural Republicans sought to advance the idea and practice of maintaining 
disproportionate representation in the Michigan Senate relative to their numbers and 
relative to what places like Detroit possessed. The entire reapportionment debate 
concerned this matter of legislative districts having disproportionately more or fewer 
people than others. If, however, counties or cities possessed a sovereignty-like status, 
then they could more easily argue that they could possess a certain number of state 
senators in the same way that all states possessed two members of the U.S. Senate, 
regardless of the size of their populations. In essence, this is what rural/Republican 
senatorial districts sought: the opportunity to have the same number of representatives in 
the Michigan Senate as districts with large populations. As already revealed, the fight to 
reapportion legislative districts, cast in another light, was about whether counties or 
similar entities could receive sovereign status. 
 Many of the issues contained in the following narrative have important legal 
dimension to them and reflect the power and force of law. Legislative reapportionment, 
including the initiative, court cases, and legislation sought to change senate 
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apportionment, is all about the law. The issue of sovereignty as it relates to 
reapportionment or collective bargaining is, likewise, a legal issue. Most importantly, the 
Michigan Legislature enacted legislation in 1947 banning strikes by public sector 
employees. This curtailed the efforts of public workers to pressure Detroit city 
government to increase wages. The power of the law manifested itself during the 1951 
strike of the Detroit Street Railway Workers, as well, when the city successfully used the 
Hutchinson Act against these city workers. That city workers refrained from striking until 
the legislature amended the Hutchinson Act in 1965 says something of the power of that 
law. The force of law also exhibited itself with the reapportionment of legislative 
districts, which paved the way for a Democratic-dominated legislature that amended the 
Hutchinson Act with the 1965 Public Employee Relations Act. The Civil Rights 
movement, which undergirds the transformation resulting in the enactment of the Public 
Employees Relations Act, has hugely legal dimensions as well. Indeed, civil rights 
leaders often looked to the courts for redress, realizing the limitations of other avenues. 
To that end, in the same way that the NAACP looked to the judicial system as the final 
arbiter for justice in school desegregation cases, the Michigan AFL-CIO sought to use the 
courts to force reapportionment, without which a collective bargaining law for public 
sector workers would never have occurred. 
Key People and Organizations Shaping Public Sector Unionism 
 People, organizations and agencies they represent bind the different parts of this 
dissertation together. With their court rulings and enactment of laws, the judicial system 
and the legislature are two forces whose influence we see throughout. With its advocacy 
of public sector workers, organized labor in the form of the Michigan AFL and CIO, and 
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their combined forces when their state organizations merged in 1958, are likewise evident 
throughout. In contrast, organizations like the Michigan Manufacturing Association 
sought to stem the tide of public sector unions with its insistence that lawmakers lower 
the very taxes that the public sector sought to increase, lest they not receive the wage 
increases and enhancements to their benefits that they sought.63  
 Among the people who played a signal role in the passage of the Public Employee 
Relations Act and reapportionment, August Scholle is important. His support of public 
sector workers is evident throughout, but the perseverance he exhibited as a plaintiff in a 
case designed to reapportion the legislature proved instrumental in the ultimate success of 
that effort. His prospects appeared dim early in the fight for reapportionment. In 1952, 
after all, advocates lost their battle to force reapportionment via a 1952 initiative, and 
Scholle likewise lost in his initial 1959 court case. For Scholle, success must have 
appeared far off given that the Michigan Constitutional Convention had approved a 
malapporitoned legislature during its 1961-1962 gathering. For this reason, Scholle must 
have been ecstatic to find that the case he originally lost was reversed when the U.S. 
Supreme Court ruled in two other cases that the state legislatures in Michigan and any 
other state, could not malapportion legislative districts. The outcome of these cases and 
their rulings not only paved the way for the enactment of the Public Employees Relations 
Act, but also acknowledged the growth of an urban area like Detroit whose citizens 
sought the representatives in the legislature that their growing numbers demanded. 
 For all of Scholle's efforts, he was no lawyer. By himself, he could not have 
battled within the legal system to realize his dream. For that, he turned to Theodore 
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Sachs. A brilliant lawyer, Sachs provided the legal foundation and strategy for a 1952 
referendum designed to reapportion the legislature and filled the need as an able litigator 
in subsequent cases. The issue of legislative reapportionment notwithstanding, it appears 
that Sachs also drafted the Public Employees Relations Act and served on committees 
affiliated with organized labor designed to garner the support necessary to move the idea 
to a bill and then on to a law. 
 George Edwards was a prominent figure in what follows and played a key role in 
diverse and numerous ways. For example, he served as a member of the Detroit City 
Council in the mid-1940s. In this capacity, he played an important role in ensuring that 
the Detroit Public School System receive the money necessary to provide pay raises to its 
teachers. Edwards later played a role in providing Ted Sachs with a scholarship and then 
served as Sachs' colleague and mentor in the firm where they both practiced. In his later 
service on the Michigan Court of Appeals, Edwards ironically ruled against August 
Scholle, who represented the Michigan AFL-CIO, which was bent on forcing the 
reapportionment of legislative districts. Because malapportionment reinforced 
conservative forces in the state, striking it down was crucial for labor's political ends.  
 If there was a Republican who provided a foil to Scholle or Sachs, one could 
argue that Edward Hutchinson could easily be cast in this role. He not only sponsored the 
act that bore his name and prohibited the strike as a means of empowerment for public 
sector workers, but he also played a key role in the 1961-1962 Michigan Constitutional 
Convention. The convention had its proposal to reapportion the legislature overturned by 
the U.S. Supreme Court, which ruled that the plan was convoluted and did not go far 
enough. Most importantly, Hutchinson hailed from a rural Michigan city and county 
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whose citizens often did not share the views of those living in big cities like Detroit. The 
product of a wealthy family, he did not think well of taxes, which is not surprising for a 
fellow whose father despised Franklin Roosevelt.64  
The Flow and Ebb of History 
 This dissertation hopes to capture the flow and ebb of history, often occurring 
simultaneously and climaxing in swirls that defy a linear or predictable progression of 
events. After all, the public sector won victories that were followed by defeats, which 
preceded more victories. In this history, there existed bright moments for the public 
sector, as when teachers successfully won concessions from Detroit for increased wages. 
With that said, research also reveals mistakes that set the cause of the public sector back. 
Many argue that the 1951 strike of streetcar workers was one such mistake. The variation 
in outcomes neither allows the historian to fixate on the defeats of public sector struggles 
nor their victories. This approach allows us to appreciate that, even when public sector 
unions experienced success or defeat, the seeds were sown for their reversals. 
 Following the Civil Rights movement, during which we find public sector 
organizations achieving some of their most notable gains, conservative forces regrouped. 
How else can we account for the victory of Richard Nixon in the 1968 presidential 
elections? In the context of public sector unionism, Joseph McCartin reminds us, 
conservative reality manifested itself in the mid-1970s anti-tax movements that 
debilitated the public sector gains of the just a few years before. This current study goes 
no further than 1967, shortly after the Michigan State Legislature passed the Public 
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Employee Relations Act; but it is worth noting that the strength of public sector unions 
and of public sector employment generally made public employees a target for a 
resurgent right. Not only was public spending an issue but also the power of public 
workers and unions. 
 The main argument of this dissertation is that the Civil Rights movement and 
growing concentration of public sector workers motivated and impelled Michigan’s 
public sector to seek rights previously denied them by the 1947 Hutchinson Act and a 
political climate that allowed for the enactment of the anti labor Taft-Hartley Act and 
Cold War. This atmosphere was not to last indefinitely, not for public employees at least. 
The Civil Rights movement, in other words, was a wave that the public sector rode and 
navigated for its purposes, even as private sector unions began their decline. The Civil 
Rights movement did not stand alone in having this affect on the public sector. Detroit-
area teachers in 1947 benefited in a similar way. When they exercised the strike in one 
instance and threatened to do so in another, public officials took note because teachers 
throughout the country won significant concessions from school boards, city councils, 
and mayors in 1946 and 1947. Detroit teachers rode that wave. The desires of these 
teachers were probably fueled by the 1945-1946 strike wave among auto workers, mine 
workers, steel workers and others. Part of the lesson that these labor activists learned was 
that timing is an essential ingredient to success. They also learned that proponents of 
public sector empowerment must not wait until a wave before they begin fighting for 
their rights.65  
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 Like so many other historical events, the Public Employees Relations Act did not 
come without a struggle. In the twenty years following World War II, liberal and 
conservative forces battled for dominance over one another. With the Hutchinson Act and 
the unsuccessful efforts to amend it, the more conservative forces remained largely in 
power during the earlier part of this period. This was not to remain the case. Conservative 
forces did seek to hold back what appeared to be the winds of change, and their 
unsuccessful efforts manifested themselves during the 1962 Michigan Constitutional 
Convention. There, Republicans sought to ensure that they would hold onto as much 
power as possible. They amended the state constitution to provide urban sectors more, 
but not enough, power. By creating a formula for senatorial representation, they 
accomplished this end. Their “success” only reinforced the idea that malapportionment 
violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Suffering from what 
must have been isolation from the Civil Rights movement, they assumed that the U.S. 
Supreme Court would acknowledge the effort they had made to provide more equality to 
the process. As evidenced by the subsequent rulings of the Supreme Court, the justices 
were not impressed. 
Chapter Outline 
 This dissertation is comprised of five chapters, an introduction, and a conclusion. 
Chapter One, “The Theory of Unintended Consequences: Detroit Teacher Activism in 
1947,” addresses the enactment of the Hutchinson Act and the Detroit-area strikes and 
often threatened strikes in and outside of Michigan that prompted the state legislature to 
pursue this legislation. Chapter Two, “The 1951 Strike of the Detroit Street Railway 
Workers,” concerns the strike that prompted Detroit Mayor Albert Cobo's use of the 
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Hutchinson Act. Mayor Cobo had threatened to use it during a strike of sanitation 
workers the previous year, but this transportation strike prompted him to utilize the 
weight of the law, which he did successfully, as evidenced by a ruling in his favor from 
the U.S. Supreme Court. Fourteen additional years passed before a legislature, this one 
controlled by the Democratic Party, amended the law to favor a growing public sector 
determined to seek a level of empowerment denied previously. The control obtained by 
the Democratic Party in 1965 resulted from the reapportionment of the legislature, the 
subject of the third chapter entitled, “Laying the Groundwork for Things to Come: 
Labor’s Fight for Legislative Reapportionment, 1952-1964.” It discusses labor's fight to 
reapportion the legislature as a precondition to enacting a number of laws, including the 
1965 Public Employee Relations Act. Chapter Four, “An Act Poised to 'Free Us From 
Slavery': The 1965 Public Employees Relations Act,” illustrates the successful 
culmination of efforts begun ever since the legislature enacted the Hutchinson Act 18 
years before. Chapter Five, “The Prospects and Limitations of the Public Employees 
Relations Act, 1965-1967,” illustrates the two-year history following the Public 
Employee Relations Act ending with an agreement between AFSCME Council 77 and 
Detroit in October 1967. The conclusion places the previous chapters in the context of 
current relations between Detroit and Detroit-based AFSCME affiliates seeking a 
contract during difficult economic times. 
 Together, these chapters illustrate the progression from a conservative to a more 
liberal period. In a sense, then, the trajectory reinforces the trends we find elsewhere. The 
latter part of this study, however, reveals that the conservatism associated with the 1970s 
began to reveal itself as early as 1967, with the reemergence of a Republican-dominated 
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legislature. That body sought to reassert its power by amending the Public Employee 
Relations Act with a bill that threatened the gains made by the public sector only two 
years before. That reality aside, this dissertation illustrates how the conservatism of the 
Cold War and the liberalism of the Civil Rights movement affected the public sector and 
how this sector made its own impact on those two eras. 
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Part I 
Of Teachers, Sanitation Workers and Street Railway Operators: 
Detroit’s Public Sector Workers Prompt and Confront the Law, 1947-1951 
Teachers are not supposed to strike! A widespread and enduring sentiment that 
still exists, the opposition toward teachers' strikes was the considered opinion of many 
immediately after World War II. In fact, many men and women bristled over the 
unionization of teachers in the public schools. The pursuit of grievances, collective 
bargaining, and strikes was he province of factory workers and others of a blue-collar 
persuasion, or so the argument ran. Teachers were, in contrast, ‘professionals.’ They 
answered to a calling that ran counter to the motives behind unionization. According to 
this reasoning, the nurturing and education of children required singular commitment and 
dedication, much like that often ascribed to a priest or doctor.  In the immediate post war 
era, many Detroiters held views similar to these, even as they faced the sticky conflicts 
between Detroit teachers and the Board of Education over issues of pay.1 
 These views notwithstanding, teachers and their representatives began 
questioning convictions that led them to institute a policy against striking. Indeed, the 
1946 convention of the American Federation of Teachers directed its executive council to 
re-examine its no strike policy. Members and officers of the organization questioned the 
                                                 
1For reference to teachers as anything but ‘common’ laborers, see Jeffrey Mirel, 
The Rise and Fall of an Urban School System: Detroit, 1907-81 (Ann Arbor: University 
of Michigan Press, 1999), 181; August Scholle to Mary Schultz, letter, 7 February 1947, 
box 20, folder 8, Michigan AFL-CIO Collection, ALUA; Sterling Spero and John M. 
Capozzola, The Urban Community and its Unionized Bureaucracies: Pressure Politics in 
Local Government Labor Relations (New York: Dunellen Publishing Company, Inc., 
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practicality of a policy that lacked sufficient means of pressuring school boards and the 
citizenry to seriously consider their plight. Absent this pressure, stagnant wages in times 
of inflation only drove teachers from the profession and made it difficult to replace them, 
thereby creating shortages that benefited no one. The question, then, to strike or not to 
strike, created ambivalence in a profession whose members could see the points of both 
arguments. With a resolution during its 1947 convention, the AFT retained its no-strike 
policy, but only after extensive debate and the introduction of a substitute motion on the 
matter. The outcome of this debate notwithstanding, some level of ambivalence appeared 
to reign, not only concerning strikes but of teacher unions that teachers themselves 
associated with strikes.2 
 During this same period, Detroit street railway workers and bus drivers that 
comprised the Street, Electric Railway & Motor Coach Employes (sic), Division 26, 
operated out of a different mindset. They had no use for a system of labor relations that 
did not allow for challenges to the poor treatment and pay they received from the city of 
Detroit. Decisions made by the Detroit mayor and the Street Railway Commission kept 
them from receiving their fair share. Strikes and threatened strikes allowed transportation 
workers to forcefully demonstrate their dissatisfaction and compelled city officials to 
more seriously address their concerns. They may have harbored a concern about their 
responsibility to citizens and residents of Detroit, but not so much so that they would 
refrain from fighting for what they deserved. Unlike teachers, public transit workers were 
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not perceived and did not see themselves as ‘professionals.’3 They, therefore, were never 
burdened with sacrificing that status for a level of labor activism that could secure wage 
increases that were in line with the cost of living. Like Detroit-area teachers, streetcar 
strikes provoked legislators who complained about the ill-effects of strikes, as they 
deliberated about the Hutchinson Act, an anti-strike law directed toward Michigan's 
public sector. 
Whatever their differences, and there were many, Detroit teachers and street 
railway workers in the immediate post-World War II era shared a common characteristic 
that the Michigan State Legislature, local branches of government, and the federal and 
state judiciary understood very well. They were public sector employees, whose 
compensation derived from a tax base managed by elected and appointed officials. The 
strikes and threatened strikes of public workers meant that there existed forces that 
directly challenged government managers that had no intention of freely relinquishing 
their powers.  Regardless of the nature of their work, Detroit teachers, street railway 
workers, and other public sector workers were prepared to actively protest their wages 
and working conditions.  In response, the Michigan State Legislature enacted the 
Hutchinson Act, which set harsh penalties against public employees who went on strike 
and those who encouraged them to do so. The implementation of the Hutchinson Act and 
the events leading up to it only intensified the relationship between public sector workers 
and the governmental agencies that managed them.4 The mixture of laws, growing anti-
union sentiments, escalating coldwar and anti-tax policies and sentiment combined to 
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restrict the manner in which the public sector could improve their wages and working 
conditions. 
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Chapter One 
The Theory of Unintended Consequences: Detroit Teacher Activism in 1947 
The desires of Michigan governments to maintain power over their employees in 
the immediate post-World War II era created anxiety among many public school teachers 
and the unions that represented them. Teacher salaries had declined dramatically relative 
to the rise in inflation. Simultaneously, teachers witnessed other unionized workers 
successfully pressure their employers to raise wages and improve working conditions. 
They also saw the size of classrooms swell, increasing their already heavy work loads. 
With these realities before them, teachers sought redress to the abysmally poor treatment 
they had received for years. Given the number of women within the ranks of the 
profession, moreover, teachers’ low pay was related to their gender. In 1947, teachers in 
Detroit and East Detroit (now East Pointe), Michigan, awoke to the possibilities of a 
more activist approach to their predicament. The strikes and threatened strikes they 
pursued simultaneously pressured local and state governmental bodies to address the 
concerns of public school teachers while also inspiring the state legislature to enact laws 
that restricted the actions of public sector employees more generally.5  
Teachers’ unions have played a vital role in the history of public sector unionism. 
Although teachers were slow to pursue the strategies adopted by others in the labor 
movement, the realities of the post-World War II era motivated teachers to more actively 
align themselves with the burgeoning labor movement. There appeared to be no other 
way to pressure lawmakers and appointed officials to consider their demands.6 
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The history behind teachers' labor activism is both nuanced and complicated. In 
response to World War II and Detroit’s role as the ‘Arsenal of Democracy,’ southern 
migration to the city and its suburbs swelled tremendously and strained the already 
burdened Detroit metropolitan economy. Indeed, East Detroit’s population had more than 
doubled in the previous seven years. As many cities nationwide experienced substantial 
growth, East Detroit was not alone.7 The substantial increase in population pressured 
school authorities to use limited resources for the construction and renovation of school 
buildings. The war played an important part in this scenario, as the men who would have 
normally been hired to build or repair buildings had been deployed in the war effort. The 
state of school buildings caused parents particular concern, and these concerns pitted 
parents and parent associations against teachers who desired salary increases and smaller 
classes over building construction. In the end, teachers received raises, but only after they 
demanded larger increases than their boards of education were willing to grant.8 
Taxation and the Public Sector 
Issues of taxation, regional interests, and representation damaged the case of 
teachers seeking salary increases. The legislature, which was disproportionately 
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Republican and rural,9 sought to hold the line on taxes used to pay teachers salaries. 
Urban-based Democrats often took exception to low teacher salaries, but with only five 
out of ninety-five members in the Michigan House of Representatives and four of twenty-
eight in the Michigan Senate, they struggled to raise taxes for any reason.10 This set of 
circumstances remained intact until the mid-1960s, when the U.S. Supreme Court ruled 
this type of legislative apportionment unconstitutional.11  
With a recently-fought war that required tremendous economic sacrifice, there 
were, at best, mixed sentiments about making continued sacrifices for education. On two 
separate occasions in East Detroit, for example, the necessary two-thirds majority refused 
to pass the property tax increase needed in order to meet teacher salary demands. Many 
segments of the business community, moreover, fought strenuously to suppress taxes, 
which compromised their bottom line, even as these taxes helped to increase teacher 
salaries. Business leaders who questioned the amount of money used to fund education 
did not acknowledge the possibility that educational achievement were directly related to 
the lack of resources allocated to education in the first place.12 
In the first half of 1947, the Michigan Legislature fiercely debated the merits of 
increasing taxes. Without tax increases, some argued, the state would descend into debt. 
With them, the Republicans in the legislature were forced to consider an idea that 
violated the principles upon which they understood the world in which they lived and 
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legislated. New social needs required increased revenues; they had to consider tax 
increases. Legislators considered a range of taxes from taxes on tobacco, liquor, and 
gasoline to sales taxes. Only a year before, the state’s electorate overwhelmingly 
approved a sales tax amendment on the November 1946 ballot. The amendment required 
that the legislature allocate one third of all sales tax revenues to schools and 
municipalities. The reallocation of taxes increased the tax receipts to schools from 28% to 
almost 45%. The problem this posed for the Michigan Legislature was to find tax 
revenues to replace those that were now assigned to cities and schools.13  
The Republican governor and Republican-dominated legislature sought to have 
the amendment repealed or resubmitted to the electorate with the hopes that the citizens 
would change their minds by the time of the 1948 elections. However, the electorate 
merely voted in their own interests when it voted to divert taxes to cities and schools that 
the legislature had denied when allocating revenue generated from taxes. Ultimately, the 
Michigan Supreme Court used strong language to uphold the amendment: “'...to declare 
the amendment a nullity would thwart the expressed will of the people.'”14 
 The tax split amendment grew out of and contributed to the continued conflict 
between the rural, conservative, and Republican-dominated legislature, on the one hand, 
and the more liberal and union-friendly electorate living in cities and the bulk of 
Democratic legislators. Educational historian Jeffrey Mirel aptly writes that, “[I]n many 
ways, the battle over the sales tax split was a microcosm of educational politics in the 
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1930s and 1940s.”15 
In its own way, Michigan's political economy following World War II laid the 
groundwork for the Hutchinson Act. This law banned public sector strikes and applied 
harsh penalties to public sector workers using the strike, but did not include language 
providing for public sector collective bargaining. With this legislation, the legislature 
took a position contrary to the expressed interests of public sector workers, who regularly 
sought salary and wage gains that required new revenues. That was at the center of the 
debates over the sales tax amendment.16 Already angered by the activism demonstrated 
by teachers, street railway workers, and other public sector employees, Republican 
legislators and their constituents were further provoked by the sales tax amendment. They 
complained about what they perceived to be the debilitating affect of cities and public 
sector demands on the state. The Hutchinson Act was, in part, a response to a level of 
activism on the part of teachers and other public employees. With the law, governments 
could better control its employees, thereby maintaining a hold on taxes. 
The sales tax amendment enjoyed overwhelming support with the electorate. 
Indeed, the amendment met with a victory of 921,144 to 426,430 at the November 1947 
polls. Its success suggests that the desires of the electorate was at an extreme variance 
with the Republican-dominated legislature that opposed it.17 When viewed in the context 
of the legislature, many of whose members gained their seats due to malapportioned 
legislative districts, this variance makes more sense.18 
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The sales tax amendment was no panacea for those teachers seeking an increase 
in salaries. That school boards received additional funds did not mean that they believed 
teachers should receive substantial salary increases. School boards argued that they 
should allocate the increased funding to the construction and renovation of buildings, 
rather than increasing teacher’s salaries.19  
The Public Sector and the Necessity of Political Activities 
 The sales tax split aside, many teachers understood the benefits of political 
activity and used their power to promote legislation favorable to their interests while 
opposing damaging legislation. At the time when Detroit teachers considered striking in 
1947, the DFT supported laws regarding fair employment, sabbatical leave, and federal 
aid to schools.20 Similarly, the DFT fought against measures designed to weaken child 
labor laws, use retirement funds for school expenses originally earmarked for teachers 
and the Calahan Bill, which required that all foreign agencies register with the attorney 
general.21 Quoting from a report authored by the Detroit Chapter of the National Lawyers 
Guild, The Detroit Teacher shared with its readers that “'the section of the [Callahan] bill 
which permits the attorney-general to seize funds of any labor organization, any of whose 
elected officials he feels is sympathetic to any foreign government, is purposely aimed at 
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the destruction of organized labor in Michigan.’”22 
 Given its interest, the DFT encouraged its members to familiarize themselves with 
the law.23 “Are you letting your legislators know how you expect them to vote on 
proposed bills which will affect you directly?” one article in the Detroit Teacher asked. 
“Take time to write a letter or send a telegram. Inform yourself on proposed legislation 
and act to support those bills you believe in and oppose vigorously those you do not want 
enacted.” The article provided the names and addresses of those who sat on the education 
committees of the state house and the senate.24  
Through its organ, The Detroit Teacher, the Detroit Federation of Teachers made 
its members aware of the platforms of prospective Detroit school board members and, 
while the Hutchinson Bill was under consideration, indirectly voiced its objections to the 
bill by asking these prospective school board members their views of striking by public 
school teachers.25 It is probable that Michigan's Republican-dominated legislature found 
it easy to pursue the Hutchinson Act, because it limited the power of DFT and 
representatives of other unions who, on so many occasions supported legislation to which 
Republicans were opposed. The Calahan Bill and the Tax Split Amendment were but two 
measures over which teachers and Republicans battled. 
Detroit-Area Teachers Take Action to Secure Wage Increases 
In Detroit and East Detroit, the lack of a resolution to the sales tax split before 
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April 1947, contributed to anger that had been brewing for some time. This anger 
culminated in decisions in the two school districts to consider other means to secure the 
salary increases they wanted. In this context, teachers in both school districts threatened 
to strike, with teachers in East Detroit making good on that threat.26 
Fortunately for Detroit-area teachers, they received representation from unions 
poised to secure salary increases, even if it meant utilizing the strike. The Detroit 
Federation of Teachers and the East Detroit Federation of Teachers had been founded in 
1931 and 1942 respectively. The DFT had achieved some notable gains in the years 
before its threatened strike in 1947. It obtained a single salary schedule, which equalized 
salaries between elementary and high school teachers and pressured the school board to 
eliminate the policy that denied married women promotions. It also gained the sick days 
lost during the Depression and successfully fought for smaller classes. Finally, it 
pressured the school board to provide returning World War II veterans with seniority 
rights and received a commitment from the Detroit School Board that it would not hinder 
the unionization of teachers. These were fairly modest gains, to be sure, but they laid the 
groundwork for more significant ones and motivated increasing numbers of teachers to 
join the DFT, thereby increasing the union’s power. With the threatened and actual strike 
of the DFT and EDFT in 1947, the labor organizations came to expand their vision of 
what they could accomplish.27 
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Unlike previous years, the Detroit Federation of Teachers and its counterpart in 
East Detroit insisted upon a salary increase in 1947. For the next academic year, the DFT 
demanded an increase of between $500 and $600 more per year than what teachers 
received previously. The East Detroit Federation of Teachers began their campaign for a 
salary increase in October 1946. That school year, teacher salaries ranged from $1,800 to 
$2,650 for teachers with a bachelors’ degree; and the teacher union sought a pay scale of 
$2,200 to $3,600. The school boards in Detroit and East Detroit sympathized with the 
teachers, albeit in a patronizing tone, but they argued that the resources to increase the 
teachers’ pay were not available.28 
 The school board's responses did not sit well with these teachers’ unions and how 
could they? Teachers could not obtain overtime, as had other workers during the war. In 
1946, inflation, which already was growing at a fast pace, received fuel when war-time 
price controls were lifted. In addition, federal income taxes continued to rise in order to 
off-set wartime debts and postwar needs. These additional economic burdens helped to 
fuel teacher anger, which had been brewing throughout a war during which they had 
endured sacrifices.29 Something had to give. 
With this backdrop, teachers and their representatives adopted a strategy they 
previously avoided. In meetings convened by the Detroit Federation of Teachers and East 
Detroit Federation of Teachers, teachers turned out in large numbers to voice their 
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frustration over low pay and the dismissive response of local school boards. The strike 
vote that the DFT took on February 15, 1947, revealed that out of the 5,978 votes cast, 
4,108 favored a strike, if the school board could not agree to an acceptable increase. The 
more conservative Detroit Teachers Association, which opposed strikes, debated the 
legitimacy of the vote tally; but even non-unionized school employees agreed not to cross 
DFT’s picket lines should that organization decide to strike. In East Detroit, the South 
Macomb News reported that on three different occasions between 300 and 500 people 
attended meetings in support of the teachers’ demands. As in Detroit, non-teaching staff 
of the school system agreed not to cross the teachers’ picket lines.30 
 As part of their strategy, Detroit-area teachers’ unions made use of local media. 
Despite editorials, particularly in Detroit, condemning the idea of a strike, teachers made 
their grievances known. Their letters to the editor spoke of the teachers’ many years of 
unrewarded dedication and financial desperation, which forced many to seek employment 
in better-paying fields or second jobs to supplement their poor salaries. Teachers’ leaders 
made themselves readily available to the media. They were quoted widely. When they 
were not quoted, teachers took out advertisements voicing their objections to the 
treatment they had received and pushing proposals for improvement. Mirel notes that in 
1947, the DFT “released a report on thirty-five municipal occupations showing that, since 
1934-35, all of the cited occupations except dogcatchers had received substantially higher 
salary increases than teachers.”31 Moreover the DFT “publicized the results of a Detroit 
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News poll that found more than 80 percent of the Detroiters surveyed favored higher 
salaries for teachers.”32   
 In East Detroit, the teachers’ garnered support from the Citizens Committee. This 
organization, comprised of parents of school-age children, sought to pressure the school 
board to meet with them and the teachers and circulated petitions for the removal of 
school board members. When the Citizens Committee found the school board 
unresponsive, members urged the removal of the school board by engaging in a campaign 
to have them replaced during the July 1947 school board elections. The efforts of the 
Citizens Committee met with success. As reported in a Macomb daily newspaper, 
“Incumbent Board of Education members Owen A. Kern and Arthur F. Rausch were 
defeated in bids for re-election at the annual school meeting in East Detroit.”33 Their 
replacements? Two board members supported by the Citizens Committee.34 
The support for the teachers played an important part in the outcome of the strike 
and strike threat among teachers in Detroit and East Detroit. In his book on public sector 
workers, historian Joseph Slater makes the point that the success of such strikes was 
contingent upon support from the citizenry. Many unions within the public sector, he 
argues, refrain from taking the gamble and seek other means to resolve outstanding 
issues. I947, however, unions enjoyed a certain level of respect within many 
communities, which aided them in their efforts.35  
With the meetings called, strike votes taken, pickets organized and citizens’ 
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groups motivated to act, teachers harnessed the power capable of forcing Detroit’s City 
Council and the East Detroit School Board to find and allocate the money necessary to 
raise teachers’ salaries. While the salary increase fell short of what the teachers’ unions 
originally demanded, both organizations accepted the new terms. Detroit’s teachers had 
reason to be pleased, because they received a retroactive raise in pay for the 1946-1947 
school year, in addition to an increase for the subsequent school year. As for East Detroit, 
its teachers did not receive pay for one of the two weeks they were on strike; and their 
$400.00 increases would not become effective until the following school year.36 Still, 
their outcome could have been worse. 
The Republican-Dominated Legislature Responds to Teacher Activism 
As teachers engaged in these job actions, members of the Republican-dominated 
Michigan legislature took notice of what they must have perceived as a troublesome 
urban-focused and labor-oriented activity 90 miles from the capital. Tensions already 
existed between business and rural interests on the one hand and labor and urban interests 
on the other, with the center being issues of taxation. With this background, it would have 
been odd had the Republican-dominated legislature dismissed these job actions taking 
place in their backyard.  Since teachers were employees of local governments and, by 
extension, subject to disciplinary actions by state government, these lawmakers did what 
they do best. They passed a law. In this case, it was House Bill 418 outlawing strikes 
among public employees. The act went beyond merely outlawing public sector strikes. It 
stipulated that public employees who went out on strike would be considered terminated. 
If their supervisors saw fit, they could be rehired, but only with the stipulation that their 
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salaries would not be increased in the succeeding year. Moreover, striking employees 
would be on probation for two years. A measure intended to intimidate and limit the 
power of public sector unions and their leaders, the law allowed for fines and jail time for 
non public sector employees who encouraged public sector workers to strike.37 
Michigan State House member, J. Edward Hutchinson, who lent his name to the 
bill, hailed from Fennville, Michigan, a small town in Western Allegan County. From the 
nineteenth century, the Hutchinsons were principal owners of the local bank, and of 
companies specializing in milling, electric light, insecticide, and canning. These 
businesses supported the agricultural industry that dominated Fennville and its 
surrounding county.38 Born in Fennville in 1914, J. Edward Hutchinson attended its local 
schools before pursuing undergraduate and law degrees from the University of Michigan. 
After serving five years in the Army, he was elected to the same seat in the Michigan 
House that his grandfather, George Leland, had occupied earlier in the century.39  
In 1947, at 31, Hutchinson began his freshman term as a Republican 
representative of Western Allegan County and immediately began proposing legislation. 
His first bill reflected the anti-communist fervor of the times. Had it passed, it would 
have required “minor parties to get at least 100 signatures in at least 42 counties on 
petitions to regain a place on the ballot.” Hutchinson’s intent was clear – to keep the 
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Communist Party and other third parties off the Michigan ballot.40 The growing intensity 
of the Cold War notwithstanding, Hutchinson’s bill did not secure the necessary votes for 
passage. In contrast, the anti-strike bill that bore Hutchinson’s name received the 
necessary support. Hutchinson later commented that he was no more instrumental in the 
bill’s success than were the 16 other house members, all Republicans, who sponsored it. 
Indeed, Detroit's local media quoted Senator Harry Hittle and Edward Frey in connection 
with the bill’s support more often than it did Hutchinson.41 Hutchinson’s rural allegiances 
and class pedigree were key to the bill’s passage, as he represented interests typically 
antagonistic towards the public sector that was prominent in large cities like Detroit. 
Co-sponsors of the Hutchinson Act varied in terms of their geographic location, 
the length of their service in the legislature, and their vocations. Five came from Wayne 
County, where public sector workers were much more in evidence, and the site of the 
threatened and actual strike of public school teachers. Like Hutchinson, other sponsors 
came from rural sections of the state. Four attorneys and three farmers represented the 
group of sponsors. An engineer, building contractor, hardware merchant retiree and in 
some capacity of the insurance industry filled out the remaining sponsors. 
Like the mixture of districts they represented, the bill’s sponsors ranged in the 
number of years they served in the legislature, from less than four to more than seven 
terms.  Women and African Americans were wholly absent from the list of sponsors, 
unsurprising given that there were no African Americans and only one woman in the 
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Michigan House of Representatives. While Hutchinson Act sponsors were diverse in 
many ways, they held one element in common. All were Republicans, who generally had 
uneasy relationships with and exhibited anxieties about organized labor and taxes, a point 
reflected in the Hutchinson Act.42 With the law's provisions against strikes, it had obvious 
implications for public sector workers, who derived their wages from the tax base. It is 
little wonder that the Hutchinson Act received strong support from the Republican-
dominated legislature. 
Many viewed the Hutchinson Bill as a knee-jerk response to the conflicts that had 
transpired between teachers and school boards. Had there been machinery in place to 
allow for collective bargaining in the public sector, it would have been less likely that the 
post-World War II strikes would have occurred in the first place. The Detroit School 
board, however, was not comfortable with collective bargaining; so teachers in Detroit 
and elsewhere believed that they had no recourse but to consider a strike as a legitimate 
method to secure wage increases. That the AFT had a no-strike policy in times of peace 
and war mattered little to beleaguered teachers, who believed that they had no other 
option to resolve long-standing problems.43 
 Still, many teachers felt uncomfortable with striking. Many of them had abided by 
the no-strike philosophy of the AFT and hesitated before joining or participating in an 
organization that might strike. That the organization went without striking for the first 24 
years of its existence beginning in 1916 says something about how ingrained the idea was 
of withholding the strike as a weapon. In the 14 subsequent years, however, teachers 
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nationwide took to the pavement on 97 separate occasions. By the mid 1940s, then, 
teachers and their unions began questioning the time-honored no-strike policy even as 
they remained ambivalent about it. More specifically, the AFT continued to support its 
no-strike policy but refused to discipline those locals that used the strike to accomplish 
their ends. Teacher ambivalence towards striking was on the wane.44 
Apparently, Michigan teachers did not anticipate the state legislature pursuing 
anything on the level of a Hutchinson Act, even though it was their activism that 
motivated it. In the spring of 1947, when Michigan lawmakers debated this anti-strike 
bill, teachers in Detroit and elsewhere had other legislative concerns. That New York had 
passed an anti-strike law directed at its public sector did not prompt them to consider that 
Michigan might take a similar turn.45 
The manner in which bills are conceived, introduced, debated and signed into law 
is an often circuitous one, characterized by the slow pace of the legislative process. 
Within this process, there are forces both internal and external to the legislature, which 
push, pull and mold bills into law or discard them before governors can render their 
judgment. To observe the Hutchinson Bill as it became a law is to better understand how 
these forces and this process operates.46  
 Hutchinson's effort received wide support within the legislature.  The bill, as 
Hutchinson originally submitted it, contained language wholly eliminated from the final 
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version. Other amendments lessened the penalties for striking, as when the Senate asked 
that the bill reduce from three years to one year the time before those who violated its 
provisions could receive a wage increase if they regained their positions. The Senate also 
requested that the number of years any such employee remain on probation decrease from 
five to two years. Finally, the Senate approved language allowing for mediation between 
disputing parties when called for by a majority of the employees in question, “or upon 
request of any public official in charge of such employees...” Whatever compassion the 
state senate exhibited with these provisions was eroded by other provisions. Specifically, 
the senate approved to levy as much as a $1,000 fine and one year prison sentence for 
“[a]ny person not a public employee who shall knowingly incite, agitate, influence, 
coerce, or urge a public employee to strike...,” clearly a reference to organized labor.47 
 Even before the original bill left the House Labor Committee, the body of nine 
Republicans and no Democrats eliminated the provision that called for the electorate to 
endorse it provisions.48 The Republican-dominated legislature recently had lost in a 
referendum, resulting in a tax split that many of them had opposed. With overwhelming 
support for House Bill 418, supporters must have determined that allowing this extra step 
was not worth the risk. Wide support for the bill was reflected in a final vote showing that 
81 house members voted for it, with only three voting against and eight members 
abstaining.49 
Forces Supporting the Demands of Detroit-Area Teachers 
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The immediate causes for the Hutchinson Act were obvious. At the top of the list 
were the strike threat and the actual strike of public school teachers in Detroit and East 
Detroit respectively. Many state legislators saw these actions as brazen and unwarranted 
attempts to undermine the power of state and local governments over employees. These 
job actions, however, existed in a larger context, one that buoyed the aspirations of 
Detroit teachers, even as they created anxiety within the state legislature. That larger 
framework included the wave of teacher strikes taking place in numerous cities 
throughout the United States in 1946 and 1947. The Detroit City Council and Detroit 
Mayor Jeffries must have appreciated the momentum on which the Detroit teachers were 
building when they decided that conceding to most of the teachers’ demands was in their 
best interest.50  
If the Jeffries’ administration required more evidence before responding to the 
proposed strike in Detroit, all it needed to do was to review the stream of correspondence, 
telegrams, and postcards that Mayor Jeffries received from citizens voicing their near 
universal support of the teachers and their request for salary increases. Often describing 
themselves as property-owning taxpayers, these Detroiters repeatedly argued the 
teachers’ case. They understood that qualified teachers needed raises to meet the high 
cost of living lest they leave the profession altogether. In this way, Manie Langley’s letter 
to Jeffries captured the essence of what others wrote in their letters to the mayor. As she 
explained, “A parent, taxpayer and woman intensely interested in civic affairs in my own 
right…, I urge you[, Mayor Jeffries,] to do everything in your power to help prevent a 
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teachers’ strike by granting them their entirely justified raise. We want the best public 
school system our money can buy.”51 Another letter, written by Bernice Howell, an 
officer of the League of Women Voters, likened a good education to food and 
encouraged Jeffries to accept the Board of Education’s budget that included a raise for 
Detroit teachers. Her argument that Detroit teachers needed a salary increase was 
informed by research she conducted about the plight of teachers throughout the nation.52 
Clearly, she had read about teachers striking for increased salaries across the nation and 
placed Detroit teachers in that context. Others who wrote to Jeffries were similarly 
informed. 
One strike that was remarkable occurred in Buffalo, New York. Involving 2,400 
teachers, 79 schools and 72,000 children, the strike of Buffalo teachers was the largest 
teachers' strike in the United States at the time. New York Governor Thomas Dewey 
called for and, ultimately, signed into law what is commonly referred to as the Condon-
Wadlin Act. Like the later Hutchinson Act, the law prohibited strikes among government 
employees of New York State. So popular was this legislation among Republican state 
legislators throughout the country that many of them modeled legislation in their states 
on the New York law. On July 3, 1947, Michigan became one of those states.53  
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Teacher activism in Buffalo, Detroit, and other major cities was not the only 
factor that compelled the Michigan State Legislature to pass the Hutchinson Act. It was, 
however, probably the most important ingredient that pushed Michigan lawmakers to 
pursue this legislation.54 As these lawmakers deliberated the components of the 
Hutchinson Bill, they made reference as well to street railway workers and their efforts to 
win concessions in pay and classification from the Detroit Street Railway Commission. 
In the Detroit daily papers, journalists made frequent references to the actions of Detroit 
Street Railway workers as what helped to prompt lawmakers to pursue anti-strike 
legislation directed toward public sector employees. “’If we pass this bill,” Republican 
Senator Wood argued in discussing the pending Hutchinson bill, “DSR employes [sic] 
cannot go on strike and the 75 per cent of the factory workers who are forced to stay at 
home when the DSR stops running can now be assured of a day’s wages.’”55 In 
discussing the bill, a Detroit daily newspaper maintained that, “The measure would have 
sweeping effect in Detroit where tieups by DSR and other public employees have been 
frequent.”56 
Hutchinson Bill Debated in the Legislature 
 Before the Hutchinson Bill made its way to the governor’s desk for his signature, 
the measure was subject to the wrangling that characterized the system. Bills up for 
consideration in late May of 1947 were part of the maneuvering between the two houses 
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of the legislature that, for a brief time, left the work of the legislature undone. On May 
27, the Detroit News reported that members of the Michigan House boycotted the 
legislative process in response to their colleagues in the Senate, who had taken on a 
“‘pompous’ policy of killing House bills so that similar measures sponsored by senators 
could become law.”57 Despite the wrangling in the legislature, there was one bill that had 
garnered enough popularity within both houses; and that bill was the Hutchinson Bill. 
What the Detroit News had not reported was the irony of a chamber of the state 
legislature conducting a boycott, even as it sought legislation preventing other public 
sector employees from withholding their labor. 
The Hutchinson Bill inspired some opposition within the legislature, and even 
from some Republican state senators. Republicans from Jackson, Bay City, and seven 
other districts opposed the Hutchinson Bill. The Detroit Times quoted Senator Nichols of 
Jackson as arguing that “‘[t]his bill is a grave mistake for the Republican Party and it 
makes us look as though we are out to cripple labor.'”58 Bay City Republican Senator 
Heath had equally harsh words for the proposed bill: “’This is cockeyed legislation 
because we are taking away the rights of certain employes [sic] unnecessarily,’” he 
began. “‘We have never had strikes of state employes [sic] and there is no good reason 
for this bill.’” 59  Indeed, the strikes and threatened strikes that motivated legislators to 
pursue this legislation were teachers and, to a lesser degree, streetcar workers, which 
were local government employees. 
When opponents of the bill realized that their efforts to stop the bill would not 
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succeed, they changed tactics and sought amendments to soften the bill’s affects. 
Senators Clarence Reid (R) and Joseph Brown (D), both of Detroit, sought amendments 
making it lawful for public sector employees to organize and bargain as well as a 
provision requiring compulsory arbitration.60 Their efforts were in vain. These legislators 
saw the bill as punitive, embodying an element of revenge, unnecessarily crippling labor, 
and denying rights to a sector of the work force.  Their arguments, however, did not 
resonate with their colleagues, and their numbers were not large enough to defeat the bill 
before it made its way to the governor’s desk.61 
Republican opposition aside, journalists of the Detroit Times, Detroit News and 
Detroit Free Press acknowledged that elements of the bill were “drastic,” “hard-hitting” 
and “stringent,” citing the bill's anti labor tone.  Editorials in these same papers tell of a 
different story. For them, the bill was necessary.62  
The Political Climate of the Times 
In its own way, the Hutchinson Act reflected the anxieties inherent in the times. 
Michigan legislators could not fully control matters related to taxation, labor unrest, or 
inflation, but public sector workers were another matter. The state presumably had 
sovereignty over its own employees. With the Hutchinson Act, the legislature found a 
way to implement this control. If the word, ‘sovereignty’ never appeared in their remarks, 
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its meaning was manifested as legislators discussed the obligations of public employees 
to honor the public trust. Editorials, responses, and articles in Detroit’s daily newspapers 
that quoted elected officials, or espoused these views independently, considered strikes 
among public employees outrageous. In February 1947, U.S. Senator Arthur Vandenberg 
of Michigan equated such strikes with ‘rebellion’ that could not be tolerated. Voicing 
concerns over communism, the author of one Detroit News editorial argued that the 
proposed Hutchinson Act “deal[s] rather effectively with the opportunity otherwise left 
open to the Commies to heave a gigantic monkey wrench into the machinery of 
government whenever that might suit their unpredictable purposes.” And then later in that 
same editorial, the author argued that, “[t]he sovereign people should be at all times, 
through their government, sovereign. That is a truth that is so elementary as to leave no 
room for argument.” Michigan legislator Harry Hittle of East Lansing, a major sponsor of 
the bill, argued that, “we cannot permit minority groups to suspend the activities of 
Government.” Another editorial, this one specifically regarding Detroit teachers was 
equally adamant. “…if there is recognition of the right of any public servant to strike, the 
beginning of the end of government as we know it is upon us.” Many legislators could 
not even envision the right of collective bargaining for public sector employees. For 
them, the idea of collective bargaining implied the possibility of strikes, which 
compromised the idea of the state’s sovereignty over public employees.63  
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Although the term 'sovereignty' possessed an archaic tone, it also possessed a 
relevance to issues of collective bargaining in the public sector and to strikes in that 
sector of the work force. Lawmakers often took the position that unions, collective 
bargaining, and strikes deprived lawmakers of making the decisions that were inherent in 
their offices. Inherent in public work, moreover, was a trust that did not exist in the 
private sector. Competition in the private sector involved companies producing or 
providing the same products or services, and consumers could patronize one 
manufacturer when and if its competitors no longer met their needs. Not so in the public 
sector. Services provided by the public sector often had monopoly status. Not only were 
the revenues generated for public service work derived from a tax base supplied by the 
citizenry, but the monopoly of government in providing certain services meant that the 
public often had few alternative sources for those services. When, therefore, people paid 
their taxes, they did it with the understanding that the revenue from those taxes would 
pay for the education of their children, removal of their garbage, and for public safety 
among others.64 When public officials spoke out against collective bargaining, the 
resolution of grievances, and especially strikes, they were voicing their anxieties about 
the loss of or impediments to sovereignty that these activities suggested. For public 
officials and others, no third party should be able to mediate the relationship between 
public sector workers and the elected or appointed officials that directed and supervised 
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their work or the wages, conditions, and benefits of that work.65 
At the same time, without workers having the right to strike, state and local 
agencies possessed little incentive to consider their legitimate concerns. In addition, there 
were no laws that ensured that teachers and other public sector employees would receive 
the pay that they deserved. There were some who argued that the Hutchinson Act was 
enacted for reasons other than issues of sovereignty but rather as a means of “taking 
revenge against government employees because we cannot control the strikes of other 
laboring men,” as one senator said.66 
The criticism was legitimate. About six weeks before the Hutchinson Bill was 
passed and signed into law, some 250,000 people demonstrated in downtown Detroit’s 
Cadillac Square to protest against the federal Taft-Hartley Act. More than a law 
advancing the agenda of business interests, with its significant restrictions on organizing, 
collective bargaining, strikes, and the banning of communists as union officers, the Taft-
Hartley Act grew from and contributed to anti-labor forces in the United States. In the 
year of 1945-1946, the United States experienced a strike wave among private sector 
workers unlike any other. Although simultaneous massive strikes were not as common in 
the spring of 1947 as they had been the year before, the memory of those job actions 
remained lodged in the public consciousness as well as in that of the Michigan State 
Legislature. With this in mind, some would argue, came a propensity to react harshly to a 
public sector over which the legislature believed they should be able to more fully 
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control.67 
Organized Labor's Opposition to the Hutchinson Bill 
Opponents of the Hutchinson Bill existed outside of the Michigan State 
Legislature as well. Unable to influence an intransigent Republican-dominated state 
legislature and governor to block the bill from becoming a law, opponents bickered 
amongst themselves as to what constituted the most effective way of stopping the bill. 
One such quarrel took place during the proceedings of the ninth Michigan CIO 
convention of June 16-18, 1947. In response to a report made by Ken Morris, the 
chairman of the publicity committee, Yale Stuart, a member of the United Public 
Workers of America, complained that the Michigan CIO did little to inform its members 
about the pending Hutchinson bill or to stop it from moving through the legislative 
process.68 Stuart was not an anomaly within the United Public Workers of America. Mort 
Furay, a fellow officer of the union, was even more adversarial regarding the Hutchinson 
bill. Desirous of testing the constitutionality of the bill in making it a criminal offense for 
labor leaders to urge government employees to strike, Furay said he would purposely 
“incite” a strike.69 Michigan CIO President Gus Scholle agreed. In his analysis of the bill, 
he argued that,  
[t]his bill attempts to isolate public employees from the rest 
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of the community by making it ellegal [sic] for any citizen 
to recommend to a public employee that he join a union 
and strike if necessary. This provision is clearly 
unconstitutional since it denies the rights of free speech and 
free assembly. It even denies a newspaper the right to print 
an editorial stating that in a particular case public 
employees should organize and strike.70 
 
In addition, UAW President Walter Reuther came out in opposition to the bill. He 
met with Michigan Republican Governor Kim Sigler in an unsuccessful effort to pressure 
the governor to veto the bill, which had already passed both houses of the Michigan 
Legislature. Reuther ascribed a certain amount of importance to the Hutchinson bill and 
its myriad implications. 
Reuther’s interest in the Hutchinson Bill may have not been limited to issues of 
labor, although this was almost certainly his main consideration. There were, perhaps, 
more personal interests. Simply put, his wife, May, was a public school teacher and card-
carrying member of the Detroit Federation of Teachers. An avowed socialist, “she taught 
in one of Detroit’s most racially integrated public schools, where she was indefatigable in 
her efforts to build a strong teachers’ union.”71 It would have been difficult, then, for the 
discussion within the Reuther household to have avoided the subject while Michigan 
legislators deliberated a law largely inspired by Detroit area teacher activism. Besides, it 
was well known that Walter and May Reuther discussed everything together.72 
Michigan's Governor Kim Sigler Enters the Fray 
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Walter Reuther must have known that his efforts were unlikely to persuade the 
governor. Even if Sigler decided to veto the bill, there existed enough votes in the 
legislature to override his veto. And yet for nearly three hours Reuther and Sigler, who 
had never met each other before, debated the merits of the Hutchinson Bill and other 
labor-related bills, along with labor unrest in the state and the nation. Reuther complained 
that simple answers could not be legislated and argued that the Hutchinson Bill would 
only “aggravate rather than remove the basic causes of industrial unrest.” Sigler 
disagreed. “For 1,000 years,” he argued, “controversies have been solved through some 
sort of law…And labor-management problem[s], no different from other controversies, 
will be solved by law.”73  
It is curious that Sigler even bothered to meet with Reuther about this or any other 
matter. A week and a half before, Reuther and other UAW officers, including R.J. 
Thomas and George Addes, had sent Sigler a telegram asking the governor to veto the 
bill. In response, Sigler invited the men to his office to discuss the matter. None of them 
kept the appointment. Sigler was particularly angered and said as much. “When a fellow 
asks a girl out and she stands him up,” he was reported to have said, “he doesn’t usually 
call her anymore.” While Sigler did not necessarily call Reuther, he did agree to meet 
with him subsequent to the original appointment.74 
Sigler’s meeting with Reuther was not the only meeting the governor would have 
with labor leaders about the Hutchinson Bill. On July 1, 1947, three days before he 
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signed the bill into law, Sigler met with about twelve other labor leaders. Contrary to the 
methods used elsewhere by public employees, these labor leaders complained that a law 
inhibiting the right of any workers to strike was not beneficial to any party concerned. 
Frances Comfort of the Detroit Federation of Teachers said it best. In discussing the 
recent job actions undertaken by Detroit teachers, she argued that, “occasionally such 
actions or threatened actions are necessary when despotic officials either elected or 
appointed absolutely refuse to meet with their employes (sic).”75  
Discussions that Sigler had with Reuther, Comfort, or other Detroit labor leaders, 
however illuminating they may have been, did not help their cause. Sigler’s parting 
words after his meeting with Reuther did not reflect a ringing endorsement of the views 
espoused by opponents of the bill. “I’ll do the best I can,” he is reported to have said, 
“but somebody is going to be disappointed.”  Needless to say, the disappointment would 
reside with public sector workers and those working on their behalf.76 
 Sigler's willingness to sign the bill may have reflected his political ambitions. 
Elected governor following his appointment as the special prosecutor in a series of high 
profile cases involving bribery, contempt of court, and murder, he had designs on the 
presidency of the United States. Indeed, Sigler looked to Thomas Dewey, himself a 
presidential hopeful, as a guide to that highest office, as Dewey had been a high profile 
prosecutor and New York Governor before pursuing the presidency. The similarities did 
not end there. Following Dewey's example with the Condlin-Wadlin Act prohibiting 
public sector strikes, Sigler did the same with the Hutchinson Act.77  
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 In the context of the Hutchinson Act, and with his sights fixed on higher office, 
Sigler may have looked back on another event for inspiration. In 1919, that is, a strike of 
public sector workers, in this case Boston police officers, “launched the national political 
career of then future president [Calvin] Coolidge.”78 Coolidge strongly opposed the 
efforts of striking police officers and, as historian Joseph Slater explains, “denounce[d] 
all public sector unions.”79 It is likely that Sigler knew about the 1919 Boston police 
strike, given that it “was routinely cited by courts and officials through the end of the 
1940s.”80 Perhaps the ambitious Sigler saw his support of the Hutchinson Act as playing 
to an audience interested in his relocation to Washington. After all, the office of the 
governor offered too many restrictions and frustrations for an attorney used to making 
decisions unchecked by the legislature or other entities. The Hutchinson Act, after all, 
allowed Sigler to make a decision without any such restrictions and to possibly reap 
political rewards for it in the future. Sigler lost his re-election bid as governor and lacked 
the popularity within his own party to pursue the presidency. Despite his failure, Sigler’s 
signing the bill into law reshaped public sector work for the next 18 years.81 
Conclusion 
 Michigan's Democratic Party experienced something of a resurgence under the 
leadership of G. Mennen Williams and even more of one after Republicans lost much of 
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their power, following the reapportionment of the legislature in the mid 1960s. In 1947, 
however, Democrats held little power in the legislature; and progressive forces suffered 
with the rightward turn of the country in the Cold War era. With this background, it is 
understandable that the Hutchinson Act experienced little difficulty in getting passed.82 
Following its enactment, the Act inspired little comment, not until 1951, that is. In that 
year, Detroit Mayor Albert Cobo deployed it as he sought a resolution to a strike 
conducted by the Detroit Street Railway. It is that story that the next chapter concerns. 
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Chapter Two 
The 1951 Strike of the Detroit Street Railway Workers 
 According to George Fox, the role of transportation, “is so vital to modern 
civilization that it has become more than a service function – it has become a partner of 
the government, the commerce, and the society which it serves and represents the 
occupation and livelihood of a large section of the population as well.”1 Local 
transportation systems reflect this importance. They move people to and from 
workplaces, schools, commercial outlets, and cultural and social functions, and help meet 
the needs of riders fulfilling social commitments to friends and families. This was true of 
Detroit in 1951, when the use of cars had not yet achieved the widespread use that they 
would in later years. When, Detroit Street Railway workers engaged in a strike 
demanding wage increases and maintenance of fringe benefits, they paralyzed the city in 
a way little else could. As a result, city officials used the newly passed Hutchinson Act to 
force Detroit Street Railway workers back to work. In the hands of Detroit Mayor Albert 
Cobo and his administration, the law comprised a force, which DSR workers and their 
union could not withstand. 
 The 1951 strike of Detroit Street Railway Workers had far-reaching implications 
for the city. Because it substantively affected the whole of the city, the strike must be 
viewed from numerous perspectives to understand what happened, why it happened, and 
the strike’s wider meaning. The law existed in the constellation of these other elements, 
largely dictating how the conflict between Division 26 of the Amalgamated Association 
of Street, Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employees of America, (A.F.L.) and its 
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members, on the one hand, and the city of Detroit, on the other, moved to some sort of 
resolution. The Hutchinson Act drew from and was inescapably connected to these other 
elements. The law shaped the actions of the Detroit Street Railway Commission, the 
Mayor, and Division 26, and the judicial system, among other actors. Given the context 
of the strike, with a raging cold war, rising inflation, fears about economic security, and 
concern of sovereignty, to mention only a few, the union and its members did not fully 
understand how a strike would provoke public opposition or how the law might be used 
against them. This chapter will reveal that the Hutchinson Act, largely inspired by a spate 
of teacher strikes nationwide, was an effective weapon to defeat the aspirations of 
workers of the Detroit Street Railway and the union that represented them.  
Prelude to a Strike  
Like most other strikes, the 1951 strike of DSR workers had as its cause workers’ 
demand for a wage increase. The strikers aimed to convince the Detroit Street Railway 
Commission and Mayor Albert Cobo that they deserved a raise of 8.5 cents per hour, in 
line with the cost of living, along with improvements to their fringe benefits, namely the 
inclusion of six paid holidays. With Division 26’s contract expiring March 30, 1951, 
union representatives sought to begin negotiations for its 3,500 members in February of 
that year. Negotiations began in March of 1951, but went nowhere. As negotiation 
sessions resumed during and even after the strike, the city agreed to a five-cent raise on 
the condition that the union agree to forego some of the fringe benefits provided in prior 
contracts. Most insulting to the union and its members, the city demanded that the union 
relinquish fringe benefits amounting to the five-cent raise the city was offering, 
essentially making the raise meaningless. For the union and its members, the city’s offer 
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was unacceptable. With the battle lines drawn, the union asked for and received strike 
authorization from its membership after the city cancelled a meeting with state and 
federal mediators on April 17. Four days later, the union’s executive board called the 
strike.2  
In the American context, strikes are such a commonplace phenomena that their 
existence, though annoying and inconvenient, is not necessarily exceptional. The 1951 
strike of 3,500 DSR workers fit within the category of exceptions that union members 
and management seek to avoid whenever possible. Its length, the nature of the service 
that the workforce provided, and the reaction it provoked offer an explanation as to its 
importance. Lasting 59 days, it became “…the longest and most costly transit strike in 
American History…” at that time.3 Given that the DSR transported 700,000 passengers 
twice a day during the weekday, while using 1,700 buses, 350 streetcars and 58 coaches” 
during peak hours,4 it played an integral part in Detroit’s life. The citizens, of the city 
made do without their transportation system by hitching rides or walking, but this 
alternative made for sore feet and traffic jams caused by the increase of cars. A large city 
could not function well under these conditions.5  
The reaction of the city residents is a second reason why this strike embodied an 
importance not found in many other job actions. Like Detroit-area teachers who took to 
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the picket lines four years previously, DSR workers were public employees, managed by 
the people through its elected and appointed officials; and they provided a service that the 
city could not easily replace. Like transit systems elsewhere, the Detroit Street Railways 
held a monopoly status.6 In order for any governmental unit to efficiently and effectively 
operate, the argument runs, it must have sovereign control over its public employees and, 
by extension, cannot allow them to fathom a strike, let alone actually engage in a job 
actions without suffering consequences designed to make the workers think twice before 
considering such an action. 
Legal Action Regarding DSR Workers 
Because citizens hitched rides with willing motorists, parked their cars in 
otherwise illegal locations, walked to and from work, school, and shopping, or refrained 
from doing so because of the lack of transportation, the parties in the dispute sought legal 
means to resolve the conflict.7  There were actually two lawsuits. The first was a suit 
initiated by Avern Cohn. Cohn currently is a federal judge in Detroit, a position he has 
held for over thirty years. In 1947, however, he worked as a lawyer in his father’s firm.8 
In the context of the 1951 Detroit Street Railway strike, he entered the fray as a 
concerned citizen. His issues were two-fold. First, he wanted the DSR workers to return 
to work and pursued litigation to force them to do so via an injunction.9 Few argued that 
he had any complaints with the workers per se, although the injunction did seek to force 
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the workers to do something that they would not have done of their own volition. Cohn 
simply did not like what the strike did to every facet of the city’s existence: “'I think this 
strike has gone far enough,’” the Detroit News quoted him as saying.10 He questioned the 
Hutchinson Act’s mandate to terminate striking public sector workers and asked the court 
to order the striking street railway workers back to work while the parties entered into 
contract negotiations.11  
Cohn served as the plaintiff in the matter, but the designation does not accurately 
capture his role in the litigation. It was his father who had an interest in settling the strike, 
and not the younger Cohn. Like many other law suits, attorneys often play a larger role 
than the actual plaintiff, as it is the lawyer who prepares complaints and pleadings while 
advocating for the plaintiff in open court and/or before the media. As his attorney, the 
elder Cohn was in a better position to advocate for the idea that the bus drivers and 
streetcar drivers should return to work without the city pursuing the full force of 
Hutchinson Act. The elder Cohn may not have believed that the case that he had his son 
bring before the court had much merit, in the legal sense of the word, but he believed 
firmly that the strike debilitated the city. The law aside, its operators had to get back to 
work, given the vital role the streetcars and buses played in the social and economic life 
of the city. This was the kind of person the elder Cohn was, someone who got involved in 
the community and found satisfaction in contributing to its health, even if it meant 
agitating for change.12 
The city sought an injunction of its own against the union, but its efforts were to 
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resume the transportation service, with or without the striking DSR workers. Most 
importantly, the city sought from the court a ruling on its understanding of the 
Hutchinson Act, namely that it was both constitutional and applicable to the 
circumstances. The last suit made its way through the Michigan Circuit Court, the 
Michigan Supreme Court, and the U.S. Supreme Court.13  
Within the provisions of the 1948 Detroit City Charter, which the city originally 
adopted in 1918, the DSR was charged with managing and operating the Detroit Street 
Railways.14 In reality, however, it had limited power to make decisions that conflicted 
with other forces in Detroit’s political structure. This power to resolve the city’s labor 
relations remained with Detroit Mayor Albert Cobo. While the Detroit Street Railway 
Commission, city-contracted attorneys, and negotiators certainly played an important role 
in the negotiations, strike, and legal strategy, Cobo never delegated significant decision-
making authority to any other person or agency. Needless to say, Division 26 and its 
members did not think well of Cobo’s decisions and resented the power that destroyed 
their chances of receiving either pay raises or improved fringe benefits, but there was 
little they could do about it.  
Observers should not have been surprised by Cobo’s position or strategy. He 
entered office having campaigned on one major issue: housing. He vigorously opposed 
public housing and, by extension, catered to white homeowners who feared that public 
housing projects meant that African Americans would move into their neighborhoods 
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and, presumably, decrease the value of their homes. Many white home owners, when 
polled, said they would vote for the popular George Edwards for mayor. Once in the 
voting booths, however, their votes reflected their perceived interests as home owners. 
Because labor organizations, particularly the UAW, actively supported George Edwards 
for mayor, Cobo was under little obligation to recognize the concerns of the street 
railway workers. Having served as a city treasurer previously, Cobo was a fiscal 
conservative who was not receptive to tax increases or, as in the case of transportation, 
fare hikes used to increase wages of Detroit streetcar workers.15 
Division 26 of the Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Railway and 
Motor Coach Employees of America presented data indicating that its members were not 
receiving wage increases consistent with what other city employees received nor 
according to the standards set by the cost of living index or the wage stabilization board. 
City officials countered with statistics that indicated that street railway workers received 
more than any other similarly situated transportation workers in the country when fringe 
benefits were taken into account. Who was telling the truth? They both were, but if letters 
written to Albert Cobo were any indication, the public believed the countless reports from 
the daily newspapers, which backed Cobo in his efforts to break the strike, if not the 
union itself. Which side was “right”, or who the public believed mattered little in a case 
that hinged on a Hutchinson Act, which made no reference to any criteria established by 
the wage stabilization board or to a cost of living index. 
Detroit Mayor Albert Cobo Receives Support  
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As the strike moved from one week to another, Cobo maintained considerable 
support from varied sectors. The press constituted a key segment of the Detroit 
community that provided some of the greatest support to the mayor and his handling of 
the DSR strike. It helped to sway citizens to Cobo's side. The editorial pages of the 
Detroit dailies did not equivocate on the issue of the strike or the Hutchinson Act. With 
titles like “The DSR Strike: Open Defiance,” “No Surrender to Outlaws,” “The Law is 
Plain and Must be Obeyed,” “The Law Must Be Upheld: City Can’t Be Intimidated By 
Threats of Strikers,” “Government by Law, Not Goons,” “DSR’s Men ARE Best Paid in 
U.S.,” and many others too numerous to cite,16 the Detroit dailies took the side of city 
officials and their use of the law against the Detroit Street Railway Workers. As James 
Aronson noted in his book on the cold war and the press, the titles themselves had the 
capacity to shape the opinions of the readers.17 
In one such editorial, the writer argued that, “The strikers by striking have severed 
their employment. That is how the law reads.”18 Another was just as resolute. “…the 
Hutchinson Act is the law of the land so far as Michigan is concerned and, as such, must 
be obeyed.”19 Commenting on the losses suffered by the city as a result of the strike, one 
Detroit Free Press editorial had this to say: “The public could not have been more 
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effectively robbed if the strikers had staged corner holdups.”20 In a particularly graphic 
representation, one cartoon depicted an ill-tempered man with the words, “Illegal 
Transportation Strike,” on his back and wielding a club over a man bearing a forlorn 
expression and beaten down on the sidewalk. He is identified as an, “Innocent Street-Car 
Rider,” and with the caption over him saying, “How Long, O Lord, How Long!”21 
Numerous other editorials are found on the pages of all Detroit dailies. Given the 
potential of the press to influence public opinion, we must acknowledge how these and 
other editorials possibly helped to shape how the public came to understand the 1951 
Detroit Street Railway strike. Given such editorials were regular fixtures on editorial 
pages throughout the course of the strike, it is little wonder that readers would be swayed 
by their arguments. 
The editorials addressing the strike adopted a consistent anti-strike tone. Former 
UAW President Douglas Fraser, who was a rising star within the UAW and the Detroit 
labor movement at the time, believed that the Detroit dailies more than likely picked and 
chose from among the sources until they found support for their generally conservative 
perspective. The Detroit Labor News almost certainly did the same. Given its limited 
circulation and weekly publication, it was not capable of fomenting public opinion to the 
extent that the three Detroit dailies did.22 
It is not clear why Detroiters took umbrage with striking street railway workers in 
1951, while they largely supported Detroit-area teachers in their bid for pay raises four 
years before. It may be that the strike of street railway workers directly affected a larger 
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array of people than did the strike of Detroit-area teachers. Indeed, the street railway 
strike made it difficult for people to get to and from work or fuel the economy in other 
ways. The four years that separated the two strikes may have contributed to how the 
public perceived the two events. While the Taft-Hartley Act reflected a definite anti-
union mood that reverberated throughout the country, unions still enjoyed some level of 
support from the general public in 1947 when the Congress enacted Taft-Hartley and 
Detroit-area teacher unions pressured their school boards to raise their salaries. By 1951, 
however, support for organized labor began to wane. The editorials regarding the Detroit 
Street Railway strike reflected this change in atmosphere.23 
When their otherwise diverse voices operate in unison and in an open manner, 
those who comprise the public have a power unmatched by most any other force. The 
power of public opinion clearly manifested itself in the letters that Mayor Cobo received 
as well as letters to the editor that similarly voiced opinions about the strike and Cobo’s 
handling of it. Fortunately for Cobo, he received overwhelming support from those who 
wrote him. Echoing the opinions voiced in the editorials of the Detroit dailies, Detroiters 
supported Cobo and his position on the Street Railway workers. “You are right in 
standing firmly on your convictions and insisting on obedience to law,” one Detroiter 
said in his letter to Cobo.24 Another wrote in order “to congratulate you on your stand! 
Don’t back down! Law and order must win.”25 Writing in the final days of the strike, 
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Henry Beam, vice president of Anchor Steel and Conveyor Company, said, “I am glad 
that Detroit has a Mayor who believes in living by the law and seeing that it is 
enforced.”26 R. Schmidt shared some advice, with which Cobo would have certainly been 
in agreement. “The Hutchinson Act is your club,” he said. “I and a lot of D.S.R. 
Maintenance workers and supervisors hope you can and will keep swinging it…Winning 
this strike will save you many headaches in the future.”27 Even some professed union 
members supported Cobo. “Hold the fort!” a member of Local 600 argued. “You’re on 
solid ground.”28 “Many of us workers at the Dodge Plant talk this strike over almost 
every morning and I have yet to hear anyone who is in favor of the strikers,” another one 
commented.29 If accurate, the comment spoke volumes. As the success of strikes are often 
determined by their support from other unions, the letters reflected poorly on the efforts 
of the striking DSR workers to solicit public support. To Cobo’s benefit, this letter and 
the overwhelming number and percentage of the hundreds of others he received, voiced 
approval of his position and methods. 
Occasionally, he received petitions from Detroit residents. One, signed by 13 
residents, opened by saying that, “The undersigned want you to know that we are solidly 
with you concerning the D.S.R. strike. It is purely a question of whether we are to be 
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governed by law or unions. We contend it should be law.”30 Frank Day Smith and Duane 
Mosier, writing on behalf of the Federated Civic Associations of Northwest Detroit, 
encouraged Cobo to continue his fight against the Detroit Street Railway workers: “You 
upheld the law as you were bound to do…”31 Edward Benscoe and Arthur Wood of the 
Detroit Republican Club had this to say about the strike and Cobo’s position on it: “If the 
streetcar men can strike, so can the firemen, the policemen, the garbage men and the 
employees of the Public Lighting Commission,” they wrote, suggesting that a law 
prohibiting all public employees was necessary.32 
Organizations and individuals did not stand alone in the opposition of the public 
to the strike. Business groups also chimed in to give support to Cobo as regards the strike. 
Signed by five people, one letter read, “We congratulate you upon your courage in 
standing firm in upholding the Hutchinson Law. We are losing money personally, and in 
our business, but feel that if the law is broken for the benefit of the bus drivers this time, 
we shall be in jeopardy from them again and from other public workers who supply the 
necessities of life.”33 Writing on behalf of the Retail Merchants Association, Charles E. 
Boyd wrote about the numerous meetings his organization had about the strike and its 
impact on its members. “Those meetings,” he said, “were held to a minimum in number 
and duration because a number of retailers were insistent that no word should go out of 
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those meetings other than evidencing support of the position which you have been taking 
during this strike period of maintaining the law.”34 These letters represent only a fraction 
of those sent to Cobo. Given that the life of Detroit significantly revolved around the 
health of its commercial enterprises, these letters and others must have encouraged Cobo 
to continue a position and strategy in opposition to that of Division 26 and its members. 
The letters of support emboldened Cobo in his approach to the DSR strike, as 
evidenced by his response. “Thanks greatly for your expression of confidence, which is 
very pleasing to me,” he wrote in response to one individual. “As long as people are 
interested enough to make their views known to those in public office,” he continued, 
“we can be assured of a responsive government.”35 In this case, the responsiveness of 
government depended upon the extent to which letter writers reflected views already held 
by Cobo himself. Otherwise, Cobo’s response would have had a markedly different tone. 
Whatever the case, it would have been difficult for him to have taken the position he did 
had the public refrained from supporting him. 
The Cold War mentality behind many of the letters did not help the cause of the 
strikers. It was an era of loyalty oaths, blacklistings, and allegations of treasonable acts 
and of espionage, all centered around the “Red Menace,” a phrase regularly used in 
headlines and public discourse. The Cold War had grown with intensity both 
domestically and internationally since its unofficial beginning four years before. Any 
time a public official, in this case Wisconsin Senator Joseph McCarthy, could make the 
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now-infamous claim that he held the names of 205 communists who worked in the State 
Department without naming them, one could argue that a widespread paranoia and 
irrational fear permeated the polity.36 With unions and their workers so often excoriated 
by large segments of the country as communists, particularly in Detroit, DSR workers 
and their union fought an uphill and, ultimately, impossible battle. The anti-communist 
sentiment of the immediate post World War II period manifested itself in particular ways 
in Detroit. 
Detroit targeted those of its public employees suspected of being members of the 
Communist Party. Supported by Mayor Van Antwerp and the Civil Service Commission 
Secretary, not to mention the Detroit News and other Detroit officials, Detroit citizens 
voted in favor of a referendum that allowed the city to investigate suspected communists 
in 1949. The city did not stop with this referendum. “The Common Council followed up 
the Charter-amendment victory by appointing a Loyalty Commission and an advisory 
Loyalty Committee, which consisted of seven dependable citizens.”37 The Council’s 
action led one citizen to write Cobo regarding the strike, asking him to use this 
commission “to thoroughly investigate the complete situation.”38 Gilbert Piks held 
similar views. In his letter to Cobo, he maintained that, “I am willing to walk 10 miles a 
day instead of letting the union take over. To me the union are like a bunch of Reds and 
poor Americans.”39 Little evidence exists to suggest that there were communists in the 
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rank and file of Division 26 or among its officers, but the power of suggestion as 
prompted by the press and believed by many made it difficult for Division 26 to receive a 
fair hearing.40 
U.S. entry into the Korean War the year before the Detroit Street Railway strike 
reflected its efforts to stop the spread of communism and, in its own way, added to 
concerns that many had about the strike. “All I hear is ‘strike,’ one GI in Korea 
commented.  
Why don’t people back home Wake up? They [i.e., DSR 
strikers] strike when they could be sending equipment to us 
over here, to help win this war…The DSR strike holds up 
the guys who make part of the M1 rifle, or the ones who 
make part of a tank or an engine. That could change the 
war altogether.41 
While the city did not employ nearly as many war-related industries at the time of the 
DSR strike as it did during World War II, it still remained an important industry. Its 
importance is reflected in the comments of this GI.42 
The reason why the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service sought to enter 
the strike, a fray that was essentially local, resulted from the possibility that Detroit’s 
contribution to the war industry would be hampered by a strike that prevented workers 
from getting to work. Reports appearing in the daily newspapers, moreover, complained 
about the significant decrease in blood donations used for U.S. Military personnel in the 
Korean War due to the strike, as would-be donors often had no transportation to get to 
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and from American Red Cross donation centers.43  
In its own way, attacks on sovereignty and support of the communist threat 
morphed into one another as threats to the state were masked as efforts of communists to 
compromise and overthrow the government. A number of letters to Cobo during the 
strike expressed these sentiments. “…[I]f the unions which in my estimation is nothing 
but communists under disguise is allowed to defy the laws then you and I will and all of 
us will be in danger.”44 “…[I]n our desire to protest a small minority interest,” another 
Detroiter wrote Cobo, “we sometimes overlook the sovereign rights of an entire 
people.”45 While most Detroiters corresponding with Cobo about the strike never used 
the word, “sovereignty” in their remarks, the idea of the government‘s sovereign rights 
rang loudly, as when Lester Larkin suggested that, “…now is the time to decide whether 
the city will operate the system or surrender abjectly to domination by its employee.”46 
Others expressed similar sentiments.47 
As revealed in chapter one, Cobo may have benefited politically from his stance 
on the strike of Detroit Street Railway workers in the same way others had before him. A 
letter from one Detroiter made this point. “As a citizen and tax payer of this city, I wish 
to advise you that if you yeal (sic) and turn this city over to the union to run it, we might 
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as well look for a city like Boston, Mass. where Gov. Coolidge once established law and 
order which made him famous in the history of our country.”48 It is not known if Cobo 
possessed ambitions for higher office, although he must have known that the possible 
results of his actions in the strike might have moved others to consider him. Any such 
ambition could have motivated him to continue pursuing the strike in the way he was.  
Cobo's Strategy 
Mayor Cobo knew better than to make full use of the Hutchinson Act, given the 
power of organized labor in Detroit. One streetcar worker spoke to this power when he 
commented on the idea of hiring replacement workers: “‘And how can they train 
substitutes if the union won’t let the buses out of the terminals?’” he asked rhetorically.49 
And yet, the city seriously considered making full use of the Hutchinson Act and limiting 
the power of the Detroit Street Railway workers even more than they had. “Now – 
mindful of the people’s mandate – the commission has determined to resume operation of 
the transit system either with or without its striking employees,”50 one Detroit News 
editorial wrote. So desperate were city officials to have the transportation system resume 
its operation that they sought some way to take over the street railway system while 
protecting it from angry members of Division 26. In response to a request for guidance on 
his powers, Detroit’s acting and assistant corporation counsel wrote to the Director of 
Civilian Defense for the city, “We are…compelled to advise you that in the absence of 
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authority from the State Director of civilian defense, you are without power to take any 
action out on the strike of employees of the Department of Street Railways.”51 This 
comment aside, the city appeared poised to run its transportation system without the 
striking workers: “Once the restraining order has been issued, a DSR officer confidently 
declared, “the lines will be put back in operation as fast as we get operators.’” The 
Detroit News reported that Governor G. Mennen Williams “assured additional protection 
by state police and the National Guard, if necessary…to maintain peace and order in 
Detroit if the police could not cope with the situation.”52 General Superintendent of 
Transportation James Bostick appeared hopeful that the city could resume service of the 
street railway even as he admitted that it would take weeks or months for each line to 
fully do so.53    
Organized Labor Supports DSR Strikers 
To whatever extent the city seriously considered resuming transportation service, 
at some point city officials backed off of the idea. They decided that managing 
customers’ inconvenience due to the strike was a better idea than breaking the strike, 
without regard to the consequences of such an act. The rationale for why the city never 
pursued such a course of action is obvious. Never actually admitted by Cobo or the DSR 
Commission, it was clear that Detroit was a union town. This idea was more than idle 
words. Robert Zieger says the same, although in a different way. “Detroit was the 
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quintessential CIO city,”54 he proclaimed in his book on the CIO. While Division 26 was 
an AFL union, the general power of organized labor was evident in Detroit-based labor 
organizations. A union's affiliation to a federation did not necessarily determine its 
activism. 
While individual union members may have voiced objections to the strike, their 
union officers stood firmly with Division 26. To this end, the power of organized labor to 
meet the challenge posed by the city seeking to break the strike and the union overseeing 
it was probably enough to inhibit city officials. Asher Lauren of the Detroit News 
reported that Detroit-area unions representing 600,000 members issued veiled threats 
should the city follow through on its plan to resume service of the DSR, regardless of 
whether or not the striking workers returned to work.55 The Detroit and Wayne County 
Federation of Labor supported the Division 26 strikers with a resolution of support and an 
effort to solicit local labor organizations to provide a strike fund.56 The lines separating 
the AFL and the CIO became blurred during the strike, as the local CIO came out in full 
support of a job action initiated by an AFL union. “At a special mass meeting of locals in 
the Wayne District CIO, a resolution was passed instructing officials of that body to do 
everything to assist the strikers in line with what AFL leaders tell them must be done.”57 
Even as the strike entered its fifth week, support among Detroit’s labor organizations did 
not wane. Delegates of the AFL and CIO assembled collectively “to hear their leaders 
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pledge all-out aid to the striking operators,” the Detroit Labor News reported.58 The 
support received not only came in the form of resolutions at mass meetings and 
conventions, but sixty-six labor organizations, with the prompting of the Detroit and 
Wayne County Federation of Labor, donated to the Division 26 strike fund anywhere 
from $5.00 to $1,000 for a total of $9,470. Eleven of these organizations represented 
public sector employees.59 
Detroit-area unions locked arms in support of the DSR workers. “Our union is 
sincerely interested in doing everything that we can to aid Division 26, Streetcar and Bus 
Operators Union, to obtain their just demands in their current strike caused by the refusal 
of Mayor Cobo and the DSR management to bargain in good faith,” the UAW Secretary-
Treasurer Emil Mazey commented in an open letter to Detroit and Wayne County 
Federation of Labor President Frank X. Martel.60 Martel submitted his own open letter to 
Mayor Cobo himself. “Our city is one of the best organized cities in the United States 
today,” he wrote. “The sentiment against strikebreaking in this city is so overwhelming 
that for you or anyone else to attempt it on a large scale would be bound to generate 
excitement and resentments that would have far-reaching repercussions,” he continued.61  
In addition to the solidarity exhibited within organized labor in Detroit, Detroit Street 
Railway workers remained committed to the strike as well, with but a few minor 
exceptions. “In voting tabulation that lasted all day Tuesday,” the Detroit Labor News 
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reported, “more than 3,100 members voted nearly seven to one in favor of the strike.”62 
Even the otherwise anti-union Detroit News had to concede that the DSR workers were 
generally ready to follow the advice of the union leaders. “‘The union leaders know what 
they are doing and I will follow their advice,’” Division 26 member, Frank H. Becker, 
told a reporter of the Detroit News.63 A week later, the same paper reported similar 
sentiments. “‘We know we’re right and we’ll stand by our union,’” another Division 26 
members said. “‘We won’t accept [an offer] until our union tells us to,’” said another. 
Another member added that, “‘I’ve tightened my belt and will stick it out with the rest of 
the fellows.’”64 When Division 26 held a mass meeting in mid-May, 2000 of the 3,000 
strikers attended. “They booed loudly when Walter Stanley, union business agent, told 
them Mayor Cobo had not changed his mind on insisting they go back to work under the 
terms of the Hutchinson Act.”65  With the city’s high level of unionization, Cobo could 
not wholly ignore Division 26, try as he might.66 
The morale among the Division 26 members remained high throughout the strike. 
In early June 1951, the union convened a mass meeting of their members, where their 
solidarity was made evident.67 That solidarity also reflected itself in members’ continued 
support of their union leaders. Indeed, two weeks following the strike, union members 
reelected Walter Stanley as business agent, Pat McIntyre as president and John Francis as 
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secretary treasurer. Had members of the DSR been angered at their leaders, they would 
not have received the votes to retain them in these, the union’s most powerful offices.68 
Organized labor’s opposition to the city’s position in the DSR strike was reflected 
in the Michigan Federation of Labor as well. Fuming from the treatment of street railway 
workers during the 1951 strike, the Michigan Federation of Labor, during its annual 
convention held in the last days of the strike, adopted six resolutions and endorsed one 
bill that reflected labor’s sentiment about the strike and the Hutchinson Act. The 
convention had ended its first day before the strike came to an end. The resolutions 
sought “repeal of this unjust anti-labor and anti-democratic Act,” and “condemn[ed] the 
Detroit Street Railway Commission and Mayor Albert E. Cobo because they … 
attempted to strikebreak and … refused to bargain in good faith.” Other resolutions 
condemned the Hutchinson law as relegating public employees to “the position of being 
second class citizens when compared to their fellow workers in private industry.” To this 
same end, the MFL “endorse[d] the necessary legislation granting to public employes 
[sic] the same right to organize, to be recognized and to bargain collectively as is enjoyed 
by people employed in private industry.” The Michigan Federation of Labor’s 
endorsement of several bills at the convention echoed these sentiments.  These bills 
advocated the right of Michigan public employees to organize and utilize the services of 
the Michigan Labor Mediation Commission.” Its fate, however, reflected the party that 
had controlled the legislature during that and many previous years. The Senate’s labor 
committee killed them.69 
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Cobo Continues his Strategy Against DSR Strikers 
To what extent Cobo and other city officials interpreted the show of unity for the 
strikers from powerful elements within the Detroit labor community is unknown. 
However, it is probable that they believed that if they had fired the striking workers, 
pursued criminal charges against their union leaders, refrained from negotiating with 
them and hired replacements, they might have inspired a powerful and negative response. 
Cobo did not want to go a route that would have had this result. 
Nevertheless, despite the power of the labor movement and the criticism he 
received, Cobo maintained a position of control during the strike and the subsequent 
period of mediation and litigation. One observer concluded in the third week of the strike 
that, “[a]t this point, [Cobo] is very properly keeping his own counsel.”70 In “keeping his 
own counsel,” Cobo did not delegate important decisions to any individual or agency.  
Since the start of the strike “only 93 of the 3,500 fired operators have applied for 
reinstatement.” With but few exceptions, they remained committed to following the lead 
of their union officers. Division 26 Business Agent Walter Stanley reportedly threatened 
that, “[a]nybody who tries to go back to work before everybody does will be very 
unhappy.” Whether through coercion or voluntary commitment, the city could neither 
break the strike nor the union that organized it. With all of the bold and strident assertions 
in editorials, as well as letters to the editor and to Cobo, the city simply could not replace 
3,500 DSR operators. Since the charter stipulated that the DSR commission had to 
maintain and operate a transit system, Cobo had no choice but to seek a resolution with 
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the DSR operators and their union representatives.71 Wayne County Federation of Labor 
President Frank X. Martel advised Cobo to ignore the Hutchinson Act, he argued that the 
police had done as much when they ignored parking and traffic laws in order to 
accommodate car owners who parked illegally during the strike or who used lanes 
reserved for use by vehicles moving in different directions. It did not help matters for the 
city that the Michigan State Employment Service refused to refer otherwise unemployed 
people to fill jobs vacated by DSR workers on strike. “We are not a strike breaking 
agency,” one of its officials said, “and it is not our policy to refer jobseekers to struck 
plants.”72 
The Litigation Concerning the DSR Strike Begins 
By the time the city and Division 26 entered litigation to resolve their conflict, the 
DSR workers had been on strike for over six weeks. The circuit court judge that heard the 
case was sensitive to the need for a prompt ruling, but fully realized that his ruling would 
be appealed to a higher court. It was in this way that the litigation began.73 
In testimony offered by several union officials before Circuit Court Judge Ira 
Jayne, the union argued that Mayor Cobo and the DSR Commission entered into 
negotiations, but they did not make a good faith effort. After the city first agreed to 
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mediation, and to a particular time and place for the first session, the city called it off. 
Determined never to willfully pursue it again, the city had argued that the state mediator, 
Charles Bowles, was “partial toward unions.” The city’s bad faith in negotiations was 
also evidenced by the constant threats to invoke the Hutchinson Act, should the union 
continue to strike. Union officials, moreover, testified that DSR workers would not return 
to work subject to the Hutchinson Act, which translated into a demand for a pay raise. 
After all, Division 26 officers believed that their members deserved raises like other city 
employees. Without offering much of a rationale, the union also argued that the 
Hutchinson Act was unconstitutional.74 
In part, the union presented an argument that had a novel element to it. The DSR 
workers were not public employees at all, it argued. Any law directed toward public 
employees could not legally apply to the striking DSR workers. The argument followed 
from the revenues the DSR generated in the form of fares, unlike “other” public sector 
employees whose salaries were derived from taxes. Besides, the city required that the 
Detroit Street Railways pay taxes based on the revenue that made its way through the fare 
box and calculated by its auditors. If this arrangement, peculiar for a ‘public’ agency, did 
not make it at least a quasi-private entity, Division 26 attorney Edward Barnard argued, 
he did not know what did.75 
City officials, and the line of questioning pursued by attorneys for the city, 
countered the arguments presented by the union and proposed that the court should rule 
on a different basis. The city requested that the court simply rule that the Hutchinson Act 
was constitutional and applied to the striking DSR workers. It further asked that the court 
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find that the DSR had complied with its tenets in dealing with its workers. Most 
importantly, the city requested that the court issue an injunction prohibiting Division 26 
and its members from interfering with the operation of the street railways. Witnesses 
during the proceedings testified that the DSR would raise wages only following an 
increase in fares and that the DSR would not increase the fares for that purpose. As to the 
charge that the DSR did not pursue good faith negotiations with the union, attorneys for 
the city argued that the law did not stipulate that the city had to pursue mediation. Since 
the union never sought mediation by having a majority of its members vote for it, as 
stipulated by the Hutchinson Act, the city was under no obligation to pursue negotiations 
independently.76 
This last argument was an important one. Without a requirement to pursue 
mediation in the process described by the act, the union’s other demands were of dubious 
merit. After all, only legally mandated mediation could have compelled the parties to 
have a representative from the state labor mediation board seek resolution to the issues 
that brought one party to strike against the other. Union officials had not asked union 
members to vote on the issue of mediation, as stipulated in the Hutchinson Act. Perhaps it 
was because the last time they sought binding arbitration with the approval of city 
officials, union members did not fare well in the arbitrator’s decision. It may have been 
the case, however, that union attorneys and officials never thought of the requirements 
concerning mediation. Why else would they actively seek it without following the law? 
Whatever the case, even mediation had little power to resolve the conflict, because the 
law did not stipulate that it was binding. In short, the Hutchinson Act did not view bad 
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faith negotiations as being all that bad. This moment in the conflict harkened back to the 
initial debate in the state legislature four years earlier when the radical, yet respected, 
State Senator Stanley Nowak prophetically declared, “…mediation is practically 
meaningless.”77 
Judge Ira Jayne, who heard the arguments and ruled on the case, offered a ruling 
that was a mixed outcome for both the union and the city. The Hutchinson Act was 
constitutional, he ruled, and it did apply to the matter that brought the parties to his court. 
However, it did not apply in the way that the city desired. Jayne ruled that the city should 
have willingly consented to mediation or pursued this avenue on its own. In this way, he 
ordered the otherwise striking DSR workers back to work and required that both parties 
pursue mediation in the mean time. In so ruling, Judge Jayne relied on what some argued 
constituted the spirit of the law. Specifically, he blamed the city for not making use of 
mediators that were readily available to the parties, even though the law did not mandate 
that either party pursue this course. As columnist W.K. Kelsey explains, Judge Jayne 
“became less interested in legal quiddities than in practical compromises more in keeping 
with the spirit of justice and the interests of the community.”78 
Under the leadership of Mayor Cobo, the city pursued a strategy that included 
countless delays, designed to wear down the DSR workers and their union 
representatives, while strategically making use of appeals leading to the U.S. Supreme 
Court.  Ultimately, the court ruled in favor of the city. In this context, the idea of non-
binding mediation played well into the city’s legal strategy, because with it the city was 
not obligated to anything beyond discussing issues. It did not have to make any 
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concessions along the way. 
First, DSR officials Hough and then Nowicki conveniently made themselves 
unavailable to meet with Division 26 officers, despite the latter’s attempts to negotiate a 
new contract. When Cobo finally made the offer of a five cent per hour raise contingent 
upon cuts in fringe benefits, he waited until the contract expired on March 31. Even after 
Judge Jayne ordered the streetcar operators back to work and authorities representing 
parties back to negotiations, the city refused to negotiate, arguing that the Hutchinson Act 
applied. The law did not require that the city negotiate with workers who violated the law 
by striking. The city would wait for a ruling from the Michigan State Supreme Court 
before negotiating. To the extent that city officials did negotiate, it was only to reiterate 
the offer that they had extended throughout the strike. The city’s position led the state 
labor mediation board to concede defeat in its efforts to resolve the conflict.79 
As for the Michigan Supreme Court, it ruled that the Hutchinson Act was both 
constitutional and applicable to the conflict that brought the parties to court. It further 
ruled that the DSR did not have “to offer and give the strikers an opportunity to return to 
work under terms, conditions, rights and benefits under which they were working before 
they struck, and without penalties imposed by the Act…” Dismissing Judge Jayne’s 
efforts to force the parties into mediation, the Michigan Supreme Court further ruled that, 
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“after the strike, the city did not have a legal duty to mediate, and continue to mediate, 
with the returned strikers under the Michigan Labor Mediation Board.80 Needless to say, 
city officials were pleased with the ruling. Their position was validated when the U.S. 
Supreme Court took only eleven words to affirm the lower court’s ruling. “The motion to 
dismiss,” the opinion read, “is granted and the appeal is dismissed.”81 
In the Aftermath of the Litigation 
 Segments of Detroit’s organized labor community fumed over the court rulings. 
Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s judgment, the headline in the Detroit Labor News 
read, “UPHOLD ‘HATCHET’ ACT.” Observing that the U.S. Supreme Court did not 
rule on the legality of the Hutchinson Act, but rather on whether any federal questions 
were at issue, Division 26 attorney Edward Barnard, in conjunction with union officers, 
weighed the options before them. The options were limited. The union conceded the 
defeat without much further comment on the matter.82 
In the end, Division 26 and its members lost more than they gained in pursuing 
the strike. They could not legally force the city to provide them with raises and/or 
improvements in fringe benefits. By pressing the matter, the union only inspired the 
courts to rule and uphold rulings verifying the constitutionality and applicability of the 
Hutchinson Act. Largely due to the money lost by the city during the strike, and a 
subsequent loss in ridership, the DSR laid off numerous Detroit Street Railway workers, 
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following a national trend.83 While those DSR workers who had been on strike were 
never forced to reapply for their jobs, their morale must have been damaged given the 
outcome of the strike. With the Cold War in full force, the Korean War underway, a 
conservative Michigan legislature in office, an anti-labor Detroit mayor and the touchy 
matter of public sector strikes, it would have been a stretch for the Detroit Street Railway 
workers to have been victorious, even given the power of organized labor in the city at 
the time. 
Streetcars ceased to exist five years following the strike. As would-be riders grew 
increasingly accustomed to driving cars for transportation during the 1951 strike, their 
choices hastened the demise of streetcars in the city. During the same time that Division 
26 sought a wage increase, larger more powerful forces were at work that may have 
facilitated the demise of streetcars in Detroit and elsewhere. The mass production and 
affordability of cars, coupled with the construction of freeways and parking facilities 
allowing for their use, did not bode well for a Detroit Street Railway system seeking to 
remain relevant.84 Division 26 could not stop this chain of events. The Cobo 
administration's use of the Hutchinson Act was one of the causes that propelled Detroit 
streetcars out of existence. 
Conclusion 
The history of the Hutchinson Act, as reflected in its emergence and subsequent 
use, reveals the perils involved in strike actions among public sector workers. When 
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Detroit-area teachers went out on strike and/or threatened to do so, there was no 
Hutchinson Act that local and state officials could use to thwart such efforts. Given that 
these 1947 job actions coincided with a national strike wave, Detroit-area teachers were 
not poised to accept anything less than a meaningful pay raise.85 That City Councilman 
George Edwards, a progressive politician, played a role in the decision to address Detroit 
teachers’ concerns, boded well for those teachers seeking a pay raise. Interestingly, it was 
18 years before Detroit-area teachers challenged the Hutchinson Act, opting instead, to 
improve their conditions through less confrontational means. 
By the time Detroit sanitation workers went out on strike in 1950, and certainly 
by the time Detroit Street Railway workers undertook a lengthy strike in the spring of 
1951, Detroit officials successfully used the law to fight back efforts by public employees 
to obtain pay raises by striking. It did not help the cause of striking public sector workers 
that the Cold War was at full tilt. The fervor of the Cold War domestically manifested 
itself in the ousting of 11 unions from the CIO, including Detroit-based locals 285 and 
279 of the United Public Workers of America. Without the institutional support of the 
CIO, its efforts to secure wage increases met with limited success. Institutional support 
did not necessarily translate into the type of power that resulted in success. The 1951 
strike of Detroit Street Railway workers affiliated with Division 26, an AFL union, 
illustrated this point. In this strike, Detroit’s entire labor leadership supported the striking 
workers; and yet the most they had to show for their efforts was a confirmation from the 
U.S. Supreme Court that Cobo’s use of the Hutchinson Act was both applicable and 
constitutional. These rulings solidified the legal basis for limiting public sector unionism. 
                                                 
85Adelaide Hart, “Walkout in Buffalo Complete Success,” The Detroit Teacher, 
March 31, 1947, 1-2. 
108 
 
In his research on public sector workers in Illinois, historian Joseph Slater reveals 
the perceived risks of public sector strikes for unions. In the course of discussing the 
Service Employees International Union’s public sector strikes during the 1930s, Slater 
had this to say:  
Strikes by government workers were illegal, unpopular, and 
usually unsuccessful. While private sector locals in the 
BSEIU used strikes effectively, the BSEIU feared that a 
strike by any of its public sector locals would be a public 
relations disaster that would undo all they had tried to 
accomplish for school and other government employees 
everywhere.86  
 
The idea often applied to other public sector unions who engaged strikes in subsequent 
decades.  
The 1951 strike by Detroit Street Railway workers is another example of the 
perils associated with public sector strikes. Had the general public believed some mutual 
interest existed between it and striking streetcar workers, those workers may have met 
with success in their strike.87  With this said, the issue of timing often dictated the success 
– or lack thereof – of public sector activism. When, that is, Detroit-area public school 
teachers engaged in strikes or threatened strikes during the winter and spring of 1947, 
they did have some success. The difference, though, was that these job actions followed a 
strike wave among school teachers throughout the country, including competition for 
trained teachers, whose effects Detroit officials probably feared. Additionally, City 
Councilman George Edwards intervened in the matter and consented to allocate the 
necessary funding from the Detroit treasury. His activism allowed Detroit school teachers 
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to receive a raise without resorting to a strike. This set of circumstances did not exist for 
either Detroit garbage collectors in 1950 or street railway workers in 1951, revealing the 
tenuous position in which public sector workers often find themselves when they strike 
against the government. 
Debates over the Hutchinson Act did not begin or end with the job actions among 
teachers in 1947, or with the dramatic 1951 DSR strike. Although it appeared to have 
settled the issue of the Act’s constitutionality, Michigan’s labor movement, in 
conjunction with its allies in the legislature, alternately pursued a campaign to confront, 
expose and neutralize the Act. An additional strike, reports publicizing its harm, 
campaign platforms and legislative amendments that intended to compromise its purpose 
and power, all contributed to the campaign to eliminate the act. To the chagrin of the 
Act’s antagonists, these efforts did not meet with success until 1965. 
 Unfortunately, DSR workers and their union did not fully appreciate the 
similarities between the sanitation workers strike of the previous year and the strike they 
pursued in terms of how the Cobo administration might respond. They also did not learn 
meaningful lessons from the earlier job action. Perhaps they believed that Cobo would 
have remembered, with kindness, the way that both the AFL and the CIO simultaneously 
supported him and attacked the garbage workers, as he considered a way to handle the 
DSR strike.88 For Cobo, it mattered little that the CIO had ejected the United Public 
Workers from its ranks the previous year. Whatever its thinking, the union clearly 
misjudged the Cobo administration’s determination to use the Hutchinson Act. Had the 
DSR workers and their union reflected on Detroit Public Works Commissioner Carl D. 
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Warner’s comments about the striking sanitation workers, they may have approached 
their negotiations differently. On the first day of the 1950 sanitation workers strike, 
Warner had this to say about the treatment the workers could expect from the Cobo 
administration: “'We’ll put the fear of God into them forever.’”89 It was a chilling 
message. 
 In the months preceding the 1951 DSR strike, the Michigan Democratic Party’s 
campaign platform called for the “[r]epeal of the Bonine-Tripp and Hutchinson Acts, and 
substitution of a state labor relations law, and a workable mediation act, to encourage free 
collective bargaining.”90 Goodwill gesture though it was, political gestures are not always 
capable of moving beyond the rhetoric, especially when there were not enough labor-
friendly legislators to repeal the act. The years that came and went without an amendment 
to the Hutchinson Act spoke for themselves. 
 Through its legislative newsletters, reports and press releases, the Michigan CIO 
argued for an amendment to the Hutchinson Act and publicized efforts for an 
amendment. In 1951, one Michigan CIO publication argued that “[t]he Hutchinson Act, 
denying public employes [sic] the basic right to strike, should be repealed and replaced 
with legislation…, which would make public employes [sic] first class citizens, not 
second-class citizens as at present.”91 The Michigan CIO repeated the argument on 
                                                 
89Louis Segadelli, president, Detroit Joint Board, United Public Workers to All 
Labor Unions,” letter, September 2, 1950, Michigan AFL-CIO Collection, box 114, 
folder 7 titled, “Public Workers, 1950-1951, ALUA; “Cobo Acts to Restore Alley Work,” 
Detroit News, 1 September 1950, 2. 
90
“Campaign Platform Adopted at Convention of Michigan Democratic Party, 3 
February 1951, box 31, folder 6, Political Action, 1951, Michigan AFL-CIO Collection, 
ALUA. 
91
“Legislative Program of the Michigan CIO,” Michigan Legislative Report, 
1951, 32, box 89, folder 5 – Legislative Report, Michigan AFL-CIO Collection, ALUA. 
111 
 
numerous other occasions, but years would pass before it would make any headway on 
the matter.92 
 Throughout the late 1940s and early to mid 1950s, members of both the Michigan 
House and Senate alternately introduced bills to amend the 1947 Hutchinson Act. 
Organized labor in Michigan enthusiastically supported these bills. They mandated or 
allowed for organizing, collective bargaining, fines and jail sentences for those refusing 
to recognize the right of public workers to organize, and for the Michigan Labor 
Relations Board to intervene in such disputes, even when neither party requested 
mediation. In a Michigan legislature dominated by anti-union Republicans, the bills 
rarely made it out of committee. Even when they did, the bills did not receive majority 
support in either house. As evidenced by his 1950 Labor Day speech in Detroit, during 
the eight-day Detroit sanitation workers strike, Williams admonished his audience about 
their election-day apathy. This apathy, he said, had allowed the state legislature to block a 
repeal or significant amendments to the Hutchinson Act. Speaking on the second day of 
the strike, Williams received enthusiastic applause from Labor Day parade spectators. 
However, he never received the opportunity to sign a bill repealing or neutralizing the 
anti-strike law.93 Neither these bills, Michigan CIO media attention, nor the strikes that 
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violated the Hutchinson Act did anything to prompt the legislature to repeal it or address 
the concerns of public sector workers who engaged in strikes. In the immediate post 
World War II period, too many forces aligned themselves against any such effort. 
Historian Joseph Slater argues that state and local agencies increasingly warmed 
to the idea of recognizing public sector unions during contract negotiations.  They 
furthered expressed less fear about public sector unions pursuing strikes to accomplish 
their ends.94 As in other historical transitions, there was continued contention between the 
public sector and the agencies that employed them. The job actions among Detroit-area 
teachers, garbage workers, and street railway workers reflected this contention in these 
same years that others achieved success at empowerment. 
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Part II 
A Bridge Over Troubled Waters 
As long as the majority of Michigan’s residents have only 
half a voice in the Michigan Legislature…these 
conservative groups can push through the kind of 
legislation they want – hold down the kind of legislation 
most of the people in the state desire.1 
Part II and chapter Three are one and the same. They fit between the section 
dealing with the enactment and implementation of the Hutchinson Act on the one hand, 
and the subsequent part concerning the Public Employee Relations Act, on the other. The 
history regarding legislative reapportionment spans the same time period and was 
inescapably connected to the Hutchinson Act and the Public Employee Relations Act 
amending it. Malapportioned legislative districts had made it possible for the Hutchinson 
Act to remain intact for eighteen years. By the same token, its amendment in 1965 flowed 
from the reapportionment of legislative districts in 1964, just in time for the elections of 
that year. That election swept into office legislators who passed the Public Employee 
Relations. The chapter that follows is the bridge that links these two laws and the eras in 
which the Michigan legislature enacted them. 
 Neither the Hutchinson Act nor the Public Employee Relations Act are discussed 
at length in the chapter that follows. Instead, the chapter focuses on how legislative 
reapportionment set the groundwork for legal changes. The Michigan CIO and its 
affiliates championed reapportionment during a 1952 initiative on the matter, but Detroit-
area public sector unions, like those affiliated with the American Federation of State, 
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County and Municipal Employees, the American Federation of Teachers and Division 26 
of the Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Railway & Motor Coach Employees 
of America were all AFL-affiliated unions. While the Michigan CIO did not oppose the 
empowerment of these or other public sector unions, they did not forcefully champion 
their causes either.   Because much of the chapter that follows focuses on the 1952 
initiative when the CIO made its first concerted effort to force reapportionment, the 
Hutchinson Act remained outside of what the CIO considered most important. Even 
given this, legislative reapportionment held an important enough place in the 
development of public sector unionism to warrant a full discussion here. 
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Chapter Three 
Laying the Groundwork:  
Labor’s Fight for Legislative Reapportionment, 1952-1964 
What better form could be found for the expression of 
contempt for the people than to equate one person with a 
specific amount of dirt?2 
An apportionment which generally over represents rural 
areas at the expense of metropolitan cities obviously favors 
farmers and discriminates against industrial workers.3 
The Brown case and the changes that it brought about 
caused many people to believe that it was the most 
important case of my tenure on the Court. That appraisal 
may be correct, but I have never thought so. It seemed to 
me that accolade should go to the case of Baker v. Carr 
(1962), which was the progenitor of the ‘one man, one 
vote’ rule.”4 – U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice Earl 
Warren. 
Teachers, sanitation workers, streetcar workers, and other public sector workers had their 
share of concerns about the Hutchinson Act. Many believed that it applied overly 
punitive consequences to public sector workers by terminating or making it difficult for 
them to retain their positions after going on strike. Particularly onerous was the provision 
that a fine and/or prison term possibly awaited those who encouraged public sector 
workers to strike. However, amending the act proved difficult, even futile, given the 
conservative make up of the legislature. They took exception to an empowered public 
sector that was poised to challenge the power structure with demands for increased wages 
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and improved working conditions. With an empowered public sector came the possibility 
of tax increases, since wage demands necessitated these changes. The Hutchinson Act 
was not the only legislation about which organized labor exhibited concern. Organized 
labor also showed a desire for the enactment of legislation concerning a Fair Employment 
Practices Commission, expanded unemployment compensation, and workmen’s 
compensation, among other legislation.  
 With these hopes for legislative change before them, organized labor sought 
another means to amend the Hutchinson Act and pass other legislation. Its efforts 
coalesced in a fight that pitted organized labor against the business community and 
certain segments of agriculture, a fight over legislative apportionment. From the lay 
perspective on this fight, “one person, one vote” described the struggle in question.5 
The idea of “one person, one vote” is fairly recent and not only because 
discrimination kept African Americans and women from voting from the earliest years of 
the Republic. Up until the mid-1960s, rural legislative districts in most states received 
significantly more representatives in the state legislature per capita than their urban 
counterparts. The disparity in the Michigan State Senate was particularly inequitable. 
Because urban districts tended to be more labor-friendly than rural districts, this 
arrangement worked against the interests of organized labor in cities like Detroit. 
Following a protracted battle that encompassed a ballot proposal, introduction of bills in 
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“Expanding the Frontiers of Civil Rights,”: Michigan, 1948-1968 (Detroit: Wayne State 
University Press, 2000), 35-96; Michigan CIO Legislative Conference Schedule, 30 
January 1952, box 194, folder 9, Michigan AFL-CIO Collection, ALUA; Neal Peirce, 
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the state legislature, suits before state courts and debates within the 1961-1962 Michigan 
Constitution, the turning point in the apportionment debate came in the early 1960s when 
the Supreme Court finally took the side of plaintiffs calling for reapportionment based 
solely on a population basis.6 
With these rulings, significantly more state legislators from urban districts in 
Michigan were elected to office. More labor-friendly legislation followed. 
Reapportionment is thus central to understanding why the 1965 Michigan state legislature 
and its governor passed and signed into law the Public Employees Relations Act. This 
legislation amended the 1947 Hutchinson Act by limiting the consequences to striking by 
public sector workers. The 1965 law also required state and local agencies to engage in 
collective bargaining with most public sector workers or their representatives. Only with 
legislative reapportionment, however, was it possible for a sufficient number of labor-
friendly (usually Democratic) legislators to be elected to amend the Hutchinson Act.  
This chapter exams the role that organized labor played in this effort to 
reapportion Michigan’s legislative districts, including the two U.S. Supreme Court 
rulings in Baker v. Carr (1962) and Reynolds v. Sims (1964), which together required 
states to reapportion state legislatures on a purely population basis.7 
Malapportioned legislative districts prevented certain measures to meet with 
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success through the legislative process. At the extreme, Michigan's 32nd state senatorial 
district, representing four rural counties with a combined population of just over 61,000 
in 1950, received one state senator, whereas Detroit's 18th state senatorial district, with a 
population of nearly 700,000 in the same year similarly received one state senator. In 
other words, one senatorial district received over 11 times more state senators per capita 
than another, leading one observer to ask, “What better form could be found for the 
expression of contempt for the people than to equate one person with a specific amount 
of dirt?”8 
Efforts to reapportion legislatures throughout the country, leading to the landmark 
Supreme Court rulings in Baker v. Carr and Reynolds v. Sims, have fueled an extensive 
literature. Because the phenomena remained controversial, there is a range of 
perspectives on its importance. Chief Justice Earl Warren himself believed that the 
reapportionment rulings by the U.S. Supreme Court outweighed the decision in Brown v. 
Board of Education (1954). With reapportionment, Warren argued, the laws of the 
country came to be more of and for the people, which is what the Warren Court is best 
known.9 
Other legal scholars refuse to ascribe any particular importance to 
reapportionment, arguing in one case that, “reapportionment problems represented 
nothing more than a bad case of acne, frequently embarrassing and temporarily 
disfiguring but not of vital importance.”10 Their argument, however, is belied by other 
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realities. With the reapportionment rulings, legislatures became more responsive to urban 
constituents who previously had a difficult time making their voices heard. After 
reapportionment, more citizens came to look to and participate in state government as a 
means of addressing their needs and concerns. Moreover, a growing number of African 
Americans representing urban districts became politically active. Because competition for 
office was more equitably distributed, legislators who were both more qualified and more 
representative began pursuing office. The very idea of reapportionment was important. 
Attorney Theodore Sachs, an integral figure in the struggle for reapportionment in 
Michigan, quoted Victor Hugo when, in writing about reapportionment, he argued that 
“there is nothing more powerful than ‘an idea whose time has come.’”11 By the early 
1960s, the powerful idea of reapportionment had come, and organized labor in Michigan 
helped to pave the way for its introduction in Michigan and beyond. 
The phenomenon of legislative reapportionment is incomprehensible outside of 
the context of the Civil Rights movement. There are few events in modern American 
history that rival the Civil Rights movement in terms of its transformative significance. 
Mass demonstrations, sit-ins, boycotts, freedom rides, marches, and landmark Supreme 
Court rulings were the most visible evidence of its importance. However, the sentiments 
and ideas generated by this era inescapably seeped into areas not always associated with 
the Civil Rights movement. Public sector unions and the people who organized, or were 
organized by them, were among the forces shaped and inspired by civil rights activism. 
Indeed, the rights consciousness of this historical moment pervaded these organizations 
and emboldened their members and officers to pursue rights few imagined just a 
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generation before. It is in the context of this era that we can best understand the equitable 
reapportionment of Michigan’s legislative districts and the subsequent growth of labor-
friendly legislators who passed laws that previous legislatures, dominated by rural and 
conservative members, had refused to release from committees, let alone support or 
champion. 
The 1952 Initiative 
In 1951, following intense debate, the Michigan CIO Council and its president, Gus 
Scholle, launched an effort to amend the state constitution “to require periodic legislative 
apportionment in both houses on  ‘strict population’ basis: each district having plus or 
minus fifteen percent of the ‘average’ district population and having effective procedural 
mechanisms for enforcement.”12 By 1952, labor honed its political argument about 
legislative reapportionment and conceived a plan to change it. It is not clear what 
precisely precipitated the idea that organized labor should choose this particular moment 
to seek a reapportionment of the Michigan State Legislature. Perhaps labor leaders 
figured that they could translate Governor G. Mennen Williams’ popularity and 
endorsement into success for the ballot initiative in the November election. Perhaps labor 
strategists determined that a presidential election year, with its larger voter turnout, would 
grant them success.  
A letter from August Scholle and Barney Hopkins, President and Secretary-
Treasurer of the Michigan CIO Council, illustrated the decision and relevance of 
reapportionment to organized labor in Michigan. In this January 1952 letter, they wrote 
that, “…1952 will be an even more vital year because of the two-“R” problem in 
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Michigan – reapportionment and reorganization. In particular” the letter continued, “the 
question of the reapportionment of the state will have to be considered, and a broad 
educational campaign begun in order to acquaint the people of Michigan with the fact 
that tree stumps and deer are better represented in our State Legislature than many 
citizens.”13 With some legislative districts containing large masses of wooded acreage but 
with few residents, the reference to tree stumps and deer held validity. 
Whatever constituted the motivating factor(s), organized labor did not hold back 
on its support of reapportionment. To that end, it designed a well-coordinated and 
multifaceted campaign to ensure the reapportionment of the state’s legislative districts 
when it began seeking a ballot initiative in 1952. As reflected in legal research, policy 
statements, manuals, surveys, resolutions, the use of sympathetic media, CIO advocates 
of legislative reapportionment moved forward with their mission. The use of lectures, 
signatures for petitions, television, newspaper and radio advertisements, state maps with 
demographics, cartoons, flyers, banners and buttons, and the substantial resources 
secured to pursue all of these activities, the campaign developed by organized labor in 
Michigan stood poised for near-definite success. 
It was with this effort that organized labor laid the groundwork for subsequent 
campaigns to compel the reapportionment of legislative districts. The plan began with 
research that the CIO undertook in 1951 and early 1952, which allowed organized labor 
in Michigan to outline the broad parameters of a reapportionment argument. In turn, the 
argument assisted organized labor in convincing its constituents that reapportionment was 
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a meaningful objective and developing a plan to pursue an initiative. The research 
analyzed the problem, including it history, outlined the current Michigan law, developed 
recommendations and considerations, provided a bibliography, and maps that included 
demographics of the counties. CIO proponents of reapportionment detailed many of these 
elements in a document titled, “Memorandum on Proposed Constitutional Amendments 
Respecting Reapportionment,” in 1951.14  
The “problem” that malapportioned legislative districts posed, the author(s)* of 
the memorandum argued, was that citizens living in rural and sparsely populated areas 
had disproportionately greater power than those in urban areas. Because they elected 
more representatives to the legislature than those in urban districts, relative to their 
numbers. Evoking a history extending back to England, which had adopted its own brand 
of malapportionment, the author(s) argued that “[f]or years, and in most of the states, city 
dwellers have had to live with rotten borough government by the few, and government by 
the land and not by the people.”15 By legally guaranteeing many counties legislators, 
often irrespective of population, the law was at fault. When legislators ignored their 
obligation to reapportion districts every ten years as constitutionally mandated, thereby 
allowing sparsely populated districts to maintain their control of the legislature, the end 
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result was disenfranchisement, the memo explained. Courts exhibited reluctance to enter 
the legal fray around malapportioned districts, arguing that to do so “would violate the 
doctrine of separation of powers,” that is, for the judicial branch to dictate the operation 
of the legislative branch. In this context, CIO proponents sought to reapportion legislative 
districts based on population, without regard to partisan considerations, and on the 
condition that mechanisms are established allowing for redress when a party believes that 
districts have returned to a malapportioned state.16  
The research for the initiative in 1952 concerned previous litigation that spoke to 
legislative reapportionment. In each case, the courts reached the same conclusions: Gross 
malapportionment, like the one the Michigan CIO sought to change, had no place in 
Michigan. The author(s) of the “Memorandum” quoted the most prominent of these 
cases, Giddings v. Secretary of State, which argued that, “‘it was never contemplated that 
one elector should possess two or three times more influence in the person of a 
representative or senator, than another elector in another district.”17 While there were 
several other decisions that came to the same conclusion, one major matter changed since 
the time of those rulings, massive population shifts that provided urban centers with far 
larger numbers than even malapportionment advocates of the nineteenth century had 
witnessed. 
 The Memorandum did not go into statistical detail about this shift, but CIO 
strategists and lawyers seeking to compel the reapportionment of legislative districts must 
have been aware of the immense changes that characterized the urban versus rural 
sections of the state. Detroit’s population grew dramatically during the first half of the 
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20th century. In 1910 that population numbered 465,766. Ten years later it escalated to 
993,678. By 1950, it reached its height at 1,849,568. Many rural cities in Michigan grew 
as well, but not as dramatically. The city of Allegan, for example grew from 1,141 in 
1910 to 4,801 in 1950 and reached 4,822 in 1960.  The contrast was phenomenal and 
revealed the potential political power of Detroit should the CIO prove successful in 
reapportioning Michigan’s legislative districts.18 
CIO advocates of reapportionment often used the essence of this argument when 
preparing material for those collecting signatures for the ballot proposal on a 
reapportioned state legislature. In one such packet of material, entitled “Speaking of 
Representative Government,” the CIO included a section entitled, “What the Founding 
Fathers Did,” that quoted Article XIV, Section 11 of the U.S. Constitution. Saying that, 
“Representatives shall be apportioned among the several states according to their 
respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each state, excluding 
Indians not taxed.”19 The CIO readily used information gleaned from its research when 
seeking signatures for its petitions. 
The year 1952 was not the first time that advocates of reapportionment sought 
changes in the Michigan constitution. Others sought changes in 1924, 1930 and again in 
1932. Their efforts improved on each occasion. However, as late as 1932, a 
                                                 
18http://www.daahp.wayne.edu/1900_1949.html; 
http://www.daahp.wayne.edu/1950_1999.html; Michigan, Michigan Manual, 1911-1912 
(Lansing: State of Michigan, 1911), 636; Michigan, Michigan Manual, 1951-1952 
(Lansing: State of Michigan, 1951), 382; Michigan, Michigan Manual, 1961-1962 
(Lansing: State of Michigan, 1961), 338. 
19As quoted in “Speaking of Representative Government,” Michigan CIO 
Council, box 179, folder 18, Michigan AFL-CIO Collection, ALUA.  
125 
 
reapportionment proposal lost by 145,000 votes.20 While unsuccessful, these efforts kept 
the issue of reapportionment alive and allowed the advocates of the 1952 effort to 
examine what might be necessary to achieve the success that eluded them on previous 
occasions. 
The effort to pursue a ballot initiative by organized labor began three years 
earlier. At that time, the CIO and UAW Political Action Department began working with 
the Michigan Committee for Representative Government to create a proposal for 
reapportionment in the state.21 Although the Committee supposedly operated 
independently of organized labor, its ties to organized labor suggest a questionable 
independence. That Theodore Sachs, who served as counsel for the Michigan CIO and 
later the Michigan AFL-CIO, acted as attorney to the committee indicates its close 
alliance with organized labor.22 The Michigan CIO spent upwards of $65,000 to fund the 
ballot initiative sponsored by this committee. 
It is misleading to say that the whole of organized labor in Michigan took up the 
charge to change the political state of affairs. In 1952, that is, the AFL and CIO were 
three years away from a merger, and their Michigan State counterparts did not merge 
until 1958. They disagreed with one another about the challenges and possibilities for 
organized labor in Michigan and more broadly. As in other states, the Michigan CIO was 
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the more militant of the two organizations, and it remained true, even after conservative 
elements largely succeeded in purging the organization of its communist elements.23  
Like the Michigan CIO, the Michigan Federation of Labor criticized the way 
senatorial districts were apportioned. As 1952 got underway, however, its official 
position remained at variance with the plan advanced by the Michigan CIO. One may 
even argue that the initial AFL plan was decidedly antagonistic to the CIO plan. In a 
March 25, 1952, MFL secretary-treasurer, Robert Scott clearly expressed the AFL’s 
views. In that missive, he referred to the plan supported by the Michigan CIO as 
“unclearly drafted,” “hastily put together,” “stupid,” and a “mousetrap.” Six different 
times in the three-page letter, Scott referred to the CIO plan as a “scheme.” While noting 
the inappropriateness of a system where “one senate district has 696,670 persons within 
its boundaries while another has 61,008 persons,” Scott argued that the CIO “scheme 
allows, in fact encourages, gerrymandering of the most vicious kind” by allowing the 
Republican Secretary of State Fred Alger to “take away or make more difficult to win 
other House and Senate seats in districts which were close in 1948 and 1950.” In contrast 
to the Michigan CIO plan, the MFL plan specified  that, “[t]he county [would be] 
preserved as the primary political unit, which prevents gerrymandering.”24 In other 
words, the MFL plan kept intact a provision allowing “every county with more than 1/2 
of 1 per cent of the State’s population [to] have a representative of its own, and each 
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county with a population greater than 1 1/2 per cent of the State’s population [to] have at 
least two representatives.”25 The Michigan CIO countered, that when a county was 
accorded this respect, it was often the case that small counties received a disproportionate 
number of representatives. 
It is not clear exactly why the MFL abandoned its competing petition drive in 
1952. It may have been connected with an effort on the part of Walter Reuther, Gus 
Scholle, and James Hoffa “to get the AFofL to withdraw their petition.”26 Given the 
power of these labor leaders, it is conceivable that their combined power swayed the 
MFL. In any case, the MFL decided that the idea of pursuing its own petition drive 
independent of the Michigan CIO did not make sense and that it was in the best interest 
of their members to support the CIO reapportionment plan. As reported in the Detroit 
Labor News in July 1952,  
[t]he abandonment of its petition by the Michigan 
Federation of Labor, and its announced support of the one 
now going on the ballot, will clear the atmosphere and 
make the unification in the effort to provide a workable 
reapportionment amendment to the state constitution.27 
Among the efforts that the CIO arranged in early 1952 to advance its interest to 
reapportion state legislative districts, was its February 9 conference, which was attended 
by upwards of 400 people and addressed by the governor. It allowed the CIO to 
demonstrate its commitment to reapportionment by educating its participants to better 
understand its importance. The conference addressed a number of topics, including 
taxation, the Fair Employment Practices Commission and civil rights, workmen’s 
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compensation and safety, unemployment compensation and welfare, and state labor 
mediation, in addition to reapportionment. Although the conference’s objectives 
discussed the CIO’s legislative program, legislative reapportionment was a key part of 
the discussion. In fact, the achievement of other pieces of legislation would be uncertain 
without a reapportioned legislature.28 Representatives of the UAW and CIO dominated at 
the session on reapportionment. Attorney Ted Sachs, who represented the Michigan CIO, 
and Bernice Howell of the League of Women Voters also participated in this session. 
They gave short presentations, but the object of this and other sessions was to engage 
audience participation.29 Many of the participants of the conference participated in the 
petition drive for a ballot initiative and used the information and insights from this 
conference in the work on this effort. 
 Reapportionment was closely connected to the issue of taxation without 
representation, and reapportionment advocates did not hesitate to remind anyone who 
listened that a relationship between the two existed. When those members of the tax-
paying citizenry pay a disproportionate amount of taxes, relative to the number of 
representatives they receive in the state senate, the taxation issue becomes contentious. 
The Michigan CIO railed against the disparity as it encouraged its members and others to 
sign the petition calling for a referendum on reapportionment. A newsletter of the 
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Democratic Party made the point this way: “Although Wayne County citizens pay 48% 
of the state’s total tax bill, they have only 7 of the 32 senators to speak for them in the 
legislature.”30  
Defendants of the current apportionment arrangement also opposed the 
empowerment of the public sector. As the public sector and their unions increased in 
power, so did their efforts to negotiate for higher wages. Because higher wages might 
require higher taxes, many bristled over these efforts. It does not require a huge leap to 
conclude that opponents of reapportionment also supported the Hutchinson Act for the 
same reasons, since this law made it more difficult for the public sector and their unions 
to fight for wage increases and improvements in their working conditions.  
The heavily CIO-supported Michigan Committee for Representative Government 
did not pursue an initiative on reapportionment alone. It formed a coalition with other 
organizations that stood to benefit from a reapportioned legislature. The Michigan CIO 
aside, the Detroit chapter of the NAACP, Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), the 
Michigan Democratic Party, the Michigan Farmers Union, the Teamster’s Union, the 
American Federation of Labor and others came together to assist in the effort to gather 
signatures and encourage their members that reapportionment had merit. The Michigan 
Federation of Labor joined the effort after its own petition drive could not gain traction. 
With the NAACP’s membership based in metropolitan Detroit, its constituents suffered 
even more acutely from the current apportionment of legislative seats. As for the ADA, 
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its civil rights platform suggested that it would think well of reapportionment.31  
While the Michigan Committee for Representative Government formally headed 
up the effort to place a reapportionment initiative on the November 1952 ballot, the 
Michigan CIO and several of its member entities played the major role in the effort even 
as they sought to give the impression that they did not.32 That the Michigan CIO played a 
major part in this effort formally coordinated by the Michigan Committee for 
Representative Government is evidenced by the presence of Ted Sachs and Bernice B. 
Howell during the drafting of the formal language to be placed on the ballot. Sachs 
served as attorney for Committee at this time.33 
In 1952 and the years leading up to it, the Michigan CIO’s stance vis a vis 
reapportionment paralleled that of the state’s Democratic Party. Indeed, Neil Stabler of 
the Michigan Democratic Party requested input from Teamster President James Hoffa, 
the UAW’s Roy Reuther, Michigan Federation of Teacher’s Robert Scott, and Gus 
Scholle of the Michigan CIO, for a strongly-worded resolution condemning 
malapportionment and calling for a democratic remedy. The resolution read, in part, 
The Michigan Legislature has for a full generation refused 
to perform its constitutional duty to reapportion the 
legislature every 10 years. This cynical disregard of a plain 
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constitutional mandate has made our law-making body a 
towering symbol of flagrant law violation. It denies the 
most basic beliefs on which our democracy was founded. It 
destroys the faith of our people in government by law. It 
arrogates to a minority the power to govern us all. We 
consider this condition intolerable, not merely because we 
are Democrats and believe men to be equal but still more 
because we are Americans and believe in our American 
democracy. We repudiate the pretensions of the present 
Republican leadership, which would perpetuate this 
condition. We repudiate their claims of superior wisdom in 
a minority of our people.”34 
That Staebler sent this draft resolution to four prominent leaders of Michigan’s organized 
labor demonstrates the interests that organized labor had in reapportionment and the close 
relationship between organized labor and the Democratic Party in Michigan. The 
Michigan Democratic Party, two weeks later during its May 10, 1952 convention, 
adopted many of August Scholle’s suggestions for changes to the resolution. This 
demonstrates the strength of the relationship, as well the deference of Michigan 
Democrats to organized labor.35 
As the Michigan Committee for Representative Government and CIO identified 
organizations to help fight for reapportionment, they used the media to assist in the effort. 
Through television, radio and film, they ensured that prospective signatories to the 
petitions knew about the issues regarding reapportionment.  
The use and distribution of cartoons comprised part of this strategy to inform and 
convince. To say that a picture can tell a story of a thousand words is to miss the point 
that pictures often tell stories that words cannot fully relate. Such is the case with the 
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cartoons that reapportionment advocates used to dramatize their position. The 1952 
campaign to gain a ballot proposal illustrates this point. One handbill had four images -- 
one of an ax chopping through a ballot, another with a man gagged and handcuffed, a 
third of a gloating politician making a speech, and a fourth depicting a man with a 
bandage around his head and carrying a tattered flag. The images sought to graphically 
depict the ill-effects of malapportionment as to how votes became unequal, how the 
majority of the people were without a voice, and how conservative politicians benefited 
from the system. “As long as the majority of Michigan’s residents have only half a voice 
in the Michigan Legislature,” the flyer proclaimed, “these groups can push through the 
kind of legislation they want – hold down the kind of legislation most of the people in the 
state desire.” “If enough people sign the petition which will be circulated house to house 
throughout the state,” the flyer continued, “this proposal will go on the ballot.”36  
In another cartoon, distributed to factory workers at plant gates, the word, 
“shortchanged,” accompanied the image of a butcher representing the state legislature 
weighing a small piece of meat with a tag attached reading, “your vote.” The buyer 
looked worried and confused while a woman left the store with a large piece of meat 
tagged, “special privileged vote.”37  Yet another cartoon depicted a fist holding up a 
dumbbell that was tilted with eleven stick figures at one end, representing the 18th 
district, with eleven people and one person coupled with three pine trees, four stumps, 
and three rabbits at the other end, representing the 32nd district. In this illustration, each 
                                                 
36
“Your Voting Power Has Been Cut in Half,” box 151, folder 4, Michigan AFL-
CIO Collection, ALUA. 
37Ralph Showalter to Purdy et al., 22 April 1952, UAW memo, box 151, folder 4, 
Michigan AFL-CIO Collection, ALUA.  
133 
 
side of the dumbbell received one vote.38 The cartoons served an important role, given 
that many perceived the reapportionment debate as confusing, somehow associated with 
communism, or simply unconvincing.39 Graphically depicting the issues helped sway 
otherwise doubtful members of the electorate to sign petitions and, ultimately, convinced 
some to vote for the proposal that made its way onto the November 1952 ballot. 
In terms of educating prospective signatories, reapportionment advocates did not 
stop with cartoons. They also bought television and advertising time. In a two-minute 
television commercial, which apparently doubled as a film to show to prospective voters, 
a prototypical voter enters a voting booth only to suddenly get squashed down to about 
1/2 size. He became agitated and worried at the thought of having his vote similarly 
shrunk. The film, a UAW memo argued, “can be used to introduce a 15 minute 
discussion, or to be followed by a short appeal to sign the petitions.”40 With the number 
of union meetings in Detroit and elsewhere in the state, CIO reapportionment advocates 
sought many opportunities to pursue this angle.41 This is why early on in the petition 
campaign, August Scholle and Barney Hopkins let it be known that “The Michigan CIO 
Council is…interested in preparing materials which can be used throughout Michigan in 
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such a [reapportionment petition] campaign. Among the materials which we are 
considering are film strips and motion picture films.”42 In an effort to ensure that this 
tactic had merit, Scholle and Hopkins requested that Michigan CIO councils complete a 
survey indicating if they had motion picture projectors and film strip machines, if they 
might be interested in purchasing such machines and if they would be willing “…to show 
these film-strips to local unions, community groups, [and] other agencies in your 
community.”43  
Because of their extensive television campaign, unions may not have limited 
themselves to union meetings as an outlet for public education on reapportionment. “For 
the first time in the history of Detroit television,” a memo from Ed Lee, Coordinator of 
the Reapportionment Petition Campaign, to petition circulators claimed, “all three 
stations – WXYZ-TV, WJBK-TV AND WWJ-TV – will be carrying the same type of 
program [regarding reapportionment] at the same time for the same sponsor.”44 As the 
memo later urged, “So we want every possible petition circulator to be ringing door bells 
while we have this tremendous television audience looking on.”45 Not only did elements 
within organized labor offer ten cents per valid signature, they also made another offer. 
“The petition circulator in Wayne County who gets the most signers that day will be the 
guest of Guy Nunn on the ‘Meet the UAW’ television show WWJ-TV, in the near 
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future.”46 As an added suggestion on how to secure signatures, the authors advised, 
“Chats and debates might be interesting, but they won’t get you on television.”47 This 
tactic was probably inspired by the need for organized labor to find “gimmicks” for this 
effort. Those involved understood that “it is many times easier to get petitions out than to 
get them back loaded with signatures.48 Other techniques included simply smiling, having 
a pleasant manner, and the timing of follow up comments to initial negative reactions. 
Hard sell tactics were followed by tactics of a soft sell nature, all of which one letter 
suggested would result in optimal results.49 
The radio announcements that the UAW produced may have been more important 
than the television programs, given that radio still had a larger audience than television in 
1952. When the UAW produced “a number of radio spot announcements …[for]… 
Wayne County,” the organization used a wise strategy. It even produced an 
announcement in Polish, recognizing the large Polish-speaking community in Hamtramck 
and elsewhere in the Detroit area.50 
To assist the petition circulators in their effort to solicit signatures, organizers 
representing the Michigan Committee for Representative Government issued “red, white 
and blue badges for you to wear on your lapel while you are circulating petitions,” which 
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simultaneously identified them as pursuing an authorized activity, but also communicated 
the idea that the effort was consistent with American values.51 In a period of American 
history where many saw unions and much of what they supported as having a foreign and 
communist element, this was an important idea to convey. 
The CIO took out advertisements in newspapers to help argue its point and 
encourage its readers to sign reapportionment petitions. In one full-page advertisement in 
the Flint Weekly Review, the headline blared, “FOR THE PEOPLE: LET’S HAVE 
REAPPORTIONMENT.” The ad showed a picture of Abraham Lincoln and quoted him 
as saying, “‘That Government of the People, By the People And for the People Shall Not 
Perish From the Earth.’” It also provided information on population disparities among 
senatorial districts and anti-labor legislation that a reapportioned state legislature could 
eliminate.52 
Reapportionment’s friends in organized labor ensured that those soliciting 
signatures for petitions received the necessary training and instructions to carry out the 
work. Leaving few stones unturned, they anticipated questions that petition circulators 
might confront. In a two-page handout entitled, “Questions and Answers on How to 
Circulate Petitions,” workers were told who qualified to circulate petitions, what other 
requirements circulators had to satisfy, and if names had to be signed in ink. The handout 
even provided instructions for the way married women should sign a petition, if initials 
were appropriate, and where circulators could obtain information about petitions.53 In 
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another handout simply titled, “Instructions,” the document instructed prospective 
petition circulators to obtain lists of registered voters from the relevant precinct, work 
with others, and solicit signatures after 5:00pm when people were more likely to be at 
home. These 'instructions' also asked circulators to return signed petitions “to your Local 
Union or to the CIO Council Office,” and complete the proper paper work so that the 
petition circulator can credit him or her properly.54 Consistent with the idea of leaving no 
stone unturned, Gus Scholle urged that “[d]uring the [petition] drive, we should have a 
weekly report and keep a list of people in each county who are to file the petitions.”55 
The CIO ensured that petition circulators received compensation for their work, 
thereby better ensuring the success of the petition drive. Since early April, “they had 
established a policy of paying 10 [cents] for each valid signature.” While costly, the 
Michigan CIO Council hired a core of full time petition circulators to undertake the task, 
even when August Scholle objected because of the cost involved.56  
Portions of the Michigan CIO considered the effort important enough to raise 
funds for the work involved in securing signatures. Instead of dipping into funds 
earmarked for other purposes, they encouraged CIO-affiliated locals “to pass [a] 10 cent 
per capita contribution” for the effort. The UAW went so far as to match five cents for 
every ten cents contributed to the campaign by non-UAW locals, indicating the 
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seriousness with which it endowed the campaign. The CIO also sought to have the wives 
of members, members of the women’s auxiliary, and the unemployed to seek signatures. 
They arranged for unemployed members of the petition drive to receive pay without 
having to pay income taxes or report their pay to the Unemployment Commission. 
Through these means, the CIO simultaneously secured temporary employment for those 
who needed it while seeking the signatures it needed.57 
In addition to the above, the UAW produced “a thousand posters on fairly thin 
paper bearing the red, white and blue colors to denote a tone of patriotism with the words, 
'Sign a petition for FAIR and EQUAL representation – Michigan Committee for 
Representative Government.’” The UAW planned to produce 5,000 posters of the same 
design and layout but made of cardboard for the purpose of “tacking up on posts and 
putting in windows.” With these posters, the UAW also produced “50 banners made of 
from the design of this poster but a different shape.” These large banners, four feet by 
twelve feet, “on sign cloth with 5 foot ropes attached at the four corners,” could be used 
during various parades and demonstrations where reapportionment advocates would 
participate.58  
For the effort it put forth, the Michigan Committee for Representative 
Government, with significant help from the Michigan CIO, secured the necessary 
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signatures, allowing it to be placed on the November 1952 ballot. Asking the electorate to 
amend Sections 2, 3, and 4 of Article V of the 1908 Michigan Constitution, the 
constitutional amendment proposed by the Michigan Committee for Representative 
Government and strongly supported by the state CIO, sought a reapportionment of the 
state legislature based strictly on population. The secretary of state, whose office held 
jurisdiction over reapportionment, was to use the U.S. Census for Michigan as the basis 
for reapportionment. The Secretary of State was to make arrangements for 
reapportionment on April 1, 1953, and repeat the process every ten subsequent years. The 
proposal required that the Secretary of State publish and distribute the plan and for the 
Supreme Court of Michigan to hold jurisdiction over its enforcement.  
Proposal 2 provided for a 33 member senate and a 99 member house, the 
population of senatorial and house districts was to be determined by dividing the number 
of state residents by 33 and 99 respectively in order to obtain the average size of these 
districts. Understanding that no reapportionment plan could assure precisely equal 
populations between districts, it allowed for a 15% differential from the average. 
Proposal 2 included clauses that operated against gerrymandering by requiring that 
individual counties not be divided for the purpose of determining senate or house districts 
unless they exceeded 115% of the average size of a county. Similarly, Proposition #2 
provided that no city may be divided to form senatorial districts unless such cities 
comprise in excess of 85% of a district. Proposition #2 allowed for exceptions where a 
single city was located within two counties, in which case it could be divided at the 
county line. Proposition #2 also mentioned that territory comprising each senatorial 
district should contain three house districts. Additionally, districts were not to be formed 
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with regard to partisan consideration, and these districts were to be convenient, 
contiguous, compact and rectangular in shape.59 
Much to the chagrin of Proposal #2 advocates, its opponents were successful in 
placing a rival apportionment initiative on the ballot. Proposal #3, which its detractors 
argued was only introduced once the proponents of Proposal #2 began their own petition 
drive, differed greatly from Proposal #2. It called for 34 state senators and not more than 
110 house members. Decidedly more complicated than Proposal #2, Proposal #3 called 
for the districts to consider factors in addition to population.60 
The basic difference between the two proposals was that Proposal #2 argued for 
population equality between districts while Proposal #3 sought to balance the competing 
interests of rural counties against those of urban interests. In the same way that each state 
has two U.S. Senators, regardless of the population of those states, so the argument runs, 
counties should have at least one senator, regardless of size. Proponents of Proposal #2 
argued that such an arrangement gave undue power to rural residents and that the 
constitutional provision mandating that each state receive two U.S. Senators was based 
on the idea that states possess sovereignty, which, by definition, requires representation, 
whereas no such constitutional provision was ever intended to extend sovereignty to 
counties within states. Even Proposal #3 supporters conceded that some counties were 
too small to justify the same level of representation as those larger counties existing in 
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urban areas.61 
With the competing proposals on the November ballot, proponents of each began 
their campaign to convince voters of their respective merits. The effort pursued by the 
Michigan CIO reflected a sense of urgency similar to that which characterized the 
petition drive. To this end, the CIO engaged in a full-scale publicity drive “through the 
medium of billboards, bumper strips, buttons, etc.” Indeed, the CIO distributed “[b]etter 
than 50,000 bumper strips on Proposal #2.”62  
Indeed, taking into account the extensive legal research, publicity in the media via 
advertisements, editorials, radio spots, films, television commercials, fees provided 
petition circulators, as well as the billboards, bumper strips and buttons, the Greater 
Detroit and Wayne County CIO “spent some $65,000 to get this [reapportionment 
amendment proposal] on the ballot.” 63 Expressing the urgency of the matter just two 
weeks before the November 4, 1952, election, President Mike Novak stated that “we 
simply have to have more representation, considering the amount of money we have 
invested, we have got to win with Proposal #2, and we ask each and everyone one of you 
to do everything you can.”64 The sense of urgency aside, the leadership of the Detroit-
area CIO was confident of success. “‘If material is going to win an election, we will 
smother the Republicans under, because we have enough slates for the plants and the 
neighborhoods.’”65 
As with the petition drive, the CIO pursued a strategy for an optimal outcome at 
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the ballot box once it had achieved success with the petition drive. They secured the 
assistance of workers from plants to spread the word about the proposal. They requested 
their names, addresses, and telephone numbers so that they could make follow up calls to 
ensure worker participation. They also took gender into consideration. “…in the 
neighborhood,” CIO officers discussed at one meeting in October 1952, “if a woman 
rings the doorbell the lady of the house is more apt to speak to a woman than to a man.” 
They understood the importance of concentrating their efforts on Wayne County, since 
the electorate of that county stood to benefit most from a reapportioned legislature.66 
The Michigan CIO sought the support of Governor G. Mennen Williams, who 
was sympathetic toward reapportionment. The month before the November 4 election, 
CIO Assistant Regional Director H. T. McCreedy asked the Governor to request material 
on reapportionment from the Council of State Governments, of which Michigan was a 
member. McCreedy even drafted the letter of request. Governor Williams sent the 
information he received to McCreedy, who used it to help the CIO build its case for a 
reapportioned Michigan legislature.67 
Speaking to civic groups about the benefits of Proposal #2, comprised part of the 
strategy. One instance of this tactic involved Tom Downs, an assistant to Gus Scholle and 
an attorney in his own right. One observer considered Downs an expert on 
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reapportionment, making him an ideal spokesman on such occasions.68 In the week 
before the November 4, 1952, election, he spoke to the Kiwanis Club of East Lansing for 
this very purpose. An opponent of reapportionment had already spoken to the club at a 
previous meeting; in the interest of hearing both views on the subject, the club elected to 
hear Downs’ views on the subject.  
Another component of the strategy involved placing advertisements for proposal 2 
in newspapers. One such full-page advertisement appeared in Lansing’s State Journal 
two days preceding the election.  “WHO Says Ingham County Residents Aren’t As Good 
As Other People???” blared one advertisement. “Proposal No. 3 Motto”? the 
advertisement continues: ‘”You Write the Checks; We’ll Keep the Balances,” the ad 
persisted, alluding to the “balanced legislature” proposal supported by Proposal #3 
proponents. In smaller print, the advertisement identified various corporations as the 
sponsors of Proposal #3. “Michigan is $70 million in debt. Under Proposal 3…you, the 
property owner, would be forced to pay that debt…because corporations…by keeping 
control of the legislature…would block every effort to increase their taxes.” After then 
listing, “What Proposal 2 Does…”, the advertisement encouraged its readers to “vote Yes 
on State Proposal 2” because “Only Proposal 2 Means a Full Vote For You.”69 That the 
Michigan Committee for Representative Government decided to place an ad in this 
newspaper suggests that its strategy entailed an attempt to influence an electorate outside 
of the more traditional base of metropolitan Detroit. 
In a particularly biting statement, clearly used to evoke patriotism and anti-
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communist feeling in an environment where labor organizations were often labeled as 
“communistic,” a flyer produced by the Committee for Representative Government and 
distributed during the campaign to educate the electorate about Proposal #2 said, 
In Soviet Russia, Joe Stalin and his Communist Regime 
have 7% of the people rule the other 93%. The ‘Balanced 
Legislature’ would have 35% rule the other 65%. The only 
difference between the minority rule – proposal of the 
‘Balanced Legislature’ and Joe Stalin’s minority 
dictatorship is one of degree!!70  
With pictures and quotes from Presidents Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Abraham 
Lincoln calling for representative government, the flyer brought home the idea that 
Proposal 2 was consistent with the democratic and American values of Michigan voters 
and not those of the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, the battle over whether organized labor 
or business groups were more in line with “communistic’ tendencies was usually won by 
business, as labor could not often rid itself of the association. 
Michigan's business community largely opposed Proposal 2. This opposition 
largely coalesced in the form of the Michigan Manufacturers Association (MMA). John 
Lovett, who had served as general manager of the MMA for more than thirty-two years, 
had always placed emphasis on politics. Thought of as a mercenary by some, Lovett 
enjoyed the support of Michigan’s business community.71 Shortly after he became 
MMA’s general manager in 1919, he addressed the membership during its annual 
banquet with words that guided his work with the organization subsequently: 
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I want to impress every man here with the importance of 
remembering that the state legislature is nominated in 
August every two years and the largest job you have or will 
have in the next twenty years is to find out who the right 
man is to represent you, and see that he is elected. You do 
not need to fear radicalism if you have the right kind of 
public officials to enforce the laws.72 
With these words in mind, Lovett spent much of the next 30 years leading this industry 
group whose purpose it was to control the legislature to the benefit of its constituents. 
On the occasion of Lovett’s death, Russell Barnes of the Detroit News 
commented that, “his main job was to stop legislation he considered inimical to Michigan 
industry. His tactics were simple,” Barnes continued. “He rarely worked the House of 
Representatives. He always endeavored to line up a negative majority in the Senate.”73 
This tactic reflected the problem that CIO advocates of reapportionment sought to 
change, namely the malapportionment of Senate districts, which benefited rural and 
conservative areas of the state. A “Draft of Statement on Reapportionment,” outlined a 
major source of the problem for advocates of reapportionment and reflected the sentiment 
posited by Detroit News writer Barnes. “The Michigan Manufacturer’s mouthpiece, John 
Lovett,” the statement said, “has found it easier to control Republican legislators from 
over-represented areas than to control legislators from under-represented areas.”74 The 
statement included the following: “The power-control to help unfair voting and to, in 
effect, steal votes from urban areas is based upon the John Lovett-Michigan 
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Manufacturers Association-Republican Party control.”75 Why did the MMA have an 
interest in ensuring Proposal #2’s defeat and Proposal #3’s success? Money. According 
to state house representative and house minority leader Ed Carey, “‘These big business-
banker groups have been more concerned with stopping corporation taxes than they have 
in good government.’”76 With reapportionment came the prospect that a more liberal and 
union-friendly legislature would raise taxes for social programs in cities and to protect 
the interests of organized labor generally.  
The Michigan Manufacturers Association exhibited concern about what it saw as 
the ill-effects of a reapportioned state senate. In one of its bulletins issued less than two 
weeks before the election, it argued: 
If Proposal No 2 wins on November 4, the constitution of 
Michigan will be re-written by organized labor and its 
sympathizers. That this is so is pointed up by the fact that 
when the present labor-backed governor of Michigan 
vetoed a bill passed by the 1952 legislature to place before 
the voters the question of calling a constitutional 
convention, he said that such a convention should not be 
called until the legislature was reapportioned. He did not 
want delegates elected from the present State senatorial 
districts. He wanted the districts rearranged so as to put 
organized labor in the driver’s seat.77 
The MMA did not suffer from misplaced logic. After all, delegates to any 
constitutional convention were to be elected from Senate districts where Republicans 
benefited from malapportionment. More to the point, a constitution framed by one party 
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invariably favored the social, economic and political tendencies of that party as well as 
the legislation flowing from this process, as had been true in Michigan with Republican 
ascendancy after the Civil War. Given this focus and strategy, few doubted how Lovett 
would have responded to the efforts by organized labor in Michigan to reapportion the 
political body that Lovett had worked so hard to influence. His death on March 16, 1952, 
coming just as the CIO began pursuing its petition drive for a reapportionment initiative, 
did not stop the organization from continuing what became a successful fight to more 
firmly solidify a malapportioned state senate. 
The MMA constituted a formidable political force and exercised that force on 
behalf of Proposal #3. This came in the form of support from eighty-seven affiliated 
Chambers of Commerce and thirty other organizations, including the Michigan Retailers 
Association, the Michigan Farm Bureau, the Michigan Bankers Association, the Detroit 
Board of Commerce and the Detroit Retail Merchants Association. With this support, the 
Michigan Committee for a Balanced Legislature, the organization that formally headed 
up the effort for a Proposal #3, filed petitions bearing 270,000 signatures, nearly 100,000 
of which the Michigan Farm Bureau secured. Expressing a sense of urgency comparable 
to the CIO, the MMA argued that, “the time for action has not only arrived, but there’s 
little of it left. This is not a matter to be laid aside for future reference. The only way the 
challenge can be met is by the circulation of petitions for the signatures of your friends 
and associates.”78  
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Like the Michigan Committee for Representative Government, the Michigan 
Committee for a Balanced Legislature, organized a campaign to secure signatures for its 
own petition. In one flyer entitled, “Preserve the American Way for Michigan – 
Reapportionment – Provide Fair Representation,” the group provided instructions and a 
fact sheet outlining how to convince citizens to sign their petition. “Let’s get one thing 
clear,” the flyer cautioned, “either Michigan will have a balanced legislature with fair 
representation or Michigan will have an unbalanced legislature with labor control.”79 By 
invoking the idea of fairness, the authors of this flyer argued against a fully population-
based form of representation and argued, instead, that geography should count for 
something in the same way that it did in the country’s federal system of government, 
which gave each state two U.S. Senators regardless of population. The author of the flyer 
rightly argued that the CIO sought to increase its legislative power with an amendment to 
the constitution mandating a population-based system of representation. “If you wish this 
to happen,” the petition warned, “sign the CIO or AFL petition – or DON’T sign any, 
DON’T vote, DON’T speak, just sit still. The CIO and AFL will be glad to run your 
affairs.”80 In a letter from Otis Cook, the Chairman of the Michigan Committee for a 
Balanced Legislature, he invoked a similar tone of fear. “This is your fight,” the 
statement said in part. “You can help stop the power grab by labor if you will move into 
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action at once and get the petitions signed.”81 The sense of urgency that the statements 
evoked had their intended effect, as the Committee for a Balanced Legislature secured the 
signatures necessary for its apportionment proposal placed on the ballot.  
Why Proposal #2 Advocates Lost 
For all of the hard work, creative tactics, and exorbitant resources the CIO 
expended to convince the electorate to vote for Proposal #2 in November of 1952, its 
leaders must have been disappointed by the outcome of the vote on Proposal #2. In total, 
1,415,355 people voted against the measure and 924,242 voted for it. As for Proposal #3, 
1,269,807 voted for it while 975,518 voted against it, ensuring continued inequities 
between districts, until the courts ruled otherwise or the people voted to support another 
initiative. While Wayne County voted 531,989 for the measure and counted 371,713 
people who voted against it, one may speculate that the difference should have been 
greater. Equally surprising was the vote tally for and against the proposal in Kent County, 
the state’s third largest county. As in Wayne County, the state CIO expended a great 
many resources to ensure its success. However, Proposal #2 received more than 30% 
fewer votes than those who voted against it. More than any other county, Oakland 
County’s tally suggested that the electorate remained confused about the meaning of the 
issues involved, as its electorate voted against both proposals. A few pundits advised this 
strategy, arguing that a yes vote on either would only incite the losing side to pursue a 
counter amendment during a subsequent election.82 Whether the electorate exhibited 
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confusion or clarity on the issues, one fact held true: The CIO lost and lost big in this, its 
first effort to reapportion the state legislature. 
August Scholle, attorney Theodore Sachs, and others in organized labor must 
have paused to consider why their efforts failed to convince the electorate to vote “yes” 
on Proposal #2 and “no” on Proposal #3. There were reasons for the outcome, the essence 
of which reapportionment advocates did not fully consider or appreciate. The strategy 
they adopted may have played some role in the outcome, but the more likely explanation 
lies in the power of the forces opposed to their efforts. 
That power came in the form of corporate America. The immediate post World 
War II era found organized labor and corporate America battling for power, with neither 
fully eclipsing the other. Labor sought to build on advances it had made during the New 
Deal and in a war where workers enjoyed gains based on labor shortages and a 
government that protected some of its interests. Labor's power coalesced in the 1945-
1946 strike wave that gained labor concessions. Labor's power also evidenced itself in 
UAW's “Walter Reuther's demand that GM open its books to union negotiators in order 
to link wages, prices, and profits,”83 demands that threatened the hegemony sought by 
corporate America.84  
As the country moved into the 1950s, however, business reclaimed much of its 
lost power, even as organized labor's ranks grew. This political shift found expression a 
few years before with the Taft-Hartley Act, which provided for unfair labor practices 
against employees, outlawed secondary boycotts, and required union officers to sign a 
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pledge verifying that they were not communists. The specific provisions of the Taft-
Hartley Act aside, historian Lawrence Richards reminds us “that the Taft-Hartley Act 
was detrimental to organized labor not because of any specific provision in the act itself, 
but because of the message it conveyed about the place of unions in American society.”85 
The Taft-Hartley Act had long-range consequences. Indeed, in the period from 1945 to 
1952, historian Elizabeth Fones-Wolf argues, corporate America went to great lengths to 
sway public opinion to a set of beliefs reflecting its interests, while denigrating those of 
organized labor and others with opposing views.86 The Taft-Hartley Act reflected a belief 
that labor had achieved more power than was deserved. The Wagner Act of 1935 had 
created the imbalance, or so the argument went. Henceforth, such terms as “labor trust,” 
“labor monopoly,” “union boss,” “big labor,” “feudal lords,” “dictators,” “tyrants,” 
“racketeering,” and “autocrats,” entered the American lexicon with increasing frequency 
and refocused favorable attention away from organized labor and toward business 
interests.87 In light of the above, it is little wonder that opponents of reapportionment 
frequently referred to those pursuing it as working within the framework of the “CIO 
plan.” In this context, it also makes equally as much sense that the CIO operated through 
the Michigan Committee for Representative Government, thereby masking a sponsor that 
many questioned. 
Part of the problem for those supporting reapportionment, concerned how labor 
occasionally referred to Michigan’s outstate residents. On one occasion, an editorial in 
the Detroit Labor News made reference to “the out-over stump lands in the jack pine 
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country; the fallow acres of our state.”88 While seeking to galvanize support for its own 
legitimate cause, the Detroit Labor News and others using similar language, unwittingly 
fostered antagonism from otherwise sympathetic people by referring to them with 
condescension and contempt. 
The defeat of Proposal 2 may also have been due to the confusion over how to 
vote. Wayne County Sheriff Andrew C. Baird, a proponent of Proposal #2, commented 
on this confusion in his letter to MCRG chairwoman, Bernice F. Howell. In that letter, 
written less than a month before the election he noted that, 
I find a general indifference among a great number of 
voters and those who are interested are very much confused 
as to how to vote. Now that the gorgeous billboards have 
been put up by the opponents of the measure, which plainly 
say, ‘vote NO on Proposal No. 2’ and ‘Vote YES on 
Proposal No. 3,’ which is in direct conflict to our 
instruction, ‘Vote YES on Proposal Number 2’ and ‘Vote 
NO on Proposal Number 3’ the confusion is that much 
more complicated.89 
Baird’s suggestion to modify the plan entailed that the MCRG create a small card to 
bring to the polls with them to refer to before voting, and for different organizations to 
distribute the ballot to their respective members.  
This distribution, of course, means work, labor and money 
and the preparation of envelopes should be started in ample 
time to have them ready for mailing say not later than 
October 28 or October 29, which will insure delivery at the 
home Friday, Saturday or Monday just before the 
election.90 
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Baird’s suggestions had merit. However, no evidence exists that the MCRG followed 
through on his advice. 
Confusion may also have arisen given the names used to refer to the opposing 
measures. The terms, “a balanced legislature” and “representative government,” both 
conjured up positive connotations. Because each side used these terms as part of their 
names, the electorate may have been confused as to which proposal they should vote for. 
After all, who would not want a “balanced legislature,” or “representative government?” 
The reality, however, is that anyone expressing anything approaching a strong view about 
one of the proposals would be opposed to the other. Confusion aside, Sheriff Andrew 
Baird brought up another problem of equal significance, which he perceived to be 
indifference. 
The Detroit News also added to the confusion. Other newspapers and magazines 
had taken a clear side in the debates. The News, however, advised its readers to reject 
both proposals. It argued that the legislature should obey the constitutional mandate to 
reapportion legislative districts three years after each federal census, instead of seeking 
an amendment that would only inspire the losing side to renew its efforts in a subsequent 
initiative. Objectively speaking, this advice was ill-conceived, because it was not in the 
interest for a Republican-dominated legislature to reapportion itself. Moreover, the 
Supreme Court and many lower courts also were unwilling to intervene in 
reapportionment cases, let alone rule in favor of those seeking redress. Whatever the case, 
many of its readers may have followed the advice of the Detroit News, thereby 
contributing to an outcome that had some ambiguous elements.91 
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August “Gus” Scholle and Theodore Sachs 
August Scholle, attorney Ted Sachs, and other labor advocates of reapportionment 
must have been disappointed and discouraged following the defeat of Proposal 2. 
Whatever sentiments they harbored, however, did not stop them from biding their time, 
considering other options, and renewing their efforts in subsequent years. Those efforts 
came seven years later, when Scholle launched a suit against Michigan Secretary of State 
James Hare, Frank D. Beadle, et al., to invalidate the amendment on which the electorate 
voted in the form of Proposal #3 in 1952 on the grounds that it violated the equal 
protection clause embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment.92 
 Scholle and Sachs were no less prominent in the discussion leading up to and 
including the ballot proposal than were Michigan CIO Secretary-Treasurer Barney 
Hopkins, Michigan Committee for Representative Government Chair Bernice Howell, 
and UAW President Walter Reuther. However, these two men committed tremendous 
time to reapportion Michigan legislative districts. The important role they played in the 
1952 ballot initiative notwithstanding, their role escalated in 1959, when Scholle initiated 
a suit before the Michigan State Supreme Court to have the 1952 amendment invalidated. 
It is not surprising that the malapportionment of Michigan’s legislative districts inspired 
them into action requiring patience and perseverance.   
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August “Gus” Scholle stood as the key figure in the long battle to reapportion the 
state legislature. By the time he began pursuing reapportionment, he already had one 
successful Supreme Court case under his belt, the “portal to portal” pay case of 1946. The 
end result of that case mandated that employers pay their employees for the time they 
needed to prepare for their jobs while on the premises of the employer and time involved 
in getting from place to place while on job.93  
Scholle spent most of his career in the Midwest. Most of that time he worked on 
behalf of organized labor. He began his career as a glass worker in 1920 after dropping 
out of high school at 16. Early in his life, Scholle became the president of a glass workers 
local in Toledo. He helped lead the glass workers, a union originally affiliated with the 
AFL, into the then newly founded Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). In fact, 
the glass workers became one of the original eight unions that formed the CIO. He served 
as president of the Michigan CIO Council, beginning in 1931 and he was elected 
president of the Michigan AFL-CIO when those two organizations merged in 1958.94 
If Walter Reuther looked beyond the immediate concerns of the UAW and sought 
significant societal changes in his form of social unionism, Gus Scholle had similar 
inclinations. His world focused most specifically on the citizens of Michigan. Like 
Reuther, Scholle pursued a wide range of social and political reforms and envisioned a 
world where common people could live with dignity. Like Reuther, Scholle also was an 
avid anti-communist. He bristled over what he considered a manipulative organization 
bent on compromising much-needed reforms with a system of government he believed 
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unworthy of the name.95  
With a gravel voice that elevated to a roar when conveying his opinions, Scholle 
was a target for Republican detractors, who often referred to him as a “dictator” and 
“tycoon.” They clearly saw him as their nemesis. Coleman Young once referred to 
Scholle as a “right-wing Reutherite from the glassblowers’ union,” obviously a pejorative 
reference.96 From another perspective, the Democratic-labor alliance Scholle helped to 
form in the late 1940s allowed G. Mennen Williams to win six successive terms as 
Governor. It also helped a number of other Democrats to win elections to state offices. 
For his efforts, Scholle received the nickname, “Kingmaker.” The achievements mattered 
little to Scholle. The governor’s seat had limited significance, he believed, when 
important legislation could not make it out of committee. Republican legislators, whose 
majority derived from malapportioned legislative districts, quashed even popularly 
supported reforms with their votes.97 Once Scholle realized the connection between 
malapportioned legislative districts and the difficulty that progressive governors like 
Williams had in moving legislation, Scholle knew that he had to do everything in his 
power to reapportion the legislature. It took many years, and there were moments when it 
seemed that a truly reapportioned state legislature was a distant and unlikely prospect. 
However, Scholle never relented. It was this Gus Scholle, with this background and these 
qualities, who launched an effort that, some have argued, solidified his stature more than 
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any other achievement.98  
 Scholle’s commitment to seeing Michigan citizens receive equity in 
representation notwithstanding, he relied heavily on a trained lawyer to research the 
matter, litigate the successive string of civil suits in Michigan, and –most importantly— 
believe in its merits. For these skills and background Scholle turned to Theodore “Ted” 
Sachs. The youngest child of Russian Jewish immigrants, Theodore Sachs was born and 
raised in Detroit. Though they were not well educated themselves, his parents Abraham 
and Esther Sachs emphasized the importance of education to their five children. Indeed, 
their son, Ted graduated salutatorian from Detroit’s Central High School before attending 
Wayne State University. The youngest Sachs eventually pursued a law degree from the 
University of Michigan, but his initial interest was in the field of physics, his major at 
Wayne. Determined to pursue an education that would allow him to help others, he 
dropped his major in physics and began a major in political science.99 
In his youth and as a college student, two separate events forced Sachs to look 
upon the world differently and charged him to make a difference in that world. The first 
concerned his father. The poor treatment Abraham Sachs received and observed while 
working as an employee at a Detroit cleaners, inspired the employees there to join a 
union. Better pay and working conditions followed. Ted Sachs never forgot this event, 
and it provided invaluable lessons about the rights of workers and their ability to effect 
change through concerted action. He probably reflected on this experience when he 
applied for a scholarship to law school. The scholarship, offered by left-leaning and 
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prominent members of the organized labor, was on behalf of members of that community 
who had lost their lives in World War II. Sachs took his studies at law school seriously. 
“He ended up editor of the law review,” his wife recalls. Even as a student at Wayne, Ted 
Sachs exhibited an interest in both the Democratic Party and the labor movement, 
interests that remained with him throughout of his life.100 Fellow University of Michigan 
law student Avern Cohn corroborates this account, exclaiming that Sachs was 
“brilliant.”101 
While he had spent his summers delivering milk and selling Good Humor Ice 
Cream, Sachs spent his last summer while in law school as an intern in the law firm 
where George Edwards worked, which prepared him for his later work. As his widow 
Joan Sachs explained,  
When my husband graduated he went to work for the firm 
where George Edwards was a partner … and shortly 
thereafter [Edwards] was named to the bench and he gave 
all the important cases to my husband and we never lost the 
relationship...There was a relationship with all the union 
people and the Democratic Party. And so he became the 
attorney for the Democratic Party in Michigan and the 
attorney for most of the public sector unions.102 
During his career, Sachs became active in a number of other progressive organizations, 
including the Michigan American Civil Liberties Union, which he served as a board 
member; Lawyers Coordinating Committee of the AFL-CIO; the Detroit chapter of the 
Industrial Relations Research Association, for which he served as president; the NAACP, 
and Americans for Democratic Action, which submitted an amicus curiae brief in support 
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of Scholle’s 1960 suit to reapportion the Michigan Senate.103  
These activities increased shortly after Sachs left school. As a supporter of 
Governor Williams, he volunteered his services during Williams’ 1952 re-election bid 
when the incumbent needed someone to represent his candidacy when his adversaries 
challenged the election results. In addition to the reapportionment case, for which he 
would be well-known, Sachs was best known as a labor lawyer who actively represented 
his clients, mostly teachers and firemen, during times of negotiations, strikes, grievances, 
and when they needed him to draft legislation supporting their interests.104 
Given his experience with unions, his association with members of organized 
labor and progressive causes, and his enduring desire to make a difference in the world, 
Ted Sachs sought out progressive causes and labor organizations that loomed large in his 
perspective. His experience, training, and background combined to prompt Scholle to 
contract Sachs to represent him in a case that had an impact on the landmark case of 
Baker v. Carr (1962). Sachs brought the same tenacity he used in pursuit of his education 
to Scholle v. Hare.105 
Let the Litigation Begin 
In late 1959, August Scholle directed his attorney Theodore Sachs to pursue 
litigation in what became Scholle v. Hare, a case litigated in the Michigan Supreme 
Court. It was positioned to invalidate Proposal #3, which had been approved in 1952. 
What the Michigan CIO hoped would be the successful culmination of prior attempts to 
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achieve reapportionment, ended as they had planned but with unexpected detours along 
the way. Like a chess game, where Sachs and Scholle carefully positioned their pieces 
with a particular road map in mind, they ultimately used many of the same pieces in a 
modified case. Surprisingly, Scholle and Sachs played an indirect role in the U.S. 
Supreme Court case of Baker v. Carr (1962). This role helped lay the groundwork for 
Reynolds v. Sims (1964), and, together, forced the reapportionment of legislatures 
throughout the country, including Michigan. What began as a defeat in the case of 
Scholle v. Hare became a battle in a war that they ultimately won.106  
In Scholle v. Hare, Sachs relied heavily on arguments initially researched and 
debated when pursuing the 1952 initiative with Proposal 2. To this end, he broached the 
issue of precedent-setting cases, he noted the clauses in the 1787 Northwest Ordinance 
calling for representative government and, argued that population shifts required that 
responsible parties reapportion legislative districts.107 Sachs did not merely rehash 
demographics from the 1952 initiative. He illustrated how these statistics reflected a more 
glaring example of malapportionment in subsequent years. As Sachs stated in his brief, 
…on the basis of projected 1960 figures, plaintiffs district 
has 724,000 persons, while the smallest, the 32nd, has only 
49,000, a variance of 15 to 1 – with such variations existing 
despite a hypothetical ‘average’ district size of 242,000 
persons.108 
As argued elsewhere, the under-represented areas were in urban areas.  
 Sachs raised other issues previously broached during the 1952 effort. He criticized 
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the legislature for not previously reapportioning the legislature decennially, as mandated 
by the 1908 constitution. He also noted that involvement of the courts in this matter was 
appropriate. The argument that malapportionment amounted to taxation without 
representation was raised as it had been seven years before. The defendants argued that 
there was nothing wrong with receiving a disproportionate number of legislators, as was 
often the case with states that received two U.S. Senators regardless of their size. To 
counter this argument, Sachs made sure to point out that states were admitted into the 
union with the understanding that they were sovereign entities and, in a compromise, 
would not enter the union unless they received two senators. This idea was never 
intended to extend to counties, Sachs continued. Most importantly, he referenced the 
violation of the 14th amendment embodied in Proposal #3, an argument put forward in 
1952. If Sachs did not use the exact words he and others used in the 1952 initiative battle, 
the same arguments were made as part of his brief seven years later.109 
 Needless to say, Sachs refined the arguments from 1952 that he presented in his 
brief in 1959 and updated them to include facts not at issue in 1952. After all, these 
arguments had to convince courts who would not have been as moved by the more 
simplistic arguments found in cartoons, billboards, flyers, buttons, bumper stickers, 
newspaper articles, advertisement, and radio and television commercials designed for 
popular consumption. For the legal suit, Sachs crafted a cogent argument. Sustained over 
the course of seventy-one pages, the brief addressed complex legal issues complete with 
eight exhibits. It reflected a strategy aimed at convincing the particular justices hearing 
the case. To his benefit, Sachs used the seven years to reflect on this strategy and how 
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best to present it in this new venue.110 
With the past and current judicial audience in mind, Sachs went beyond the 
arguments used in 1952. In addition to illustrating how malapportionment violated the 
basic precepts of the Fourteenth Amendment, Sachs also argued that the litigation in 
Scholle v. Hare was subject to judicial review and should grant relief to the aggrieved 
parties by allowing the legislature to reapportion itself, lest it suffer the consequences of 
an at-large election until the problem was otherwise resolved.111 From these basic 
arguments, Sachs maintained that, “[e]quality in all respects is at the heart of the 
democratic process,”112 an idea that Proposal #3 blatantly violated. He further argued that 
the rationale for the disparity was arbitrary and did not even conform to issues of land 
mass, as some geographically large counties did not receive a state senator because their 
populations were too small for even Republicans to justify.  
Interestingly enough, Sachs relied on a states rights argument, often the province 
of conservatives, to argue a portion of his case. He relied on Michigan State Supreme 
Court cases as setting precedents and not decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. He relied 
on the Fourteenth Amendment since “[i]t is as much the duty of the Michigan Supreme 
Court to uphold the ‘law of the land’ as it is that of the United States Supreme Court. In 
this way he endeavored to avoid any possible counter-arguments or court’s possible 
subsequent unfavorable ruling that federal courts could only adjudicate in a federal case 
since the plaintiff was merely seeking a ruling in a state court, where similar matters had 
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been adjudicated in the past.113 
As part of the strategy Sachs employed, he made few references to Scholle’s 
constituents or of the interests of metropolitan Detroit.114 He probably felt compelled to 
mention that Scholle was “President of the Michigan State AFL-CIO, representing more 
than 800,000 trade union members in 83 counties and 34 senatorial districts of 
Michigan,”115 but said little more of the matter. The strategy was clear. Any such 
references may have suggested that the fight for reapportionment was primarily about the 
empowerment of labor and Detroit, as opposed to a more basic overarching right that had 
been continually violated. Since many clearly feared the power of organized labor, Sachs 
did all he could to minimize such references without appearing too obvious about 
Scholle’s interests. 
For all of his efforts, Sachs’ arguments to invalidate Proposal #3, did not move 
the majority of the eight Michigan Supreme Court justices hearing the case. Stated 
plainly enough, Justice George Edwards, Jr., speaking for the majority, ruled that, 
Equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, as presently construed by the supreme court 
of the United States do not prohibit, as a wholly arbitrary 
classification, a State constitutional amendment which 
establishes districts substantially unequal in voting power 
for election of State senators…and the State Supreme Court 
is powerless to hold invalid a duly-adopted amendment of 
the State Constitution in the absence of a higher authority 
for so doing than the State Constitution itself...116 
With this, the Court dismissed the petition asking it to invalidate “a duly-adopted 
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amendment of the state constitution”117 and deferred to the U.S. Supreme Court, which 
had not yet ruled on the matter. In so doing, the Court dismissed the issue of inequality 
between districts, however “substantial” that inequality proved to be.  
 The three justices dissenting in the ruling did so in strong and unambiguous terms. 
Justice Kavanagh, for example, referred to the efforts to maintain malapportionment as 
“tyrannical” and inconsistent with the idea of freedom and justice defended through Civil 
and world wars.118 Attacking efforts to preserve malapportioned legislative districts, 
Justice McGrath argued that, “The only designations that can be given the 1952 
amendment are palpably arbitrary, discriminatory, and unreasonable, and as such it is 
class legislation which deprives the plaintiff and other citizens of Michigan of their rights 
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.”119 In his 
dissent, Justice Smith decried the dilution of voting strength, the lack of any formula 
determining state senatorial districts, and the disparity between taxation and 
representation.120 Taking up a charge that brought Scholle into court, Smith stated that, 
“It is clear from the 1950 census…that many of the vast areas partially disenfranchised in 
the State of Michigan are precisely those areas wherein are concentrated the reservoirs of 
manpower necessary to our industrial might, the emigrants from the South, and from 
foreign soil.”121 The ill-effects were clear: “The racial problems, the social problems, and 
the suffrage problems are here brewed together in a vast cauldron.”122 Finally, he argued 
that, “The sorry catalog of abuses of minority rule, here shown in small part, amply 
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demonstrates that government by only part of the people is both pernicious and 
destructive.”123 The comments exhibited during these dissenting arguments while having 
no effect on the ultimate ruling may have resonated with justices ruling on subsequent 
reapportionment cases. 
Notwithstanding the unfavorable ruling handed down by the court, a concurring 
opinion by Justice Black reflected an uneasiness with the way in which powerful forces 
within the state so easily dismissed the wishes of its majority. Justice Black contended 
that, “[s]ome day, inevitably, the supreme court will authorize justifiable employment of 
the equality clause in cases of present political nature. But that day has not yet arrived.” 
Further acknowledging the changing times and the response of the courts to those 
changes, Black concluded that, “Already, in this swiftly advancing second half of the 
Twentieth Century, it becomes more and more apparent that the law, while it ‘must be 
stable,’ cannot ‘stand still.’”124 Referring to the 1952 Proposal #3, Black argued that, 
“…section 2 of said article 5 ruthlessly and progressively discriminates against great 
masses of citizens in favor of a minority of citizens.”125 Even with these caveats, Justice 
Black “vote[d] to dismiss plaintiff’s petition.”126  
Even Justice George Edwards, who stood firm on the legal basis of his ruling in 
this case, suggested that there existed inherent problems with Proposal #3. In his ruling, 
for example, he argued that “[t]his Court does not determine the wisdom of the decisions 
made by the people of Michigan in adopting their Constitution.127 From this vantage 
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point, he argued that, “[h]owever distasteful to some of us the rationale of the majority of 
voters in 1952 may be as support for the classification of senatorial districts which 
resulted from the 1952 amendment, it clearly has been regarded to date as acceptable 
under the United States Constitution by the United States Supreme Court.”128  Given the 
wide and growing population disparities between districts, some justices must have 
questioned whether they had trampled upon the spirit of the law, even as they adhered to 
its letter.  
The Civil Rights movement represented a period of history where forces battled 
over control of socio-economic and political matters. Legislative reapportionment 
signified one of the arenas in which this battle transpired. Much like a tug of war between 
two formidable opponents, the outcome did not appear clear. Historians viewing the 
battle from hindsight could certainly see how the contest transpired in the way that it did. 
In this way, Scholle v. Hare set off, or at least contributed to a chain of events that fed 
into the proceedings of a constitutional convention in Michigan and court battles 
transpiring elsewhere in the country. 
The next battleground over reapportionment came at the 1961-1962 Michigan 
Constitutional Convention. Emboldened by their success in Scholle v. Hare, the 
Republican-dominated convention sought to further solidify malapportionment in the 
Constitution by what came to be known as the 80-20 plan, which allotted 80% of value to 
population and the remaining 20% to area in determining the apportionment of legislative 
districts. It was a convoluted formula that maintained an imbalance that would only differ 
in degree from the then current arrangement. That the 144 delegates included such 
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Michigan AFL-CIO labor leaders as William Marshall and Tom Downs (one of Con 
Con’s three vice presidents), did not thwart the efforts of delegates to adopt a proposed 
constitution that retained legislative districts based on factors other than population. As 
far as these delegates and others were concerned, their battle in this forum was doomed to 
be a losing one. The distribution of delegates by political party within the convention 
reflected the distribution by party within senatorial districts, a method reflecting the pre-
existing and, what many argued, was an imbalance in favor of Republicans in the first 
place.129 
Before the convention adjourned, however, the Supreme Court ruled in Baker v. 
Carr. The ruling did what Scholle and advocates of reapportionment among Con Con 
delegates could not: It forced the Republican-dominated body to reformulate its 
reapportionment plan with the knowledge that any such plan must now pass scrutiny by 
the Supreme Court. The attempt was a futile one. Before malapprotionment advocates 
determined how best to respond, Scholle mounted another legal maneuver to seal the 
promise advanced by the ruling in Baker v. Carr. In Scholle v. Hare II, he sought to 
ensure that the Michigan Supreme Court determine that it would deem that the case was 
subject to judicial review and no longer infringed upon an alternate branch of 
government. This is what the ruling in Baker v. Carr promised.130 
Numerous other lawsuits followed. Michigan AFL-CIO Vice President William 
Marshall, for example, filed suit in Federal District Court, asking that the eighty-twenty 
plan adopted by 1962 Con Con be held unconstitutional. At about the same time, a 
defendant in the first Scholle case, Senator Beadle, appealed the ruling in the second 
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Scholle case on the basis of Justice Stewart’s stay order. In the first of these two cases, 
the plaintiffs lost, as two of the three justice assigned to the case hailed from decidedly 
Republican ranks.131 
Following Justice Stewart’s stay, the Michigan Supreme Court waited to receive 
guidance from the U.S. Supreme Court. Their wait ended on June 15, 1964, when the 
high court ruled in Reynolds v. Sims, which mandated that legislative districts be 
apportioned solely based on population. That meant that the 80-20 plan of the Michigan 
Constitutional Convention was null and void. It also meant that time remained for the 
apportionment commission to adopt a constitutionally acceptable plan prior to the 
November 1964 election. That plan was strictly based on population and gave little 
regard to county boundaries. Just a week after the ruling in Reynolds v. Sims, “the U.S. 
Supreme Court refused to hear the appeal from the second Scholle suit, thus allowing the 
Michigan Supreme Court’s decision to stand.”132 Immediately, the Michigan Supreme 
Court ordered the use of a population-based apportionment plan in the upcoming 
elections. With this apportionment plan in place, Democrats won control of both houses 
of the legislature. While challenges to the reapportionment plans did not immediately 
end, even though little hope existed for these challenges, as far as the election of 1964 
was concerned, strict population-based reapportionment was law.133 
Sachs employed a well-defined strategy to accomplish his goals in these 
reapportionment cases. Their logic notwithstanding, his judgments did not always hit the 
mark. In the end, however, enough of his arguments stuck. In her dissertation, “Interest 
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Groups, the Courts, and Legislative Reapportionment in Michigan,” Judith Gething 
outlined his strategy in detail. There, she showed that Sachs wrongly assumed that 
George Edwards, known for his progressive politics, would rule in favor of Scholle. 
Gething also illustrates how Sachs replaced Gus Scholle with Michigan AFL-CIO Vice 
President William Marshall in the case of Marshall v. Hare in Federal District Court. 
After all, Marshall, unlike Scholle, lived in Wayne County where residents suffered most 
from malapportionment. Besides, Scholle also was a polarizing figure. Bringing the suit 
in federal court allowed justices to rule on them without threat of having such rulings 
count against them when running for re-election or impeachment before those elections 
could take place, a scenario federal judges did not fear.134  
Understanding the position in which Sachs placed the justices in both Scholle 
cases, he consciously refrained from publicly criticizing those same justices. He advised 
his client to take a similar tack. In addition, the new constitution did not so easily allow 
for challenges to apportionment cases in state courts. Sachs’ strategy reflected sound 
reasoning, and yet he lost this particular case, which was evident even before the court’s 
ruling, given the court’s make-up.135 Whatever Sachs’ misjudgments, he vigorously 
pursued all of these cases and finally met with success, once the U.S. Supreme Court 
ruled in both Baker v. Carr and Reynolds v. Sims.  The latter ruling forced the Michigan 
Supreme Court to change previous rulings to conform with the high court. 
Absent in Gething’s analysis, however, is a connection between the Michigan 
cases that Sachs litigated and the cases of Baker v. Carr and Reynolds v. Sims.  After all, 
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the plaintiffs in Reynolds v. Sims benefited from Sachs’ assistance in the case. It 
ultimately met with success at the federal level and, thus, determined the outcome of such 
cases in other states.  
Concerning Baker v. Carr, Neal Peirce and T. George Harris commented on the 
role that Sachs played in that litigation. Peirce argues that, “The AFL-CIO counsel, 
Theodore Sachs of Detroit, did the basic research and then as a courtesy passed it on to 
the plaintiffs in the famed Tennessee suit of Baker v. Carr.”136 T. George Harris made a 
similar comment in his biography on George Romney. There, he states that “Scholle’s 
original suit in Michigan provided the legal brief for the Tennessee case on 
reapportionment that, decided by the Supreme Court first, brought the one-man, one vote 
rule to the fifty states…”137 
Sachs played a role in Reynolds v. Sims as well. In writing about that period, he 
argues that,  
[t]he two years…were not without activity. The network of 
attorneys and correspondence proliferated. We seized upon 
every judicial development for the making of further 
arguments. We made suggestions, stated positions, and 
developed, refined, and exchanged theories and strategies. 
Plaintiff-advocacy in the legislative apportionment area had 
become a seamless web. When the landmark decision 
finally came down, it bore the imprint of many and was in 
that regard extremely gratifying.138 
The litigation in both Baker v. Carr and Reynolds v. Sims was a team effort in which 
Sachs played an integral role. Because Sachs had been involved in reapportionment 
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issues stretching back to 1951, and with substantive litigation beginning with Scholle v. 
Hare in 1960, we can assume that Sachs had a great deal of advice and guidance to 
provide. 
Some have argued that this fight for legislative reapportionment was more of a 
fight involving August Scholle and attorney Theodore Sachs as opposed to one involving 
organized labor more generally. There is some merit in this argument, as the fight largely 
depended upon the determination of Scholle and Sachs to see the fight through to the end. 
With Sachs, Scholle initiated the effort and remained committed to its favorable outcome, 
regardless of the intense opposition to it. Natural allies counseled him to concede defeat 
during critical moments of the fight. Even Democratic Governor G. Mennen Williams 
thought ill of the effort, believing that it might embarrass him and the Democratic Party. 
We must remember, after all, that Democratic constituents in the Upper Peninsula, for 
example, actually benefited from malapportionment. They lived in rural districts that 
received a disproportionate number of legislators relative to their numbers.139  
Scholle’s adversaries within and outside of organized labor notwithstanding, he 
could not have pursued the effort without organized labor. After all, it was not as if the 
monetary resources used for the fight came from his personal bank account or that he 
pursued the fight when not committing his time to his duties as Michigan CIO and then 
Michigan AFL-CIO chief. Whatever reservations his adversaries in organized labor or the 
Democratic Party had toward Scholle’s effort to achieve the reapportionment, no one 
prevented him from using those resources for these purposes.140  
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Conclusion 
In the same way that reapportionment gained little traction with voters in 1952 
and failed to resonate with the justices of the Michigan Supreme Court in 1960, 
opponents of legislative reapportionment were similarly stymied once the Supreme Court 
ruled in Baker v. Carr in 1962. From that point forward, nothing could stop legislative 
reapportionment from becoming a reality in Michigan and other states. Not the Michigan 
Manufacturers Association that had railed against it in 1952, nor the Republican 
delegates to the Michigan Constitutional Convention whose own reapportionment plan 
retained gross disparities between districts representing rural versus urban districts, nor 
the litigants who opposed reapportionment, could reverse the tide. Not even threats to 
impeach Michigan Supreme Court justices who ruled in favor of Scholle v. Hare after the 
ruling in Baker v. Carr could stop the fight for reapportionment. However, the status quo 
suffered other defeats in the early 1960s. Anyone witnessing the Civil Rights movement 
with its bus boycotts, the Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education, lunch 
counter sit-ins, and mass demonstrations replete with high-powered fire hoses trained on 
African-American demonstrators, jailings of civil rights leaders, and freedom rides, may 
have realized that legislative reapportionment was, as attorney Ted Sachs argued, an idea 
whose time had come.141 
With the acceptance of legislative reapportionment came a range of other 
possibilities, the possibilities of a voice for urban America, silenced just a few years 
before. Organized labor's efforts to reapportion the Michigan senate on a strict population 
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basis in 1952 by way of an initiative and beginning in 1960 via litigation with Scholle 
and Marshall standing as plaintiffs, is representative of labor’s role. The money for the 
effort, most of it coming from the coffers of the Michigan CIO and the Michigan AFL-
CIO, is a testament to the role that organized labor played in the effort. Archival sources 
tell us that the failed attempt to inspire citizens to vote for reapportionment in 1952 came 
to $65,000. The effort beginning in 1960 outpaced this amount by approximately 
$135,000, a significant amount of money at the time. Others contributed to the effort 
during the 1952 referendum and with amicus curiae briefs supporting Scholle v. Hare, 
but organized labor, particularly as directed by its labor chief, August Scholle, dictated 
the pace, the intensity, and the particulars regarding the case. 
Because labor’s power was centered in Detroit and other urban Michigan areas, 
the possibility for legislation reflecting urban interests improved. No other indicator 
demonstrated the changes to come than the complexion of the Michigan legislature in 
1963 versus what we find only two years later, following court decisions for population-
based legislative reapportionment.  During the 1963-1964 term, Republicans dominated 
the state senate with 23 members to the Democrats’ 11. In the state house for that same 
term, 58 Republicans prevailed over 52 Democrats. During the 1965-1966 term, 
however, 28 Democrats now dominated the 18 Republicans in the state senate while 73 
Democrats significantly beat out the 37 Republicans that the Michigan electorate voted in 
that term.142 With these changes in the partisan and ideological balance of the legislature, 
legislative changes were inevitable, even with a Republican Governor, George Romney, 
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in office. An amendment to the Hutchinson Act ranked high amongst the efforts that 
legislators pursued with the reconfigured legislature for which legislative 
reapportionment paved the way. It is to this story that we now turn.  
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Part III 
A New Era for Detroit-Area Public Sector Workers, 1965-1967 
Before many states began adopted laws that encouraged collective bargaining by 
public employees beginning in the 1960s, Philadelphia, New York City, Wisconsin, and 
the federal government had taken action that allowed collective bargaining for various 
groups of public employees. These actions paved the way for similar measures in other 
states with Michigan being among them. With the advent of reapportioned legislative 
districts, the Democrats gained a legislative majority in 1965. This chain of events led to 
the enactment of PERA, as well as a Detroit City ordinance that mirrored the state law. 
Intense and competitive organizing drives ensued, strengthening public sector unions as 
they sought collective bargaining agreements. In some cases Michigan public school 
teachers, even pursued strikes to achieve their goals. While few strikes took place, they 
dominated the headlines and prompted legislators to seek measures to stop strikes.  
In 1966, the Democrats lost control of the legislature just as quickly as they came 
to dominate it in the previous session. Republicans never did reverse the Public 
Employee Relations Act in the session following it enactment, but they made a credible 
effort and revealed the precarious position of public sector workers whose fortunes 
appeared to hold little security. A fragile economy, exacerbated by a decreased tax base, 
internal dissension within Detroit’s AFSCME Council 77, and civil disorder meant that 
AFSCME Council 77 could not expect its first contract in October 1967 to be as 
favorable as it would have liked. 
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Chapter Four 
An Act Poised to “Free Us From Slavery”: 
The 1965 Public Employees Relations Act 
Public Employees are hard working and skilled workers 
who are entitled to treatment equal to the best workers in 
private industry. This they expect and this treatment they 
want – nothing else will satisfy them.1 
[T]hese amendments [to the Hutchinson Act], which were 
made possible by Democratic control of the Legislature in 
1965, corrected grave injustices imposed upon hundreds of 
thousands of public employees, a large percentage of whom 
are black.2 
Many of us didn't realize it at the time, but Public Act No. 
379 of 1965 [a.k.a. the Public Employee Relations Act] was 
the most significant enactment of the 73rd Michigan 
Legislature.3 
On July 23, 1965, Michigan’s Governor George Romney signed into law Public 
Act 379. Better known as the Public Employees Relations Act (PERA), the law gave 
thousands of Michigan’s public employees collective bargaining rights. By his own 
admission, Romney had given the bill more consideration than the nearly 400 bills passed 
by the Michigan state legislature during that year’s session.4 Public employees and their 
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representatives had previously engaged in collective bargaining, but some referred to the 
practice as “collective begging,” as they were forced to take what was given to them.5 
There was no requirement for local agencies to engage in the process. In the summer of 
1965, however, the Public Employee Relations Act elevated collective bargaining to a 
right and changed the nature of the relationship between the public sector and those who 
employed them. 
 Public employees and labor unions had been fighting for the enactment of such a 
law ever since the legislature enacted the Hutchinson Act 18 years before. Opposition 
prevented the effort from bearing fruit. The failed strike of streetcar workers in 1951 and 
the existence of malapportioned legislative districts revealed this reality. By 1965, times 
had changed. The state and the nation were moving toward accepting public employee 
unionism and its consequences. The Civil Rights movement, with its protest marches, 
boycotts, and legal challenges compelled lawmakers, the judiciary, and citizens to enact, 
fight for, reinterpret and accept laws that provided for a more equitable distribution of 
power. Governor Romney gave voice to this trend when he declared that, “a government 
which imposes upon private employers certain obligations in dealing with their employes 
[sic], may not in good faith refuse to deal with its own public servants on a reasonably 
similar basis, modified, of course, to meet the exigencies of public service.”6 If a 
Republican Governor could accept this view, it was reasonable to expect others would do 
                                                                                                                                                 
(1966): 12-16; see also George Romney to Donald A. D’Amato, letter, 29 September 
1965, box 127, folder titled, “Legislature Regular Session, Miscellaneous D-F, 1965,” 
George Romney Collection, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan. 
5
“For reference to “collective begging,” see Local 214, “An End to Collective 
Begging,” Detroit Labor News, 19 August 1965, 10; Slater, Public Workers, 203. 
6Popa, Romney Gives OK to Union for Public Employes [sic],” Detroit News, 24, 
July 1965; Law student Richard Fleming makes a similar argument. See Fleming, 
“Municipal Collective Bargaining,” 3. 
178 
 
the same. 
Romney's Relevance 
 Michigan voters elected George Romney Governor for the first of three 
successive terms in 1962. He took office with a more varied background than that of 
other high-level elected officials. Romney had worked as a lobbyist for the Aluminum 
Company of America. He also served as chair of the Citizens Advisory Committee, 
established to reform the Detroit Public Schools, and as the chair of the Citizens for 
Michigan designed to reform the state of Michigan. From there, he served as a vice 
president of the Michigan Constitutional Convention of 1961-1962. Most importantly, he 
served as the Detroit manager of the Automobile Manufacturers Association and in 
increasingly responsible positions with American Motors Corporation. As AMC’s CEO, 
Romney popularized the compact automobile. These experiences familiarized him with 
state constitutional reform and the state's most vital manufacturing industry. However, his 
previous record was far different than what he would find in his six-year tenure as 
Michigan Governor.7  His unique experiences are what attracted many of his supporters. 
Romney went to some lengths to distance himself from partisan politics, so much so that 
his conservative detractors within the Republican Party complained that he did not 
identify himself as a Republican frequently enough.8 However, as Republicans often did, 
Romney railed against what he considered the ill-effects of labor in Michigan and its role 
in politics. At the same time, he spoke out against the auto industry’s influence in the 
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Republican Party. Unlike many other Republicans, he criticized monopolies, which by 
their very nature, he believed, inhibited the competition necessary for a healthy economy. 
For Romney, then, the people, acting in conjunction with business, labor and 
government, but with greater power, should dictate the course of the nation. This was the 
George Romney that successfully ran for Michigan governor and signed the Public 
Employee Relations Act into law four years later.9 
 If staunch Republicans expressed reservations about Romney’s ideological stance, 
organized labor was even less enthusiastic. To be sure, Walter Reuther once referred to a 
collective bargaining agreement signed by Romney as “’the most significant and historic 
collective-bargaining agreement ever signed in the United States.’”10 Michigan AFL-CIO 
President August Scholle, however, saw Romney differently. On one occasion, Scholle 
called him a “clown.” Romney’s candidacy raised other issues for organized labor. His 
belief that organized labor had too much influence in the Democratic Party aside, 
Romney angered organized labor during his candidacy when he showed up uninvited to 
the September 1961 Labor Day celebration in Detroit. As far as organized labor was 
concerned, he might as well have crashed a party and sought the attention of the host's 
girlfriend or boyfriend.11 
 Reservations by organized labor notwithstanding, Romney did not bear the same 
antagonism toward it as many in the Republican Party did. Romney’s views on the 
Wagner Act provide a window into his views on the Public Employee Relations Bill. 
Twenty years before the Michigan Legislature passed the Public Employee Relations Act, 
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Congress enacted the Wagner Act. Among other things, the act required private 
employers to engage in collective bargaining when called upon to do so by their 
employees. Romney spoke well of the Wagner Act, believing that the working man 
needed a voice. “The idea of the Wagner Act was sound,” a biographer quoted him as 
saying. “[I]t gave the laboring man the power to organize his own force to bargain with 
the rising  power of management. We settled at the bargaining table many matters that 
would in other countries have been left to government.”12 For Romney, the government 
had a role to play in affairs otherwise limited to labor and management. At the end of the 
day, however, the two sides had to resolve matters themselves, to the extent that this was 
possible. Both the National Labor Relations Act and, later, the Public Employee 
Relations Act served this purpose.13 
 Romney received pressure from organized labor to sign the Public Employees 
Relations Act once it arrived on his desk in July 1965. Pressure came from other areas as 
well. Michigan’s Republican Lt. Governor, William G. Milliken, thought the Hutchinson 
Act, providing for harsh penalties for public employees who engaged in strikes, required 
amending. “The law [Hutchinson Act] is so punitive that not once in its 18 year history 
has it been fully enforced,” Milliken wrote in a special report. “Besides that,” he 
continued, “it is outmoded in light of progress made through employer-employee 
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relations in business and industry,” an idea that Romney voiced as well.14 
Romney was what many would refer to as a liberal Republican. He had, in fact, 
supported many civil rights initiatives. His brand of civil rights, of course, did not reflect 
the thinking of many in the Civil Rights movement. Romney opposed bussing as a means 
of integrating schools, thought ill of affirmative action, or what he referred to as “reverse 
discrimination,” and refused to disavow his affiliation with the Mormon faith, which 
forbade both interracial marriage and African Americans becoming priests.15 He also 
argued publically for the role and responsibilities he believed both African Americans 
and whites were required to play in the fight against discrimination.16 
Citing his policy to refrain from working on Sundays, Romney did not attend the 
June 1963 “Walk Toward Freedom” in Detroit where Martin Luther King, Jr. gave his “I 
Have a Dream” speech.  It was a later version of the speech that he would give in August 
to a national audience in Washington, D.C. Romney did, however, participate in “a civil 
rights demonstration against discrimination in housing in fashionable Grosse Pointe, an 
all-white suburb of Detroit” just a few days later.17 This show of support for open 
housing was not the first time he had done so. Indeed, he supported it as far back as 
World War Two.18 Romney also spoke out in support of the civil rights march to Salem, 
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Alabama, supported the family of Viola Liuzzo (who was murdered there), and took heat 
for this support from many Michigan citizens.19 At a 1964 tribute given in his honor, 
Romney spoke in support of broad civil rights connected with voting, employment, 
educational opportunities, equal access to public facilities and businesses open to the 
public; and he reiterated his support for open housing.20 In a word, the Civil Rights 
movement, which Romney noted as “sweeping over the nation,” clearly moved him.21 
His support of the Public Employees Relations Act reflected the rights consciousness 
widely evident elsewhere in society. As Romney argued, public sector employees 
deserved the same “right” to engage in collective bargaining as private sector employees 
had had for the previous thirty years. 
Public Sector Unions Embrace the Civil Rights Movement 
 Organized labor’s support of the Civil Rights movement outpaced the support 
Romney provided it. The Detroit Federation of Teachers, Council 77 of the American 
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, and the Service Employees 
International Union, all organized public sector employees in metropolitan Detroit. They 
also embraced the Civil Rights movement. The inspiration that other public sector 
workers received from that movement empowered them to push for what would become 
the 1965 Public Employees Relations Act.22 Others, including the Michigan AFL-CIO, 
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played an important role as well. 
The Detroit Federation of Teachers in particular exhibited an increasing concern 
for civil rights in the 1950s and 1960s. The Detroit Federation of Teachers had a 
significant proportion of African-American members for some time. It did not experience 
the explosion and tension-laden problems of New York City where that city’s African-
American population had little input into the teaching and pedagogy of its children.23 In 
contrast, the DFT issued a resolution enthusiastically supporting the “concern to develop 
books and materials that will give fair and adequate treatment to all groups in the 
American culture.”24 The local federation joined in the celebration of the Emancipation 
Proclamation centennial and advised those realtors who sought advertisements in its 
paper, The Detroit Teacher, that it no longer accepted advertisements from those who 
violated open occupancy standards. 
Acknowledging the local’s efforts in civil rights, President John F. Kennedy 
invited DFT President Mary Ellen Riordan to a meeting to discuss the intersection 
between education and civil rights. In the same month, Riordan wrote the Detroit Board 
of Education recommending that teacher vacancies in schools with a predominant white 
faculty be filled by African Americans, even recognizing that African-American teachers 
might not have wanted to “pioneer alone” in potentially hostile environments.25 
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Most importantly, the DFT fought for a state Fair Employment Practices law and 
its enforcement. The DFT then initiated an effort to encourage Detroit-area organizations 
to sign a joint letter requesting the city’s Board of Education to adopt a policy for the 
placement of teachers on a non-discriminatory basis. The DFT also wrote letters to state 
senators expressing its frustration over their refusal to support an FEP law. The federation 
complained about the unwritten policy of school counselors, who often encouraged 
students to take classes that qualified them only for menial jobs or considered race when 
pointing students in the direction of employment in defiance of the mandates of this 
law.26 
Nationally, the American Federation of Teachers passed resolutions barring 
segregated locals, even before the ruling in Brown v. Board outlawed such practices.27 In 
1965 the AFT’s Civil Rights Committee prepared a detailed report outlining its position 
on civil rights and its ideas of how locals could implement the plan. Authored by six 
people, one a Detroit teacher on leave, the report reiterated the union’s support of 
integration, focusing its attention on the North. In some of its concluding remarks, the 
authors of the report argue that, 
Unions such as the American Federation of Teachers that 
are involved in a ‘rights’ struggle of their own, as well as 
the many unions that clearly remember their days of 
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leanness, have a common bond with the civil rights 
movement.28 
In these and other ways, the DFT, supported by its parent body, both contributed to and 
rode the wave of a rights consciousness activism, elements of which contributed to the 
activism of others in Michigan, including the advocates of an amendment to the 
Hutchinson Act. Detroit Federation of Teachers President Mary Ellen Riordan gave voice 
to the local’s overarching concern with and support of civil rights when she stated that, 
“[t]he Detroit Federation of Teachers was among the first in insisting that equal 
opportunity be given to all, without regard for race, creed, color or national origin.” “This 
belief,” she continued, “was and is a major article in our basic philosophy as well as in 
our written contract.”29 
AFSCME was also greatly influenced by the growing Civil Rights movement. For 
AFSCME, 1963 was a busy year. In February, the organization established a four-man 
committee “to deal with AFSCME's external and internal civil rights and liberties.” Its 
purpose was to determine the existence of laws on which AFSCME members could rely, 
identify what other unions had done in civil rights, and widely publicize opportunities for 
redress of complaints. Beyond these areas, the purpose of AFSCME’s committee was to 
support a similar committee of the executive board.30 In June 1963, AFSCME held the 
first of a series of conferences designed to address “internal union problems, employment 
and promotions, civil service, public laws and contracts, as well as housing and public 
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accomodations [sic].”31 A month later, AFSCME President Arnold Zander clarified the 
mission of the conferences. As he explained, they represented the union's “'full-scale 
entry into the fight against all forms of discrimination, with particular emphasis on 
ending job discrimination at the state, county and municipal level.'”32 Later that summer, 
AFSCME sent many of its members to the 1963 March on Washington, as part of a total 
of a reported 50,000 unionists, exhibiting commitment to the cause of civil rights.33 
Additionally, AFSCME used its chief organ to press Congress for a civil rights act, one 
of the chief aims of the march.34 In addition to the conferences, committees and marches 
that AFSCME members and officers attended, the organization also issued resolutions at 
its conventions. In these resolutions, the organization formally went on record as 
opposing school segregation, restrictions to voting and “discrimination in housing and 
public accommodations,” and the immediate passage of the civil rights bill before 
Congress.35 
 The Service Employees International Union (SEIU) also made civil rights part of 
its program in the 1960s. During the union's 1964 international convention, for example, 
SEIU advocates of civil rights identified 10 out of 167 resolutions that reflected a concern 
and interest in civil rights. The convention noted the union’s Committee on Civil Rights, 
first established in 1961, “and urged each local union be called upon to establish an 
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effective and meaningful civil rights program.” The convention proceedings identified 
Thomas Flowers, recording secretary of Detroit’s public sector union, Council M, as one 
of the seven SEIU officers who assisted in preparing one of the more forceful resolutions 
on the matter. In one resolution, it noted the “painfully slow progress made” in the area of 
civil rights, the litany of violent crimes waged against African Americans, the continuing 
denial of employment and promotional opportunities, educational opportunities, and the 
lack of rights at the ballot box. This particular resolution also took note of overt and 
covert acts of segregation, and the poverty that grew out of racial discrimination, and it 
challenged union members to refrain from discriminating against one another. The 
resolution commended SEIU President David Sullivan for establishing the civil rights 
committee and similarly noted “courageous leaders” who fought on behalf of the Civil 
Rights movement. The resolution supported the work of the AFL-CIO in its work to 
combat discrimination, pushed for each local to “appoint a Civil Rights committee,” and 
directed SEIU President David Sullivan “to telegraph … each member of the Untied 
States Senate the unanimous demand of this convention that the indecent and iniquitous 
filibuster be ended immediately and the pending Civil Rights bill be put to a vote without 
weakening or amendment.”36 
 Unlike the Detroit Federation of Teachers, Detroit’s Council M of the Service 
Employees International Union did not have a history of civil rights activism. In fact, it 
did not have much of a history in Detroit at all. Given that it had been established only in 
1958, the Council had not yet developed a civil rights track record. During its ten-year 
history in the Detroit area, the SEIU council spent all of its time trying to build what was 
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a struggling organization before events forced it out of existence. 
There was, in fact, no consistent pattern of public sector union civil rights 
engagement. The nature, extent, and duration of involvement does not provide a 
barometer for fully appreciating how this sector was influenced by the Civil Rights 
movement. There were few places in the country where one could avoid the influence of 
the Civil Rights movement, much less in a city that had as large a number and percentage 
of African Americans as Detroit. By 1960, Detroit’s African-American population stood 
at 482,229 or 28.9 percent of the population, up from 16.1 percent the previous decade. 
The strength of the Civil Rights movement was dramatically illustrated in any number of 
Detroit-area marches, lawsuits and boycotts before and leading up to the enactment of the 
1965 Public Employees Relations Act. The 1963 March Toward Freedom in Detroit was 
one such moment. Led by Martin Luther King and organized by the then prominent 
Reverend C.L. Franklin, with the support of Reverend Albert Cleage, Detroit Mayor 
Jerome Cavanagh, and UAW President Walter Reuther, it was attended by as many as 
125,000 people, the largest civil rights march up to that time. The march reflected a 
moment in history where African Americans and other marginalized people in Detroit 
worked to make their concerns known. In its own way, the enactment of the 1965 Public 
Employees Relations Act was a byproduct of this moment in history, for it sought to 
address the concerns of the public sector, which believed it suffered from marginalization 
as well.37  
The Civil Rights Movement Meets the Public Sector 
When Jerome Cavanagh became Detroit’s new mayor in 1962, one of his first acts 
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was to issue an executive order mandating that the city’s personnel policy specifically 
ban discrimination in the hiring, promotion and training of its current and prospective 
employees. Given the support that African Americans provided Cavanagh during the race 
for mayor and his campaign promises, Cavanagh’s course of action was understandable.38 
Besides, the executive order reflected the exigencies of the times. 
Beyond this tangible expression of support for civil rights, public sector 
employees and their union officers lived in a world where marginalized groups actively 
sought redress for their grievances. In this world, the status quo forced could not 
withstand the forces of change. As historian Nelson Lichtenstein explains, “In public 
employment, American trade unions did ride a wave of rights consciousness to build 
collective organizations of considerable size and power.”39 AFSCME, SEIU, the AFT 
and other unions representing public sector workers all grew substantially during this 
period and that growth provided them strength to seek rights inspired by the Civil Rights 
movement. 
Public sector workers routinely borrowed language from the Civil Rights 
movement when demanding improvements in wages, working conditions and benefits. 
The Detroit Labor News and its columnists engaged its readers with discussions of public 
sector rights in order to motivate them to fight for the right of collective bargaining. In 
the immediate months preceding the enactment of PERA, references to second class 
citizenship and struggle to gain first class rights are frequently found within the pages of 
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the Detroit Labor News.40 The use of this language demonstrates one significant way in 
which Detroit-area public sector workers received inspiration from the Civil Rights 
movement.41 An editorial appearing in the Detroit Labor News made the point clear: 
We think it high time that workers in government be given 
equivalent citizenship status to everyone else in the 
community. We believe there ought to be a defined and 
printed grievance structure through which government 
workers can engage in collective bargaining on grievances 
arising from working conditions. We further believe the 
overwhelming majority of the citizens of Wayne County 
and Detroit support that viewpoint.”42 
Appropriating the language of the Civil Rights movement, a columnist from AFSCME 
Local 23, representing employees of the Detroit Housing Commission, argued that,  
…public employees are related to second class citizens 
with substandard wages an [sic] dother [sic] iniquities [sic] 
that make it difficult for Public Employees to live. We are 
also saddled with an Act that makes it unlawful to strike or 
arbitrate with the ‘City Fathers’ to improve our 
conditions.43 
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References to “second class citizens” and “iniquities” reflect the concerns of public sector 
workers. They also reflect the influence of the Civil Rights movement.  
When public sector union leaders fought against what became the Hutchinson 
Act, they argued that the public sector should not be prohibited from striking. AFSCME 
leaders made a similarly bold statement in 1965 when the union moved forcefully to 
amend the Hutchinson Act. “‘Sometimes you must break the law in order to get justice,’” 
AFSCME President Jerry Wurf said of the law banning public sector strikes. “’Our 
success is not dependent upon the law, but rather on winning the election through union 
solidarity,’” he later said, echoing the same tone.44 This statement was similar to those 
concerning discriminatory laws throughout the South and elsewhere. In his famous letter 
from a Birmingham Jail, for example, Martin Luther King, Jr., famously argued the point 
well: “One has not only a legal but a moral responsibility to obey just laws. 
“Conversely,” he continued, “one has a moral responsibility to disobey unjust laws.”45 
For Wurf, it was unjust to prohibit public sector workers from striking when necessary. 
They had a moral responsibility to disobey any such law.  It mattered little that the courts 
had routinely denied public sector workers the right to strike in the past.46 Many public 
employees began to entertain and, on occasion, use strikes to force their employers to 
seriously consider their concerns. 
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Advocates of public sector empowerment often used the word, “rights,” in the 
context of comparisons with the private sector. The public sector, then had a ‘right’ to 
wages secured by those in the private sector for comparable work, a ‘right’ to engage in 
collective bargaining, and a ‘right’ to working conditions comparable to what private 
sector workers enjoyed.47 The more radical of the group argued that public sector 
employees had a right to strike as well, although most did not voice this desire publicly. 
Times had certainly changed. 
At the same time that the Civil Rights movement began gaining momentum, the 
AFL and CIO merged and “gave impetus to intensified efforts to organized municipal 
employees and furthered the control by these municipal unions of entry and promotion 
opportunities in the public service.”48 
The Public Sector Expresses Right To Equal Treatment 
Many within the public sector believed that the state and local governments that 
employed them treated them unfairly in terms of the wages, benefits, and working 
conditions, relative to workers in private industry. Similarly, public sector employees 
spoke out against a system where benefits in the private sector eclipsed their own. As the 
Detroit Labor News reported, 
Employees in private industry are now negotiating for 
pensions amounting to half of final pay for 25 years of 
service or 2/3 of final pay for 30 years of service while 
Wayne County employees must work at least 33 or 34 
years – in some cases over 35 years – for half of average 
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compensation – AND THEY HAVE HELPED TO PAY 
FOR SOME OF THAT.49  
Organized labor often expressed their dismay over the disparity in pay in the language 
commonly used during this era of rights consciousness. In anticipation of the passage of 
House Bill 2953, the Detroit Labor News reported that, “[t]hese Bills  if finally made 
State Law will permit Public Employees some of the rights which other workers already 
enjoy.”50 With expanded collective bargaining rights, public sector employees would 
have an avenue to fight more effectively for improvements in wages, working conditions, 
and benefits. 
The outspoken president of one public sector union made a complementary 
argument about the disparity in pay between public sector workers and in the private 
sector: 
Some of the news media in this area suggested that we 
should compare some of our wages with those in other 
cities. And we should not use industrial rates. We do not 
agree with this formula because we do not educate our 
children, feed or cloth[e] them nor shelter them in other 
cities. Therefore, the bread and milk that rise because of the 
cost  of a rising economy or a new contract must be paid by 
the city or county employee the same as the industrial 
employee.51  
The issue of wages, while often the most important part of a compensation package, 
played only one part. Benefits also factored significantly into the equation. Public sector 
workers seeking improved benefits, often framed these discussions in the language of 
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unfulfilled rights, to which they believed they were entitled. The right to medical 
insurance was one such benefit. “The full paid hospitalization we have requested the city 
to pay is not a new program,” local public sector president Alton Cobb argued. “It is paid 
in full by cities in this area. And [it] is a standard part of industrial contracts in this area. 
Here again the employees are victimized.”52  
 Articles in the Detroit Labor News reported how some public sector workers 
recuperating from illnesses, suffered from a lack of insurance. In fact, some locals had 
established “sick committees” that not only organized efforts to ensure that sick and 
infirmed members were not forgotten with cards and hospital visits, but, most 
importantly, they assisted in collecting donations to offset lost wages and the cost for 
medical treatments. As revealed in a Detroit Labor News column written by and for 
Local 1497 members employed by Wayne State University, “After getting a report from 
Bro. Fisher, the Chair stated, that there will be letters sent out, asking for donations for 
Bros. Horace Cox and Charles Dawson. Their sick and vacation banks have been 
exhausted.”53 Improvements to their employer-paid health insurance would have 
benefited those forced to rely on the kindness of others.  
Even as late as 1965, many Detroit-based AFSCME members did not receive an 
income equal to what the Division of Living Conditions Studies, compiled by the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics, said was necessary for an average household. While the article never 
argued that an increase was a right, public sector workers did not hesitate to make 
demands consistent with the demands of other groups seeking equity in the era of civil 
rights. As an example of the inadequate pay, the Detroit Labor News reported that bus 
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drivers later that same year sought the equivalent of a $602 raise, which would have 
brought their income up to no more than $6,114 less than what the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics prescribed for an average family household five years before. The paltry pay 
placed Detroit behind “cities comparable to Detroit – Chicago, Washington, D.C., 
Philadelphia, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Boston, [and] Pittsburgh.”54  
The working conditions under which some public sector workers toiled would not 
have been tolerated by many private sector workers. Conditions where Detroit Street 
Railway drivers received only eight hours of pay for shifts of 13.5 hours further angered 
public sector workers. The Detroit Street Railway Commission also required that bus 
drivers pay for clothes and pay other expenses without compensation.55 These conditions 
prompted them to seek redress for this treatment that private sector workers may not have 
tolerated. 
Michigan's Organized Labor Supports Public Sector Collective Bargaining Law 
The coverage of public sector issues in the pages of the Detroit Labor News 
assisted those seeking legislation for a public sector collective bargaining law in 
Michigan. Union conventions and meetings constituted another important way that 
advocates of public sector unionism sought to advance their cause. Sponsored by the 
Michigan AFL-CIO as well as AFSCME Councils 23, 68 and 77, conferences publicized 
the importance of public sector collective bargaining legislation. 
  A particularly important source of political pressure in support of PERA was the 
bold action taken on the part of teachers to amend the Hutchinson Act. To be sure, 
teachers received some of their motivation to act from gatherings they attended and 
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information in the pages of labor periodicals. Whatever the source of their motivation, 
Detroit-area teachers kicked into higher gear the discussion of legislation providing for 
expanded public sector collective bargaining. 
As an educational mechanism, the Detroit Labor News called upon subscribers to 
work on behalf of labor’s cause. In one article, a writer sought to inspire readers into 
action. “Has your Local Union carried its fair share of the fight?” asked this writer. “Ask 
your officers and yourself whether your Local and you have done anything to make this 
proposed legislation a reality,” he continued. “If you are not fully supporting the 
Michigan Public Employees’ Legislative Committee through your Council,” this 
columnist stated, “you probably don’t recognize the great need for this legislation.”56 
Many regarded member education as the key to the success of organized labor to 
achieve its goals. The Detroit Labor News stood as one of the key tools in educating 
members of organized labor as to what they needed to do beyond educating themselves 
on the issues at hand.57 The Wayne County AFL-CIO commended the Detroit Labor 
News as a vehicle for the type of education needed for union members. In a resolution 
adopted during its Spring 1965 convention, the delegates resolved that “[t]he Editor of 
the Detroit Labor News, Brother Hal DeLong, be commended for his enthusiastic 
cooperation in publicizing Education Committee activities, and that local unions be 
urged, likewise, to use the Detroit Labor News as their media of communication.”58 The 
commendation applied to educational work that DeLong and the labor organ pursued on 
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behalf of public sector empowerment. 
In 1964, the Michigan AFL-CIO redoubled its efforts to promote public sector 
unionism and collective bargaining rights. Of the many resolutions it passed during its 
September 1964 convention, one in particular spoke to this goal. With this resolution, the 
state AFL-CIO sought to “give all-out support to the Public Employees Legislative 
Committee in its concerted drive to secure immediate legislation which will assure to all 
public employees in Michigan their full rights as employees and citizens.” It also 
encouraged its affiliates to develop educational programs supporting public sector unions 
and to press the Democratic and Republican parties to push for the legislation.59 
Interestingly enough, the resolution made reference to the rights of public sector workers 
five times, thereby invoking the language of the Civil Rights movement.  
Months before the voters elected a new legislature from reapportioned legislative 
districts, Detroit-area AFSCME affiliates hosted a collective bargaining conference. In 
addition to prominent members of leaders of Detroit-based public sector unions, Victor 
Gotbaum of AFSCME’s national office was on hand at the conference, thereby signifying 
its importance to the larger mission of the union. Even given the conference’s purpose “to 
develop a new interest in the education and training of leaders in Public Employee 
Unions,” its organizers included sessions on the law and prospects for its application to 
states like Michigan. To this end, Michigan State University professor Russell Allen 
discussed the importance of President Kennedy’s Executive Order 10988 granting federal 
employees collective bargaining rights. More to the point, Hy Parker “gave the students 
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of the conference a new insight on the Hutchinson Act.”60 
To complement the Michigan Public Employee Legislative Committee, AFSCME 
appointed Nancy Pratt Vanderbeek as Director of “the newly created Michigan Public 
Employees Technical Council 68.” In making the announcement, newly-elected 
AFSCME President Jerry Wurf said that the purpose of the council was “‘to provide 
union members and local officers education in trade union principles and techniques and 
coordinate the legislative activities of the local unions.’”61 The AFSCME Board 
established Technical Council 68 along with other councils at the AFSCME International 
Board Meeting in June 1964.  At that time, newly elected AFSCME President Jerry Wurf 
said that “[t]he very important and necessary job of setting up sound education and 
research programs, being active in a meaningful way in political action, and participating 
in coordinated legislative programs has been neglected too long.”62  
In terms of legislative action, AFSCME planned for the technical councils to 
“adopt unified legislative programs for their area.” The councils were to prepare bills and 
resolutions and designate a spokesman who will serve as the council’s legislative 
representative.63 For Council 68, that person was Theodore Sachs, who had served as the 
Michigan AFL-CIO legal counsel for many years. With Sachs’ guidance, Technical 
Council 68 sought to assist in the effort to press for the amendment of the 1947 
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Hutchinson Act. Union officials argued that lack of coordinated support stifled their 
attempts to amend the Hutchinson Act. During the course of Council 68's effort to amend 
the Hutchinson Act, Nancy Vanderbeek said that, “many different bills have been filed 
by many different senators and representatives. While each bill contained some important 
improvements, no one bill has developed which had the support of the entire labor 
movement.”64 One of aims of Council 68 was to organize labor’s support and coordinate 
efforts. 
 Nancy Pratt Vanderbeek's background as ASFCME's director for Technical 
Council 68 equipped her for the job at hand. She had served in different capacities with 
the League of Women Voters in Michigan and the United Fund Agency's Area Service 
Association. In terms of her activities for organized labor, she wrote columns for the AFL 
and then the AFL-CIO concerning consumer economics. Once the two federations 
merged, she represented the labor federation concerning women workers.65 When 
Council 68 held a conference on October 31, just two days before the November 
elections, Vanderbeek pressed for the election of legislators sympathetic to the concerns 
of the public sector workers.66  
 In March 1965, after having reviewed the state of the public sector in Michigan, 
Council 68, with the assistance of Detroit's Council’s 23 and 77, sponsored a legislative 
conference. Major AFSCME figures of local and national prominence made an 
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appearance. Jack Kaufmann and Alton Cobb, who served as president and secretary of 
Public Employee Council 77, were both on hand as was Council 68 Director Nancy 
Vanderbeek. Of particular importance, AFSCME President Jerry Wurf attended the 
gathering, as did State Senator Sander Levin. Levin’s presence was particularly 
important, given that he now served as the chair of the Labor Committee for the Senate. 
He was in a position to push for a law to change the 18-year old Hutchinson Act and push 
for public sector collective bargaining. Admittedly, Levin believed that there existed a 
“terrific logjam of bills introduced in the State Legislature”67 in 1965 and that public 
sector unions would have to “document and substantiate its claims for better laws.”68  
In February 1965, the Michigan AFL-CIO sponsored the Education Conference 
on State Legislation. While the War on Poverty was a focal point for the gathering, it is 
likely that the discussion group on labor legislation, addressed the matter of state labor 
laws, including the Hutchinson Act.69 The Michigan AFL-CIO sponsored a similar 
gathering in Lansing two months later.70 As reported in the issue of the Detroit Labor 
News, AFSCME Public Employees Council 77 “was well represented in Lansing at the 
Legislative meeting of Public Employees. The final action was taken as to the bills 
covering Recognition, Collective Bargaining Elections and Binding Arbitration.”71 
Representatives of public sector workers encouraged their members to write their 
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state legislators, expressing to them their thoughts on matters of interest. “You can help 
by writing your representative in Lansing and let them know of your concern,”72 a 
column written for AFSCME Local 23 members suggested in the context of the bills 
brought before the legislature which gave public sector workers avenues for 
advancement. A number of public sector workers answered the call and urged Romney to 
support the legislation amending the Hutchinson Act.73 
 In addition to individual letters, at least one local submitted a petition to State 
Labor Committee Chair Sander Levin. Bearing ninety-four signatures of the Detroit-
based Local 413 of the Utility Workers of America, the petition asked that Michigan 
Senate pass four bills, including the bill amending the Hutchinson Act. Levin received at 
least one other petition as well.74  
 The change in the times revealed itself in a Detroit Free Press editorial. “If the 
Law is Useless,” the title said, alluding to the Hutchinson Act, “It Ought to be Changed.” 
The editorial endorsed the measure introduced by Leonard Walton, a Democratic state 
representative who sought a middle ground “between those who want to keep the act 
unchanged and those who want to legalize public strikes.” As teachers in nearby 
Hamtramck had gone out on strike the previous month, thereby violating the Hutchinson 
Act’s ban on striking among public sector workers, “the obvious conclusion is that the act 
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doesn’t work. It’s not difficult to see why,” the editorial said, using words such as 
“punitive,” “inflexible,” “harsh,” “too automatic,” and “vicious,” to describe the law. The 
assessment was not as startling as was the source. When street railway workers engaged 
in a strike in 1951, the paper was less than supportive. The Detroit Free Press had then 
argued that, “[t]he public could not have been more effectively robbed if the strikers had 
staged corner holdups.”75 By May of 1965, too many segments of Detroit’s public sector 
were challenging the law and demanding concessions from the city. As the editorial 
suggested, the tenor of the times convinced otherwise hostile forces that the law could not 
remain unchanged. 
The legislation amending the Hutchinson Act received significant support from 
organized labor, which then placed pressure on the now Democratic-controlled 
legislature. The Michigan Democratic Party also supported the effort. As reported in the 
Public Employees Council 77 Mirror, ‘[t]he Democratic Party has made comprehensive 
labor relations legislation for public employes [sic] a priority item in its agenda…”76 
Although critics argued that labor had undue influence on Michigan’s Democratic Party, 
there were moments when this influence was lacking.77 This was not the case with the 
bills supporting an amendment to the Hutchinson Act. 
Obstacles to Public Sector Collective Bargaining Law 
The bill amending the Hutchinson Act received support from many areas. The 
Michigan AFL-CIO, AFSCME Councils 23, 68 and 77 individually and through the 
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Michigan Public Employee Legislative Committee, and the Democratic Party all weighed 
in with their support, as did the Michigan AFL-CIO's publication Detroit Labor News 
and AFSCME's publication, the Public Employee. However, forces detrimental to 
amending the act and supporting legislation existed, often within the same labor 
organizations. These forces included internal discord, fragmentation, factionalism and 
uncertainty as to which course of action to take. Additionally, there were other forces that 
actively worked against the efforts to amend the Hutchinson Act. The Michigan 
Municipal League and Michigan Education Association stood as two of the more vocal 
opponents to HB2953, the bill amending the Hutchinson Act. These forces were to prove 
formidable, as this history reveals.  
The establishment of Technical Council 68 did not receive endorsements from all 
circles and contributed to discord. Some took umbrage with the per capita taxes levied on 
Detroit-area locals to support its operation. Others took to referring to the council and its 
director as the “'dragon lady' and her crew,” an obviously sexist reference to the council’s 
director Nancy Vanderbeek.78 Additionally, there were some who believed that the 
Council should have been supported with per capita taxes from locals throughout 
Michigan, instead of just Detroit-area councils 23 and 77. However, not even the 
resistance that certain segments of the union’s membership or leadership possessed stood 
in the way of the voters electing the people they felt would enact legislation supporting 
their concerns. Ultimately, Council 68 could not sustain the support that the international 
union provided it during its early years and it dissolved. During its short existence, 
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however, it did play a role in raising awareness about issues affecting public employees, 
including the restrictions of the Hutchinson Act.79 
Union fragmentation plagued public sector unions. Often, they competed with one 
another for members employed in the same units of government, instead of pursuing a 
unified and strengthened position. For this reason, AFSCME and other unions did their 
best to organize Detroit-area public sector unions under the Council 77 umbrella, 
contending that fragmentation does organized labor little good. Arguing the point, an 
article in the Detroit Labor News asked, “…why is [it] that Public Employees fragment 
themselves into forty or fifty meaningless associations without national or international 
affiliations?”80 
Issues of class and status put public sector workers in conflict with one another 
from time to time as well. This happened in Ecorse, a Detroit suburb in the case of its 
teachers and non-professional school employees. Ecorse Teachers complained that non-
professional employees received more pay than they should have given teachers’ current 
compensation and the training required of teachers. To demonstrate their frustrations, the 
Ecorse Federation of Teachers demonstrated outside of the offices of the Board of 
Education. “Lydia Rizzo, president of the Ecorse Federation of Teachers, said it takes an 
Ecorse teacher 22 years of earning power to equal that of a custodian, even including the 
increments teachers get.”81 Representatives of some city employees in Ferndale took 
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exception with the disparity in wage increases between them and police and fire fighters. 
“As I take up my pen this eve, I’ll admit, I’m in a foul mood,” a representative of a 
Ferndale local admitted…The police and firemen,” he continued, “get 7.5 per cent. Us 
second class citizens 5 per cent.”82  
Some public sector locals experienced dissension within the ranks, which did not 
contribute to the cohesion desired to support the public employee relations bill. One 
article in the Detroit Labor News, for example, took exception with the opinion of a 
former member of the local they both represented. “Mr. Dun was a mediocre member as 
long as he had an expense account with the local,” he began. “[A]fter he was dropped 
from the grievance committee he became irritated and did as I forestated. He has been 
indoctrinating every new man with his lies about the union, for which he has proven to be 
a poor loser.”83 We do not know how much dissension this local endured as a result of 
this 'poor loser,' or if, the writer brought his own biases to this assessment of Dun. 
Whatever the case, such conflicts did not have a meaningful impact on the pressure that 
the public sector was able to place on the powers that be to enact legislation empowering 
them. 
 The negative impact of internal dissension aside, opposition to legislation 
amending the Hutchinson Act received direct attacks. The Michigan State Employees 
Association, for example, “consistently opposed collective bargaining.” While the 
Michigan Civil Service Commission did “release a proposal to the [AFSCME] on June 
5[, 1964] which spells out forms of recognition, 'management' and 'employee rights, and 
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certain procedural steps which can be taken,” it never warmed to the idea of collective 
bargaining rights in the way that AFSCME had thought of them.84  The vice president and 
general manager of the Sheraton-Cadillac Hotel probably spoke for others when he wrote 
Cavanagh in March 1965 complaining of “outlandish demands of the city workers.”85 
The sentiment and convictions found in this opposition aside, it was not significant 
enough to withstand the forces supporting the bill that became the Public Employees 
Relations Act.  
 The most vocal opponent to HB 2953, however, came from the Michigan 
Municipal League. A non-partisan organization founded in 1899, “the league had brought 
together city and village officials to exchange information to learn from one another, 
developed unified policies on matters of municipal concern and spoke as a collective 
voice on those matters...”86 In an effort to stop HB2953 from going forward, the 
organization lobbied Sander Levin and James Bradley, chairs of the senate and house 
labor committees respectively. In a policy statement issued in 1961, and a letter 
forwarding it four years later, the MML shared its concerns with the bill as it was 
introduced in April 1965.87 
 Making several references to “representative government,” the League argued that 
elected and appointed officials in the state legislature, boards and commissions provided 
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for “sound and adequate” provisions for employer-employee relations. The statement did 
not use the word, 'sovereignty'; but it clearly believed that “if a procedure were developed 
in which public officials could abdicate their responsibilities because of commitments 
made by some outside authority, there would be no effective means of holding ... officials 
accountable.”  The League made the point even clearer in its comments on 'compulsory 
arbitration': “Compulsory arbitration in the public service is completely incompatible 
with a system of representative government. A primary and basic concept of 
representative government is that elected officials are essentially arbitrators in the public 
interest. Any attempt to introduce an outside arbitrator is a clear negation of this 
concept.”88  
The League’s statement also stressed the differences between private and public 
employment, noting that 'profit motive,' the 'significant personal financial stake” and the 
exclusivity found in bargaining parties make the private sector much different than the 
public sector. In making decisions, representative government is, the statement argued, 
concerned with “all groups, organizations and individuals among the general public,” 
which significantly differentiates it from the private sector. “If legislation were developed 
which provided that representation could only be accomplished through alliance with a 
group [i.e., a union], there would be a destruction of the democratic concept that each 
individual is entitled to be represented as he chooses.” Embodied in the idea of public 
service, the statement continued, is the idea of a public trust that extends to all people, 
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many of them operating outside of the bounds of the parties found in a collective 
bargaining scenario.89 
 When the Director of the Michigan Municipal League, Robert Fryer, wrote 
legislators about the Hutchinson Act four years later, he also stressed the differences 
between public and private employment in the context of labor. He also “found 
objectionable the concept of 'exclusive' bargaining representative of public employees.” 
The four years between the letter and an earlier policy statement did, however, change the 
way the League thought about employer-employee relations in the public sector. Since 
1961, the legislature had been reapportioned, and this led to a Democratic legislature 
more inclined to grant public sector rights similar to those found in the private sector. The 
Civil Rights movement was at its height at this moment as well. After all, 125,000 
Detroiters had participated in March Toward Freedom demonstration in Detroit two years 
before, Congress had passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Voting Rights Act in 1965. 
These events and others must have moved the officers of the Michigan Municipal League 
to tone down their disappointment with HB2953.90 
One other important thing had occurred since 1961. In January 1962, President 
John F. Kennedy issued Executive Order 10988, which established a system of collective 
bargaining for certain employees of the federal government. Kennedy’s executive order 
was important for two reasons. First, it signaled a change in mood in the relations 
between employer and employee in government, of which local and state governments in 
general must have taken notice. In his letter to Levin and Bradley MML Director Robert 
Fryer said that, “[w]e believe that if employee rights are to be recognized,” indicating that 
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the bill might be passed into law, “that certain public employer rights should be set forth 
in this legislation.” To that end, he suggested the inclusion of language from Kennedy’s 
Executive Order. The language reflected the desire to maintain control over public sector 
workers that the original bill did not include. For example, the language from Executive 
Order 10988 said that “'Public officials of the various governmental agencies retain the 
right in accordance with applicable laws and regulations...to hire, promote, transfer, 
assign and retain employees with the agency, and to suspend, demote, discharge or take 
other disciplinary action against employees...'”91  
In order to maintain the provision banning strikes, the League suggested that the 
bill include a measure requiring that public sector unions “must be free of corrupt 
influence and must not assert the right to strike or advocate the overthrow of government 
by force, violence, or other means.” For the MML, while the rights consciousness of the 
Civil Rights era demanded that the organization change its approach to public sector 
unions, the 'red menace' still retained enough of a threat to require language banning 
unions from “the overthrow of government by force, violence, or other means.”92 
Opposition to House Bill 2953 also came from the Michigan Education 
Association, not because its leaders thought well of the Hutchinson Act, but because they 
believed that the changes reflected in HB 2953 failed to meet the needs of teachers. The 
MEA argued, instead, for legislation that created a Professional Negotiations 
Commission, which would include a service panel comprised of educators “with 
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demonstrated competence in dealing with problems of education” and be authorized to 
pursue fact-finding when necessary. The panel would provide recommendations made 
available to the public, but they would only be advisory. The MEA supported collective 
bargaining between duly represented parties but argued for the use of a commission on 
those occasions where the parties could not resolve issues. The MEA also feared 
mediation by non-educators, believing that such individuals would not fully appreciate 
the educational issues at hand and, therefore, would not be able to competently resolve 
educational disputes. In addition to bread and butter issues, “curriculum and pupil 
placement,...working materials, facilities and conditions,...teacher involvement in 
decision-making,...teacher participation in staff selection and evaluation, 
and...administrator backing of teachers” were issues that required educational expertise.93 
Joining the Michigan Education Association, the Association of School Boards also 
opposed HB 2953 for many of the same reasons.94 
 Having an indirect, but potentially damaging affect on the bill was the situation in 
New York, where Governor Rockefeller vetoed a measure that lessened the penalties for 
striking public sector workers. The veto, Senator Levin believed, would embolden 
opponents to voice their concerns about HB 2953.  “Because we have learned that the 
Governor's office is receiving some mail in opposition to this vital legislation, let me 
suggest that you encourage some communiques urging his support,” he wrote to 
supporters in a letter. Understanding the need to publicize the advocacy for the bill, Levin 
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made reference to an enclosed press release, which he hoped would “be useable in local 
newspapers, on bulletin boards or for personal distribution to members of 
organizations...”95 As the end result revealed, opposition to the public employees relations 
bill did not have the desired affect. 
A Reapportioned Legislature with a Democratic Majority Bodes Well for PERA 
 Even with the apathy of some public sector workers, internal discord, factionalism 
and fragmentation within and among public sector organizations and the efforts to derail 
any meaningful changes to the Hutchinson Act, the state legislature and governor did 
pass and sign into law HB 2953. Democratic Party control of both houses, which was due 
in large part to the reapportionment of that lawmaking body, largely accounted for the 
success of what would become the Public Employees Relations Act. “'Never before in the 
history of the Michigan State AFL-CIO has the Democratic Party been a majority in both 
Houses of the Michigan Legislature,” one writer for the Detroit Labor News commented. 
“Imagine what this means translated into legislation for the people. This historic fact 
heralds the possibility of tremendous success towards a legislative program. At no time in 
the history of this state,” the article continued, “have we had a better opportunity to 
accomplish the legislative goals for which we have struggled for years.”96 Quoted in 
another Detroit Labor News article, a Democratic party official explained it this way: 
“‘What has gone unnoticed is the uncontrovertible [sic] fact that a fully reapportioned, 
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‘one – man one – vote’ legislature can be both responsible and responsive to the total 
needs of all the people.’”97 Writing in his memoirs, Michigan State Representative 
George F. Montgomery echoed these same sentiments.98 Reapportionment, as we have 
argued, flowed from even larger forces in Detroit and throughout the United States, 
namely the Civil Rights movement. Its impact was only beginning to be felt. 
There are those who argue that legislative reapportionment did not matter. In fact, 
the Republicans recaptured the Michigan legislature shortly thereafter, as part of a 
national backlash to President Lyndon Johnson’s agenda and that of the 1965-1966 Great 
Society’s where Democrats controlled Congress. This reaction had consequences 
affecting electoral politics in Michigan, as many cast their votes for Republican 
legislators. During a brief window of opportunity in 1965, however, dominant 
Democratic forces stood on the side of the Public Employees Relations Act. One article 
in the Detroit Labor News said it best:  
Those of us who have been journeying to Lansing for years 
and been continually rebuffed by a malapportioned 
Legislature on basic issues affecting the people of 
Michigan, have cause for rejoicing. It is obvious that the 
first equitably apportioned Legislature in a century in this 
state has done a good job for the people.99 
One such basic issue concerned those public sector workers interested in obtaining 
collective bargaining rights and a repeal of the anti union Hutchinson Act of 1947. 
To illustrate the importance of legislative reapportionment in the 1964 election, 
and its impact on the Public Employees Relations Act, we observe that the Michigan 
Senate in 1963-1964 session had twenty-three Republicans and 11 Democrats, while in 
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the Michigan House Republicans held a fifty-eight to fifty-two majority. Given this, it is 
little wonder that pro-labor legislation faced difficult hurdles. Similar disparities existed 
in both the Senate and House labor committees, where the Republican majority had not 
allowed similar bills to make it to the floor for a vote in previous sessions.100  In this 
climate, it made little difference that the governor was a sympathetic supporter of labor 
legislation, which had been the case since early in G. Mennen Williams tenure in that 
office.101  
With reapportionment, the voting majorities became reversed. During the 1965-
1966 legislative session, Democrats outnumbered Republicans twenty-three to fifteen in 
the Senate and seventy-three to thirty-seven in the House. Democrats also outnumbered 
Republicans by four to two in the Senate Labor Committee and nine to five on the House 
Labor Committee.102 From a Democratic point of view, however, there was the problem 
posed by the election of the first Republican in sixteen years, George Romney. Ironically, 
this meant that the divided partisan control of state government continued, except that 
now the Democrats controlled the state legislature and the Republicans the Governorship. 
This situation was less damaging than it might have been, however, as Governor Romney 
was a liberal Republican who was at least somewhat sympathetic to collective bargaining 
in general, and public sector collective bargaining in particular.  
 The reapportionment of the state legislature constituted one reason why 
Democrats came to outnumber Republicans in that legislative body. Another reason 
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involved the coat tails associated with President Johnson’s landslide win over Barry 
Goldwater. Because high voter turnout generally benefits Democratic candidates, 
advocates of a public employees relations act benefited from this element as well. In the 
same way that a lack of voter turnout during the 1946 ushered in a conservative U.S. 
Legislature that ultimately passed Taft-Hartley into law, the voter turnout of moderates 
and liberals that dominated the Democratic Party, turned out to elect Johnson.103  
Despite the import of the 1964 presidential election, reapportionment was the 
more important reason that advocates of the Public Employees Relations Act met with 
success in 1965. Of the eighteen Michigan House members who introduced the Public 
Employee Relations Act, eight had not previously served in the legislature. All were 
Democrats; all but two were from the Detroit metropolitan area, and thirteen represented 
Detroit proper. Of those legislators who listed occupations for publication in the 
Michigan Manual, four indicated a current or past profession as a teacher, two listed 
affiliations with the UAW, one listed himself as a machinist and another as a housewife, 
an occupation found nowhere amongst the Michigan house members of the previous 
term. While three listed themselves in real estate and one as an editor, most of those who 
introduced this legislation represented occupations that suggested a union and/or working 
class affiliation. In introducing the bill, they supported a major constituent base of the 
city: public sector workers and the people they served.104 
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Representative Leonard Walton introduced the bill in the Michigan House.105 He 
entered the legislature in 1962 without the benefit of a reapportioned legislature. Like the 
others who co-sponsored HB 2953, Walton was a Democrat representing the 18th district 
in Detroit. A Catholic who had memberships in the Irish American Club, Knights of 
Columbus, and American Legion, Ford Motor Company Post 173, little in his 
background would have marked this life-long Detroiter as pro labor.106 However, Walton 
lent his name and office to HB 2953.  
Walton's sponsorship of the bill may have been based on the district he 
represented. As the legislator representing Detroit's 18th district, he almost certainly 
represented a significant number of public sector workers. Given that public sector 
workers and their unions paid particular attention to how their representatives voted on 
important legislation, Walton's support of HB 2953 certainly would benefit him when he 
sought re-election.  
Sources regarding Senator Roger Craig, who introduced the bill in the Senate, are 
more extensive than those for Walton. Craig subsequently ran for governor in the early 
1970s. At 31, Craig was one of the younger legislators. His election was made possible 
only by a Dearborn law that disqualified candidates who were simultaneously running for 
other elected offices. Craig’s opponent in the primaries, George Hart, had violated the 
rule; as a result, Craig entered the legislature after having lost the primary a few months 
previously. His youth was not the only quality that distinguished him. As a member of 
the American Civil Liberties Union and the Americans for Democratic Action, and 
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serving as a vice president of the Detroit chapter of the National Lawyers Guild, Craig 
was a bonafide liberal. The label meant that he would have had his share of run-ins with 
Dearborn’s controversial and long-time mayor, Orville Hubbard, whose biographer 
described him as “The Dictator of Dearborn.”107 Craig had come into conflict with 
Hubbard over matters concerning the school board. Then Craig challenged Hubbard for 
his position as mayor. These conflicts with Hubbard meant that Craig did not mind a 
fight. Although no significant fight existed over the legislative process leading to the 
enactment of the Public Employee Relations Act, Craig’s supporters in the Senate could 
not have been concerned about any fortitude he might require to lead the senate on this 
matter. 
James Bradley, who served as chair of the House Labor Committee during the 
1965 session, and played a significant role in shepherding the 1965 Public Employees 
Relations Act into law, previously had been active in the Civil Rights movement. During 
Bradley’s unsuccessful campaign for Congress in 1961, Reverend George Hutchinson 
commented that, “he ha[d] been a fighter for equal rights, equal housing, equal education 
and equal employment opportunities…”108 He received numerous commendations for his 
work in the area of civil rights throughout his career. He received satisfaction for his 
work on behalf of “minority groups and the economic underdog.”109 These accolades 
                                                 
107David L. Good, Orvie: The Dictator of Dearborn: The Rise and Reign of 
Orville Hubbard (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1989), 276-286; Michigan, 
Michigan Manual, (Lansing: State of Michigan, 1965), 169; Press release, July 30, 1964, 
Orlando Falvo, Chairman of the Craig for State Senate Committee, biographical file, 
Burton Historical Collection, Detroit Public Library. 
108George H. Hutchinson, “James H. Bradley Seeks Support of Minority Groups,” 
Michigan Chronicle, 14 October 1961, bio file, ALUA; “Bradley Testimonial Planned for 
Nov. 4th,” Michigan AFL-CIO News – Detroit Labor News, 18 October 1967, 3. 
109Birthday Party Program from the Friends of State Representative James 
217 
 
suggest a rights consciousness that had implications for his career as a legislator. Bradley 
took great pride in his work to amend the Hutchinson Act, which, he maintained, 
“corrected grave injustices imposed upon hundreds of thousands of public employees, a 
large percentage of whom are black.”110 
 Senator Sander Levin had a keen interest in the bill, as evidenced by his 
attendance at conferences and workshops organized to lay the groundwork for this and 
other pieces of labor legislation. Levin also collected and reviewed material from both 
proponents and adversaries of the bill, including alternative legislation, and a report 
assessing its merits. The information from these sources provided him with the 
background he needed to clarify his position on the measure.111 It is clear, however, that 
Levin was leaning toward for support for this legislation even as he considered the 
counterarguments of the Michigan Municipal League and other stakeholders.112 Despite 
the reservations that the Legislative Service Bureau had about an amendment to the 
Hutchinson Act, Levin supported the measure through the legislative process. These 
reservations could not withstand the arguments that Ted Sachs and Al Barbour of the 
Public Employee Legislative Committee provided Levin. 
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Michigan Poised to Consider Public Sector Collective Bargaining Rights 
 
The political climate to support public sector collective bargaining manifested 
itself in Philadelphia where, beginning in 1952, Mayor Joseph Clark, Jr. initiated an 
effort to formalize collective bargaining relationships with police, fire fighters, and other 
municipal employees.  By 1958, AFSCME District Council 33 organized these latter 
workers. AFSCME’s agreement with the city approximated private sector models but 
with the absence of a strike provision.113  However, these relationships transformed the 
city’s public sector labor relations and influenced others to review their own labor 
relations. 
With what would become a trend continued in 1958, when New York City Mayor 
Robert Wagner, Jr., issued Executive Order 49, which allowed the city to certify 
exclusive bargaining agents for particular groups of workers…” Given the size of the 
city’s workforce, the executive order had a significant impact, evidenced by unions’ 
sense of empowerment and successful efforts to unionize.114 
At the time, Michigan-based stakeholders probably looked more toward 
Wisconsin than Philadelphia or New York City to determine how to pursue a state-wide 
law enabling public sector workers to bargain collectively. Wisconsin had passed a public 
sector collective bargaining law in 1959 that the legislature strengthened in 1962. Like 
Michigan, Wisconsin was a Midwestern state that had a history as a stronghold of 
progressive forces, even as it also witnessed the growth of conservative forces that often 
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neutralized the former’s influence. While organized labor forcefully sought a public 
sector law, the conservative League of Municipalities, County Board Associations, and 
the Chamber of Commerce in Wisconsin successfully opposed bills permitting public 
employees to bargain. When Wisconsin voters elected a Democratic governor 
sympathetic to a public sector law, the path was paved for such a law. It opened the door 
to similar laws in other states, among them Michigan.115 
The influence of events in Wisconsin extended to at least one conference attended 
by officers of metropolitan Detroit-based AFSCME Councils 68 and 77. This conference, 
sponsored by the University of Chicago and held in February 1965, focused on public 
employment and collective bargaining. There, Arnold Anderson, who served as a 
commissioner on the Wisconsin Employment Relation Board, gave a presentation titled, 
“The Developing State of Collective Bargaining for Public Employees.”116 His 
presentation almost certainly provided insight into the possibilities for pursuing collective 
bargaining legislation for the public sector in Michigan. 
In addition, advocates of public sector unions received support from another 
important place: the American Bar Association (ABA). In 1955, the labor relations 
section of the ABA issued a report outlining the parameters for public sector labor 
relations. While the authors of the ABA report did not advocate public sector strikes and 
sided with administrators who opposed public safety personnel joining unions, where a 
“conflict of interest and loyalties” might exist, they advanced a set of balanced ideas and 
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practices that supported public sector collective bargaining without conceding managerial 
prerogatives of public sector managers.117 The authors advised that public sector unions 
should be consulted before drafting revisions to pre-existing legislation. They believed 
that such unions “should not be expected to make any non-essential sacrifices”118 and 
should not “subject public employees to arbitrary treatment by administrators hiding 
behind the protection the law affords.”119 The report also argued that department heads 
should be willing to hear grievances if necessary, but only after they went through proper 
channels.120   
While acknowledging the sovereignty of legislative and executive bodies to set 
wages and working conditions, the authors argued that, “no sound reason exist[ed] why 
such policies would not be the subject of reasonable negotiations with the duly 
constituted and democratically chosen representative of organized employees.”121 As for 
strikes, the authors argued that,  
[i]t is the responsibility of government administrators to 
avoid conditions becoming so unfavorable as to justify 
public employees resorting to such extreme measures. It is 
no answer to the problem of preventing strikes of 
government employees to outlaw the 'strike' by legislation. 
These have proved unworkable and mostly futile.122 
The authors may well have reflected on the application of the Hutchinson Act during the 
1951 DSR strike when making this statement. 
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The importance of the ABA's report was evidenced by Michigan Governor 
George Romney’s reference to it. When he signed legislation allowing for public sector 
bargaining in Michigan, Romney quoted some of the language found in the ABA's 
report.123 Given the credibility of the ABA, his reliance on the report justified his 
position. 
With this background, we turn now to event in the Detroit Metropolitan area. In 
particular, we review a spate of conflicts that the Detroit-area teachers had with school 
boards and how these conflicts motivated others to more seriously consider the plight of 
public sector workers in general. Teachers played a central role in the history herein 
examined. Their actions prompted the state legislature to enact the Hutchinson Act and, 
through a number of strikes and threatened strikes in Detroit, Hamtramck, Lincoln Park 
and Taylor Township, motivated that same body to enact the Public Employee Relations 
Act 18 years later.124 Romney gave voice to the influence of teachers in 1965 when, in 
responding to the President of the Warwick Teachers Union about his support of PERA, 
he conceded that, “I am hopeful that this [i.e., PERA] will relieve some of the teacher-
school board strained relations that exist in some areas.125 
The most prominent of these conflicts took place amongst Hamtramck teachers. 
In a chapter of his Working Detroit, Steve Babson provides a history of salient moments 
                                                 
123Ibid., 90;  Robert A. Popa, “Romney Gives OK to Union for Public Employes 
[sic],” The Detroit News, 24 July 1965, 1-2; Slater, Public Workers, 161. 
124Labor Mediation Board, “Memorandum on House Bills Nos. 2954 to Amend 
Labor Mediation Act and 2953 to Amend the Hutchinson Act, box 103, folder titled, 
“Labor Mediation Board – Legislation Labor Dept. of – 1965,” George Romney 
Collection, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan. 
125George Romney to Donald A. D’Amato, letter, 29 September 1965, box 127, 
folder titled, “Legislature Regular Session, Miscellaneous D-F, 1965,” George Romney 
Collection, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan. 
222 
 
leading up to and including the amendment of the 1947 Hutchinson Act in 1965. 
Focusing attention on the plight of Hamtramck teachers to gain some basic rights, he 
recounts the treatment that they had received at the hands of Hamtramck’s school board, 
which paid its teachers less than most other teachers in the state, and indeed less than 
janitors who worked in the district. That these teachers took to the picket lines surprised 
few, not only because of the history of low wages and poor working conditions they 
received but because Hamtramck enjoyed a large union population that suggested that 
these teachers would take only so much from what Babson describes as a “corrupt” 
school board.126  
Meetings with the school board went nowhere, Babson says, and, in fact, the 
superintendent avoided scheduled meetings, further angering the teachers. Finally, 
Hamtramck teachers met secretly in late April 1965 and voted 133 to 23 to strike if they 
continued to receive resistance, which they did. However, the teachers called the job 
action a “'prolonged teachers’ meeting’…hoping to circumvent the anti-strike provisions 
of the Hutchinson Act.”127 For their efforts, the Hamtramck teachers “signed the first 
genuine legal, binding contract with a school board,” the Detroit Labor News reported. 
“No other teacher’s union has ever accomplished that feat,”128 it continued. These 
teachers won the victory while fellow members and officers of the Michigan Federation 
of Teachers attended the 31st annual convention of their union.  
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…delegates to the convention literally held up … on their 
shoulders Robert A. Kulczycki, president, and Cornelius 
Quinn, vice president, of Hamtramck Local 1052, as 
though they were the heroes who brought in the winning 
score of the big game.129 
Other teachers in the Detroit metropolitan area shared the concerns of those in 
Hamtramck, although the latter appeared to have suffered more than most.  
To be sure, the conflicts between Detroit-area school boards certainly weighed 
heavily on those who pursued the Public Employees Relations Act. Events outside of 
Detroit and Michigan played a role in prompting these events. It is worth noting that 
events in New York shared the history under study. In 1947, teachers in Buffalo, NY 
struck, which inspired the Condon-Wadlin Act, which, in turn inspired the Hutchinson 
Act after Detroit area teachers took to the picket lines or threatened to do so. Fourteen 
years later, teachers affiliated with New York’s United Federation of Teachers 
successfully pressed for collective bargaining rights, which, in turn, inspired Detroit-area 
teachers to successfully press for bargaining rights of their own.130 
HB2953 Moves Through Legislative Process 
 The House and Senate introduced their versions of the public employees relations 
bill on the same day, April 14, 1965; on June 22, the legislature passed the bill. Governor  
Romney signed PA 379 into law the next month. The new law amended the Hutchinson 
Act in a number of significant ways. Like the Hutchinson Act, it prohibited strikes by 
public employees. The new act, however, did not assign punitive consequences to those 
who did strike. Most importantly, the new law more narrowly defined what constituted a 
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strike. In the Hutchinson Act, if a single person did not come to work as scheduled, he or 
she could be deemed to be on strike and, as a result, be fired, lose his or her pension, or 
other benefits. The Hutchinson Act also prohibited the employee who violated its 
measures from receiving increases in pay for a year if allowed to return to work. The 
employees would be on probation for two years, during which time he or she would serve 
“at the pleasure of the appointing officer or body.” Non-public sector employees 
encouraging or coercing public employees to go out on strike would be subject to a fine 
for as much as $1,000.00 and/or one year in prison.131 This measure, directed toward 
union staff members and officers, was particularly onerous. Some even argued that it 
violated the constitutional guarantee to free speech. 
In contrast, the new law provided for unions and required collective bargaining 
should employees of a governmental unit request this option. Most importantly,  
Representatives designated or selected for purposes of 
collective bargaining by the majority of the public 
employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be 
the exclusive representatives of all the public employees in 
such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in 
respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment or 
other conditions of employment, and shall be so recognized 
by the public employer.132 
This clause meant that unions representing a minority of workers in any governmental 
unit would lose their members to unions representing a majority of the employees in that 
unit. This assured less fragmentation among public sector unions, as fragmentation that 
had weakened organized labor in the public sector. The clause also served to simplify 
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negotiations, as public employers now only had to negotiate with one representative in a 
unit as opposed to additional ones. 
 The new bill was passed by a 90 to 4 margin in the House, with ten Democrats 
and four Republicans abstaining. Because the margin exceeded a two-third majority the 
law had immediate effect. Otherwise, 90 days would have to have elapsed before the bill 
became effective. 
 As the Public Employees Relations Act was state law, it did not apply to federal 
workers. However, it did not apply to classified state workers. The state constitution 
mandated that their labor relations operate under the civil service system. Initially, 
employees of state universities were exempt from coverage under PERA. As for PERA, it 
covered local and county workers as well as teachers and others who worked within the 
public school system.133 
 In the months following the passage of HB2953, organized labor applauded the 
support provided by the legislature and governor. “300,000 Michigan Public Employees 
Get Right to Collective Bargaining,” the headline of one paper said.134 “'I think this is a 
real victory for Council 77 and I hope the city employes [sic] realize it was this union that 
paved the way for the rights they now enjoy,'”135 the Public Employees Council 77 
Mirror quoted Council 77 staff representative Alvin H. Rutherford. Chair of the Senate 
Labor Committee Sander Levin, as did Detroit City Councilmen James Brickley, referred 
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to the law as “the magna carta for public employees.”136  Public Employees Council 77 
President Jack Kauffman proudly declared that, “[n]ow, by law, we can sit down at a 
bargaining table and pound out reasonable conditions of work and wages.”137 An article 
titled, “Public Employe [sic] Act Hailed as Historic,” remarked that Sander Levin, chair 
of the Senate Labor Committee, “said that the law, passed by this year's Democratic 
controlled Legislature, marks a revolutionary development between public employer and 
employee.”138 
 With whatever success a law might meet as it winds its way through the 
legislative process, there are often challenges that it confronts in route to that success. For 
the two months between its introduction in April 1965 and passage in June, members of 
both the house and the senate introduced amendments to the public employee relations 
bill. In the process, wrangling took place between supporters and opponents before a 
resolution was found. It is little wonder, then, that the adage, “laws and sausage are the 
two things no one wants to see made,” resonates for many. 
 Following its initial submission, Michigan House Labor Committee Chair James 
Bradley (D) and Representative Bobby Crim (D), offered amendments to House Bill 
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2953. Many of those offered by Bradley aimed to clarify language in the bill as originally 
submitted. The Senate successfully demanded that the final version more clearly define 
who could and could not qualify as a supervisor in the Fire Department for purposes of 
collective bargaining. The final version also comprised reasonable language outlining the 
restricted conditions under which a party could demand a representational election.  
Representative Bobby Crim's objections reflected a combination of his training, 
background, and affiliations. A former teacher, Crim held affiliations with the Flint 
Education Association and Michigan Education Association. A Democrat representing 
the 79th Representative District in Genesee County, he had previously served as mayor 
and councilman, in Davison, Michigan. Crim had a closer ideological allegiance with the 
more conservative Michigan Education Association than the American Federation of 
Teachers.139 After all, the language he introduced as an amendment to HB2953 reflected 
that organization's interests and concerns. In particular, Crim called for a Professional 
Negotiation Commission to be used during collective bargaining in the Michigan 
Department of Education.140 Both the Michigan Education Association and Crim 
believed that educators should play a central role in negotiations. While discussing 
bargainable issues in teacher-school board labor relations, Robert Pickup voiced a similar 
concern. As the executive director of the Citizens Council of Michigan, an organization 
charged with providing information about important matters concerning state and local 
government, Pickup had studied this issue.141 “The Michigan law,” he argued, “does not 
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specifically define the subjects, which are open for negotiation.”142  Crim's colleagues in 
the House did not agree. The MEA’s lobbying and Crim's proposed amendment 
notwithstanding, efforts to modify the bill to reflect these concerns were rejected. On 
June 21, the day before the legislature passed the bill, Democratic Representative Traxler 
moved for a reconsideration of the measure, hoping that the move might result in further 
changes or simply to record his opposition to the bill.143 
The limitation of the law was inherent in the nature of laws themselves. Laws 
regulate behavior and, often, restrict parties from pursuing redress for unresolved matters 
outside of the parameters of the law.144 Since the new bill did not provide for strikes, 
which were and are rarely accepted for public sector workers, and since the bill did not 
allow for binding arbitration, the right to collective bargaining could mean little more 
than an opportunity to engage in non-binding discussions. So long as the employer could 
demonstrate that he or she had pursued the negotiations in good faith, little could stop the 
employer from maintaining unacceptable wages, work conditions, and benefits. This was 
the fear of public sector workers and the unions who represented them.145 
During the course of the process whereby the bill became Public Act 379, 
Representative Crim exhibited concern that the bill was unable to accommodate the needs 
of the educational community. In a similar vein, there were others who worried that the 
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state labor mediation board was unqualified to mediate disputes between public 
employees and employers when private sector labor relations was its specialty. After all, 
labor relations in the public sector came with unique issues that some believed did not 
mirror the private sector. Robert Pickup said it best. “It is argued that the entire 
orientation of the staff was toward the private sector and that the tendency has been to 
apply to the public-employee negotiations those standards that had already developed to 
meet problems of the private sector which are not the same as those in the public 
sector.”146 
Other concerns surfaced as well during the legislative debate. For example, the 
proposed law extended an unfair labor charge clause applicable to state and local public 
employers, but not to their employees or their representatives. In this regard, legislators 
modeled HB2953 after the Wagner Act and did not include its amendments under the 
Taft-Hartley Act. Advocates of the clause argued that employers held power to discipline 
employees under these circumstances. Some, however, questioned the fairness of a 
system that applied what they considered to be different standards of acceptable behavior 
to one party but not to the other.147 The law, while it provided “for public employees to 
organize together or to form, join or assist in labor organization,” neither said nor implied 
that these same employees had a right to refrain from joining or assisting in the 
organization of a labor organization.148 As with other elements of the bill, opponents may 
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have refrained from arguing the point because of the perceived futility in the matter and 
the political capital expended in the process. 
Public Sector Activism During Legislative Deliberations 
While the legislature was considering changes to the Hutchinson Act, public 
sector workers in the Detroit metropolitan area expressed their frustration in the form of 
strikes over wages, working conditions, and benefits. In May 1965 employees of the 
Public Lighting Commission, the Detroit Public Works, and the Building and Safety 
engineering Department called in absent, on vacation, or not at all, in protest to the 1965-
1966 city budget, adopted earlier in the spring. These plumbers, painters, electricians, and 
carpenters slowly ended their strike after three days, with each day finding increasing 
numbers returning to their jobs. The Cavanagh administration threatened the plumbers 
who participated in the strike with disciplinary action, ranging from “loss of pay, 
suspension, loss of longevity pay, consideration for promotion and possible termination 
of employment” in a letter. Newspaper reports indicated the same.149  
Mayor Cavanagh said that he was not prepared to invoke the Hutchinson Act, 
because work continued at sites. His executive secretary, however, did not get that memo. 
According to his executive secretary’s investigation, “work had stopped on the City 
Airport terminal, the new south wing at the Detroit Institute of Art, Receiving Hospital, 
the Kennedy Square underground parking garage, the swimming pool at McCabe Field, 
the zoo refectory and the Children’s Zoo on Belle Isle.”150 In all likelihood, Cavanagh 
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refrained from invoking the law because of its implications. Once public sector 
employees engaged in a strike, regaining their jobs would be difficult; and any such 
employee could lose pension and retirement rights. A prison sentence was reserved for 
anyone encouraging or coercing a public employee to engage in a strike, a provision 
clearly directed at unions. These provisions elicited fear in public sector workers but did 
not provide viable alternatives to resolve outstanding problems. The fear was reflected in 
newspaper articles that referred to the job actions as a “stay-home,” or referred to the 
workers in question as being “absent” from their duties. Media outlets did not use the 
word, “strike.”151 
In solidarity and sympathy with protesting city employees, a group of private 
sector employees honored the strike by withholding their work for at least one day of the 
job action. The combined actions of striking city employees and those privately 
contracted on city projects prompted the mayor to make a concession. As reported in the 
Detroit News, “[t]he stay-home protest ended Monday after Cavanagh approved a 
suggestion by union officials that a lump sum be set aside in the next budget to make 
wage adjustments in line with prevailing rates in private industry.”152 
Therein was the issue: public sector workers received less than their brethren in 
the private sector. “Even with recent raises granted by the city, …tradesmen on city 
payrolls get 25 to 50 cents less an hour than those employed by private contractors,” one 
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union official complained during the May 1965 strike of skilled city workers.153 The 
argument “that there should be a differential because of the assurance of year-round work 
in city employment did not resonate with city building tradesmen who bristled over a 15 
cent differential between what they received compared to “their counterparts in private 
industry.”154 Whether the differential equaled 15 or 50 cents did not matter to a number 
of city workers. For them, any differential raised questions of inequity.  
As for Cavanagh's “assurance of year-round work in City employment,” public 
sector workers had a counter argument to which he did not have as ready an answer:  
As for the so-called 'guarantee of tenure,' of former 
Government employes [sic] – dropped from the rolls 
because of consolidation, because of management decisions 
dictating reductions in force, or because of the introduction 
of new systems, new equipment, new ways of doing things 
– are grim testimony to the reality that looms far larger than 
the myth.155 
Making reference to the introduction of technical innovations while reflecting on the 
safeguards afforded workers in private industry, the author of the above notes the tenuous 
position of public sector employees. 
 Even the venerable American Bar Association concluded that public employment 
did not offer the security necessary to offset pay differentials. In the same report that 
Romney used to justify his decision to sign PERA into law, the ABA argued that, [e]ven 
alleged security in the public service has become not much different from that enjoyed in 
many areas of private employment.” The ABA issued the report ten years earlier, 
indicating that ideas concerning compensation and security for public sector employment 
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had begun to change long before.156  
Even as incidents of May 1965 unfolded, Cavanagh received three copies of a 
form letter signed by members of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 
Local #58, requesting parity in pay.  The letter quotes a portion of the City Charter that, 
“‘no skilled mechanic shall receive compensation in a sum less than the highest 
prevailing wage in that particular grade of work.’” Apparently, the practice began as 
early as 1948 and continued through the Miriani administration. The actual city Charter 
corroborates this claim.157 According to the union’s letter, there had been a time when the 
city provided skilled workers retroactive pay after withholding that pay for periods. The 
letter then pointed out past, current, and projected differentials described as “glaring and 
is the cause of much resentment.” The projected differential for the 1965-1966 fiscal 
year, the letter argued, was $11,050 for those in the private industry and only $9,256 for 
those in the public service, amounting to a differential of nearly eighteen hundred dollars. 
The letter then noted Cavanagh’s income tax plan and a “promise” that if it passed, 
Cavanagh  
would see to it that the skilled craftsmen employed by the 
City of Detroit received [sic] the prevailing rate of pay. 
Needless to say, the income tax plan passed, with our help, 
but so far, the Mayor has not kept faith with his promise. 
This is not good at any time but is especially so in an 
election year.158 
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January 1, 1948), Title IX, Chapter II, Section 4, 221. 
158Richard B. Stone to Mayor Cavanagh, letter,10 May 1965, box 212, folder 5,  
Cavanagh Collection, ALUA. The other letter are signed by John Parke and John Canales 
[sic?] (note: as standard archival practice generally dictates that duplicates are discarded, 
it is possible that there were many more of these form letters sent to Cavanagh than the 
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There is no known response to the allegations outlined in this letter. However, Cavanagh 
did respond to the differentials in response to the strike in May 1965. As reported in the 
Detroit Free Press, Cavanagh “said he believes workmen agree that there should be a 
differential because of the assurance of year-round work in City employment.”159 What 
constituted a reasonable differential in pay? It was Cavanagh’s “intent to keep City of 
Detroit rates of pay within 25 cents of the construction industry rates.”160 If the strike 
revealed nothing else, it illustrated that workmen did not placidly “agree” to a differential 
and, in fact, took exception to it. Historian Joseph Slater argues the same point. 
“Throughout this period their experiences contradicted the notion that government 
employees were somehow privileged,” he says in his book Public Workers. “They were 
poorly paid,” he continued.161 
The strike in the building trades was not the only time in 1965 that city workers 
engaged in an unauthorized strike to demand an improvement in their wages. Fourteen 
plumbers in the Department of Public Works, reported sick for two consecutive days in 
protest of inadequate pay raises for the 1965-1966 fiscal year. Their demands for a 60-
cent raise were answered with an unacceptable 29-cent upward pay adjustment. This did 
not sit well with the fourteen workers. Instead of calling a formal strike, knowing that the 
Hutchinson Act might be used against them, many of them called in sick. Beginning April 
14, the same day that the state legislature introduced House Bill 2953 and Senate Bill 621 
amending the Hutchinson Act, the plumbers absented themselves from work. The tactic 
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Collection, ALUA. 
161Slater, Public Workers, 202; see also Ross, “Those Newly Militant Government 
Workers,” Fortune, August 1968, 106. 
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did not work to the extent or in the way that the protesting plumbers desired. Indeed, 
Glenn Richards of the Department of Public Works “ordered sick pay withheld from 13 
city plumbers in his department who reported sick for the second day.”162 The workers 
pursuing the “strike” did not appear to be coordinating it with legislators. That these two 
events took place on the same day does say something about the tenor of the times, when 
public sector workers and the legislators who responded to some of their concerns 
operated out of a rights consciousness. Indeed, these legislators were, in their own way, 
responding to the concerns of public sector workers about the Hutchinson Act. The Civil 
Rights movement, with its sense of rights consciousness, must have shaped how the 
plumbers went on strike and how legislators responded to the push for a change in laws 
that would empower city workers to pursue their rights. 
Conclusion 
Marvin Esch stood as one of the few legislators who vocally opposed HB2953. A 
former Wayne State University professor who represented the 53rd district in Ann Arbor, 
Esch was not only one of the four representatives who voted against the bill when it came 
up for a final vote before reaching the governor's office for signature, he also felt strongly 
enough about the bill to formally comment on it before it won success. “Mr. Speaker and 
members of the House,” he began, 
I voted 'no' on House Bill No. 2953 not only because I 
object to the substance of the bill, but also because the bill 
passed through the Labor committee with but ten minutes 
discussion, and because debate was cut off on the floor 
before any member of the opposition had a chance to 
debate the bill, and before the motion to refer to the Ways 
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“City Refuses Sick Pay to Plumbers,” Detroit Free Press, 16 April 1965, p. 7B; 
se also, “City Warns it May Fire ‘Stay-Home’ Building Workers,” Detroit News, 18 May 
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and Means committee could be discussed, in spite of the 
fact that the Secretary of State had indicated the bill would 
have real financial implication[s].”163 
As one of thirteen members and one of four Republicans of the House Labor Committee, 
Esch possessed particular insight into the workings of this committee and the legislative 
process that moved this bill from its introduction through to its passage.164 The concerns 
about the bill’s “financial implications” and lack of “debate” said much about interests 
that House Bill 2953's advocates had in the measure. Following strikes, most prominently 
the strike of Detroit Street Railway workers in 1951, a number of previous efforts to 
amend the Hutchinson Act through the legislative process during the 1950s, the 
opposition that G. Mennen Williams, a popular governor, had to the law, not to mention 
numerous calls for its amendment by an organized labor energized by the Civil Rights 
movement, the Hutchinson Act remained intact for eighteen years. When Democrats 
finally came to dominate both the Michigan House and Senate following legislative 
reapportionment, they were in no mood to further discuss the merits of the bill, let alone 
more than the ten minutes that Representative Esch argued was too little. As to the bill's 
“financial implication[s],” its enactment did mean that the state had to now expend more 
resources for a bureaucracy established to administer its mandates. Most importantly, an 
energized public sector, emboldened by the Public Employees Relations Act, could more 
forcefully pressure elected and appointed officials to accommodate changes in wages, 
benefits as well as other terms and conditions of employment, which had financial 
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implications for the Detroit metropolitan community and beyond.165 
 However legitimate the concerns of Representative Esch, the momentum 
generated by the rights consciousness sentiment would not allow anything to stop or slow 
the enactment of the Public Employee Relations Act. Moreover, despite the legitimacy of 
Esch's concerns, the success of the measure may have prevented larger problems. As 
public sector workers in Detroit and beyond witnessed their counterparts in the private 
sector receiving contracts with wages, working conditions, and benefits that far outpaced 
theirs, the threat of escalating in strikes was real. The strike of Hamtramck teachers in 
April and of Detroit building tradesmen in April and May probably influenced other 
public sector workers to seek redress for treatment they believed they did not deserve. 
The Detroit News article entitled, “Other City Unions Eye 'Stay-Home', quoted one union 
official as saying that “'If this tactic works, others may try it. After all, we can't strike and 
we can't even get across-the-table bargaining. If you feel hurt, you've got to do 
something.'”166 The State of Michigan and its cities and counties may have been hard 
pressed to come up with the resources required to manage a state labor mediation board 
with increased responsibilities,167 but the impact of widespread and continuous strikes 
amongst public sector workers may have proven more damaging.  The argument herein 
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posed is a counterfactual one, but one no less important to consider when reflecting on 
the pros and cons of the 1965 Public Employees Relations Act. 
For the public sector and those who supporter their empowerment, the Public 
Employees Relations Act offered numerous benefits. With the law, public sector workers 
had an avenue to improve their wages, working conditions, and benefits. Their ace in the 
hole was to bring pressure upon the powers that be to sign favorable agreements. They 
had the capacity to accomplish this end by their use of the media and the collective 
bargaining provision within the law to force what they had difficulty proposing in 
previous years. We must remember, too, that PERA encouraged otherwise unorganized 
public sector workers to become organized. In theory, a more dense membership base 
had the capacity of strengthening unions during contract negotiations. While public sector 
membership grew substantially in Detroit with the passage of PERA, the contract 
AFSCME Council 77 negotiated in October 1967 was not nearly as strong as its officers 
and members would have liked. The following chapter examines why that was.
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Chapter 5 
The Prospects and Limitations of the Public Employees Relations Act, 1965-1967 
It is a pleasure to see how knowledge of the new laws can 
be a shot in the arm to members of ... A.F.S.C. & M.E. 
[l]ocals.1 
We will be able to raise our heads and get off our begging 
knees and set down across the table with management and 
bargain COLLECTIVELY.2 
'You have won the war here in Michigan, so to speak. Now 
you must perform the important task of securing the peace 
by establishing strong local unions and councils – 
financially strong with well-trained local union leadership 
that is able to use the power of this union, not only at the 
collective bargaining table, but in the halls of the legislature 
and in the communities where our people live.'3 -– 
AFSCME President Jerry Wurf 
 
Laws may set into motion responses that create other sets of challenges that the 
polity is then compelled to manage. The Public Employees Relations Act had this affect. 
Because the workers that were regulated by it served the entire community, the law 
inspired significant changes in Detroit. How could it be otherwise? Detroit was a “union 
town” and because Michigan’s Public Employees Relations Act significantly changed the 
relationship between the city and its sizeable work force, it would have been surprising 
had changes not occurred.  
The responses that PERA set into motion in the two years following its enactment 
                                                 
1
“Local 207, Detroit Water Board Employes [sic],” Detroit Labor News, 11 
November 1965, 7. 
2
“DPW Locals 26, 229, 327 and 1220 to Meet Nov. 28,” Detroit Labor News, 11 
November 1965, 10. 
3AFSCME President Jerry Wurf quoted on the occasion of the Second Annual 
[Michigan] Leadership Council in November 1967 in “Michigan Leadership Moves to 
Create Strong Program,” Public Employee, December 1967, 12. 
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include a Detroit ordinance that mirrored the state law, intense organizing efforts by 
public sector unions and associations, and the adverse effects of a shrinking economy on 
public sector workers seeking improvements in pay, benefits and working conditions. In 
addition, the legislature changed from Democratic to Republican control, AFSCME 
international imposed trusteeships on two AFSCME affiliates, government officials 
resisted PERA, and the Civil Rights movement continued to influence the course of 
public sector labor relations. Each of these developments factored significantly into the 
modest agreement into which Detroit and AFSCME Council 77 finalized in October 
1967. 
Detroit Enacts it Own Labor Relations Law 
In December 1965, following the enactment of the Public Employees Relations 
Act, Detroit's mayor and City Council passed and signed into law Ordinance 140-G. By 
enacting this ordinance, the city established the administrative machinery to manage 
Detroit's labor relations. In the process, city officials limited the state's role in labor 
relations with city employees, thereby taking control of those relations. In so doing, the 
city sought to prevent any negative consequences from the involvement of a state labor 
mediation board in particular: a scenario where a state labor mediation board, trained to 
mediate private sector labor relations, might intervene in Detroit’s public sector labor 
relations. Moreover, with city labor relations in the hands of Detroit officials, the city 
could better define relations where PERA was ambiguous.4  
 The ordinance “established a labor relations bureau to consist of a director and 
                                                 
4Sterling Spero and John M. Capozzola, The Urban Community and Its Unionized 
Bureaucracies: Pressure Politics in Local Government Labor Relations (New York: 
Dunellen, 1973), 47-50. 
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such other assistants as may be required.” It provided the director with the power to 
negotiate on grievances, make rules for the administration of the ordinance, and carry out 
its mission under the direction of the mayor and Common Council. In short, the law 
created a division of the city government designed to mediate and direct relations 
between the city and its employees.5 
 On the surface, the passage of the city ordinance facilitated collective bargaining 
between the city and its employees. For many at the time, the civil service system did not 
work, and other agencies proved inadequate in managing the city's employees. An office 
specifically charged with labor relations might stabilize and systematize public sector 
labor relations. The ordinance, then, replaced what many referred to as “collective 
begging.” The city council promptly approved the ordinance with no dissenting votes.6 
 Previously, public sector unions, associations, groups, and clubs lobbied the 
mayor and city council members for wage hikes and improvements in benefits and 
working conditions. In the years leading up to 1965, public sector unions, and 
associations, representing repairmen, boiler inspectors, nurses, guards, traffic sign 
mechanics, typists, stenographers, construction inspectors, librarians, sanitation workers, 
recreation workers, bus drivers, window washers, and engineers, among many other 
workers, sent letters to the mayor and city council members requesting adjustments to the 
terms and conditions of  employment for their members. On other occasions, the mayor 
                                                 
5Ibid., 45-46; Detroit, Michigan, “Labor Relations Bureau for City Employees’ 
Collective Bargaining Ordinance,” Amendment to the Municipal Code (1965), Ordinance 
No. 140-G, Chapter 2, Article, 7; McLaughlin, Michigan Labor, 149-150. 
6Ibid.; Mel Ravitz, Interviewed by Louis Jones, 7 August 2008. In this interview 
Mel Ravitz who was on the Common Council when that body passed this resolution, 
indicated that the two people that were not present, may have objected to the ordinance 
but decided not to vote against it since they knew that their vote would not have mattered 
anyhow. 
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convened groups of public sector representatives, often in the auditorium of the City-
County Building, to discuss compensation packages. The process did not allow for 
meaningful negotiations and reinforced the image of 'collective begging,' as it suggested 
that public sector workers had little say in the outcome.7 
 Dozens of organizations represented city employees in the years leading up to the 
enactment of the Public Employee Relations Act.8 In addition to AFSCME's Public 
Employees Council 77, which represented approximately 9,000 workers, a range of other 
organizations made their requests known to city officials.9 Their requests chiefly 
concerned wages, as when AFSCME Local 236 President complained in his letter to 
Detroit City Councilmen Mel Ravitz, that his members, employed at the Mistersky Power 
Station of the Public Lighting Commission, received wages and fringe benefits that were 
far less than comparable workers at Detroit Edison. To emphasize the disparity, this 
Local 236 president included a chart reflecting a wage study illustrating the differences. It 
called attention to the fact that, “MISTERSKY WAGES LISTED ABOVE AVERAGE 
ABOUT 60 [CENTS] PER HOUR OR ABOUT $1200 PER YEAR LESS THAN 
                                                 
7Mae MacLeod to Al Leggat, 24 February 1966 and Mayor [Jerome Cavanagh] to 
45 employee representative groups, 23 February 1966, box 270, folder 14, Jerome P. 
Cavanagh Collection, ALUA. 
8Robert E. Pickup, executive director of the Citizens Research Council of 
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48. See “Michigan Public-Employee Relations,” Proceedings of the Academy of Political 
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EDISON WAGES.”10  
 The local was not alone in complaining about the terms and conditions of work 
for its members. “From our observations,” wrote a senior staff representative for 
AFSCME Local 1220, representing maintenance workers and window washers, “it 
appears as though length of service with the Department [of Public Works] have little 
weight as to transfer rights, choice of jobs or promotional opportunities.”11 The 
Association of Governmental Senior Clerks, Typists, and Stenographers personalized the 
plight of its members in seeking an increase in wages. In writing to Councilmen Mel 
Ravitz, public sector representatives described a typical member of their local:   
Generally, he is a husband and father – a responsible 
citizen – who is seeking to raise his standard of living. This 
pressure becomes most urgent when he feels that he is 
losing out, either in lower income, in higher living costs, or 
by comparison with what others are receiving.12 
These concluding words, “by comparison with what others are receiving,” reveals the 
growing sentiment that public sector workers deserved what private sector workers 
received. 
 Robert J. Hugler of the Governmental Accountants and Analysts Association 
complained that, “the failure of your Honorable Body to approve the executive salary 
rates recommended by the Mayor is, in our opinion, a questionable economy.” He cited 
the difficulty in recruiting and retaining qualified individuals at lower rates than the 
                                                 
10Robert J. Jones to Mel Ravitz, 6 March 1962, and “Edison/Mistersky Wage 
Study,” 1962, box 2, folder 20, Mel Ravitz Collection, ALUA. 
11Lawrence C. Stranahan to William G. Rogell 
12Robert Steill and Mary Keene to Mel Ravitz, 22 January 1963, box 6, folder 7, 
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private sector.13 Again, this union representative alluded to the disparity in pay between 
his members and those employed elsewhere doing similar work. 
 The issues of wages aside, public sector employees also concerned themselves 
with health care, seniority, pensions, vacation rights, sick leave, life insurance, and death 
benefits, among other benefits.14 They often pressed for changes in benefits as forcefully 
as they did for wage increases. As with the wages, many of the complaints centered on 
the lack of equal treatment with private sector employers. 
 During the period preceding the new law, neither the council nor mayor were 
under any obligation to address the concerns of the public sector. With the establishment 
of a Bureau of Labor Relations, however, which had the power to conduct formal 
collective bargaining and the resolution of disputes, the relationship between the public 
sector and the city became formalized. 
  Responding to the enactment of the Public Employee Relations Act, city officials 
pressed to have a local ordinance. Less than a week after the legislature passed PERA, G. 
Remus, of the Board of Water Commissioners, advised Fred Romanoff, executive 
secretary to Mayor Cavanagh, that the city should establish practices concerning 
collective bargaining procedures for city employees under the new state law. Remus, 
however, did not conceive the idea on his own; he was prompted by Clem Lewis, 
regional director of Local 413, Utility Workers Union of America. Lewis had requested a 
meeting with Remus for the purpose of engaging in a collective bargaining relationship 
with the Board of Water Commissioners over which Remus served as general manager. 
                                                 
13Robert J. Hugler to [Detroit] Common Council, 18 May 1964, box 8, folder 19, 
Mel Ravitz Collection, ALUA. 
14See, for example, Alvin H. Ruthenberg and Robert N. Pruitt to the Honorable 
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Needless to say, Lewis’ letter was inspired by the passage of the new state law. 
Anticipating the wide-ranging implications of the new law, Remus advised Romanoff 
“that a meeting be held with the proper people...to establish uniform practices as far as 
the City is concerned.” In the months after the enactment of PERA, but prior to the 
enactment of Detroit Ordinance 140-G, other unions approached the city, or particular 
city departments that employed their members, for the purpose of engaging in appropriate 
collective bargaining relationships. In each case, the requests were made to the Chief 
Assistant Corporation Counsel with the recommendation that they submit petitions to this 
effect to the State Labor Mediation Board. Now there was more pressure for the city to 
establish uniform practices that Remus thought necessary.15  
 Inspired by the enactment of PERA, the relationship that the city had developed 
with AFSCME over the decades began to mature. Early in August 1965, a memorandum 
of understanding was created regulating the relationship between AFSCME Local 23 and 
the Detroit Housing Commission. The memorandum addressed employee representation, 
grievance procedures, promotional policy, personnel practices, employee training, union 
business, general working conditions and general provisions. The importance of the 
memo notwithstanding, its authors noted that its dictates were tentative, since Public Act 
379 was not fully operational.16  
                                                 
15Clem Lewis to G. Remus, 29 July 1965 and G. Remus to Fred J. Romanoff, 30 
July 1965, Jerome Cavanagh Collection; Robert Reese to Fred Romanoff, 10 August 
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Collection. 
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Local 23 AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 14 July 1965; Anthony Ripley to Richard Strichartz and 
Robert Reese, 11 August 1965, box 212, folder 5, Cavanagh Collection, ALUA. 
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While memoranda of understandings are important mechanisms, they lacked the 
finality that the city’s labor relations required. In the course of determining a plan of 
action for a more formal mechanism, significant players within city government 
convened committees and drafted proposals for dealing with the state law before, and 
perhaps in anticipation of adopting, a comparable local ordinance. Chief Assistant 
Corporation Counsel Thomas H. Gallagher, Controller Richard Strichartz, Charles Meyer 
of the Civil Service Commission, Budget Director Edward Nowak, Arthur Petrimoulx, 
Head Governmental Analyst for the Budget Bureau, and Fred Romanoff, executive 
secretary to the mayor, comprised members of the local government who acted on behalf 
of the city in connection with labor relations. However, it was not until mid-August that 
Gallagher received a formal request from Detroit’s Common Council “to develop means 
of complying with the newly enacted law providing for recognition of collective 
bargaining units among public employees.” To this end, Gallagher convened a 
provisional committee on labor comprised of Charles Meyer, Arthur Petrimoulx, Al 
Leggat as a consultant, and Gallagher as chairman, to act as agency for the city before the 
Labor Mediation Board and recommend procedures and means for dealing with labor 
matters.17 
 Later in August, budget director Nowak drafted a “Proposed Ordinance 
Governing Bargaining Procedures,” wherein he provided alternatives for the formation of 
either a Labor Relations Counsel or Commission intended to manage grievances, 
complaints involving unfair labor practices, petitions requesting modifications in wages, 
hours and working conditions without impinging upon the jurisdiction of the Civil 
                                                 
17Thomas H. Gallagher, 16 August 1965, box 212, folder 5, Cavanagh Collection, 
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Service Commission, Controller, other departments, or the Common Council. It was a tall 
order. After the Common Council reviewed the provisional committee’s proposal, a 
subsequent and lengthier, albeit tentative, proposal was put forth in early November. This 
latter proposal argued for a labor relations director as part of a labor relations bureau that 
would be subordinate to the mayor in order “to avoid a possible threat to the strong 
Mayor concept in the present and all future administrations.” Interestingly, this proposal 
was as much concerned with adhering to Kennedy’s 1962 Executive Order 10988 
allowing for collective bargaining among certain federal employees as it was with PERA, 
thereby acknowledging the importance of a tone established on the federal and state level. 
The Provisional Committee on Labor then set out to draft a Detroit-related Code of Fair 
Labor Practices for Common Council approval. It was to outline a proposed process for 
negotiations, providing for the powers and duties of the Director for the Labor Relations 
Bureau as well as for an advisory committee. It was also to designate the scope and order 
of negotiations, agreements with bargaining units, rights and duties of employees, labor 
organizations and departments.18 
 The Provisional Committee on Labor submitted similar proposals outlining issues 
to be considered for Common Council approval. Of particular interest was a memo 
regarding employee relations in city service. The unidentified author(s) maintained that 
“[t]he addition of a new and different agency merely added to the fragmentation of 
personnel administration and make its coordination more difficult.” The author(s) argued 
that duplication of effort and interdepartmental conflicts resulted from the proposal to 
                                                 
18Nowak to Strichartz, 23 August 1965, box 212, folder 5, Cavanagh Collection; 
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establish a labor relations bureau. While the proposal set forth in this memo did not come 
to fruition, it anticipated concerns voiced by others after the ordinance for a labor 
relations bureau had been approved by the Common Council and mayor.19 
 The enactment of laws requires that sponsors consider how they will impinge 
upon existing laws. In this case, those charged with formulating Ordinance 140-G needed 
to take a close look at Ordinance 336D, which the city had enacted 20 years before. 
According to Budget Director Edward J. Nowak and Head Governmental Analyst Arthur 
J. Petrimoulx, “Ordinance 336D, among other things, purports to authorize the Civil 
Service Commission to administer the pay play, ordinances and resolutions affecting 
compensation and fringe benefits.” The ordinance was inoperative, it was generally 
believed, since there was neither a Personnel Director nor rules required by its provisions. 
Besides, the Controller performed those functions delegated elsewhere by Ordinance 
336D. The new ordinance needed to define the role of the Controller as well. These 
developments demonstrate the force PERA, as it forced Detroit city government to adapt 
to the new public employee labor relations rules and, ultimately, nullify previously 
established ordinances.20 
 Part of the force behind passing the ordinance for a city labor relations bureau 
came from the rights consciousness stirred by the Civil Rights movement. This 
burgeoning movement found expression in Detroit's Mayor Cavanagh. Detroit citizens 
elected Jerome P. Cavanagh its mayor with great hope and expectation. At the age of 33 
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and a Catholic, Cavanagh reminded many of John F. Kennedy, who assumed the 
presidency in the previous year. Cavanagh, a virtual unknown, embraced the Civil Rights 
movement and publicly announcing his commitment to reform the Detroit Police 
Department, which had long been seen as racist toward African Americans.21 Cavanagh's 
public stance motivated the Trade Union Leadership Conference, the NAACP, Cotillion 
Club, the Wolverine Bar Association and the Michigan Interdenomination Ministerial 
Alliance to support a voter registration drive designed to support Cavanagh's election.22 
Cavanagh entered the Mayor's office, with a sense of hope and expectation, as well as a 
concern and interest in civil rights.  
 Programs initiated by Lyndon Johnson's Great Society and War on Poverty 
programs further solidified the relationship between Detroit's African-American 
community and Detroit's mayor, who embraced the new initiatives. Even though issues 
such as police brutality and shop floor oppression continued unabated during much of his 
tenure, many voters expected Cavanagh to make Detroit a better place to live and work 
than what his predecessor had left. When Cavanagh won, he made good on his 
commitment to bring equity in the executive order he issued shortly after assuming his 
new duties, one that tied his concern with civil rights with the public sector. On February 
22, less than two months after his inauguration, Cavanagh issued Executive Order No. 1. 
It said, in part, 
City employees shall be recruited, appointed, trained, 
assigned, and promoted without regard to race, color, 
religion, national origin or ancestry. Equal treatment of all 
                                                 
21Mary M. Stolberg, Bridging the River of Hatred: The Pioneering Efforts of 
Detroit Police Commissioner George Edwards (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 
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22Ibid., 31 
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persons without regard to race, color, religion, national 
origin, or ancestry shall be afforded to the public by all 
municipal departments and commissions in performing 
their services and in their operation of municipal 
facilities.23 
To ensure that the order would be taken seriously, Cavanagh required that, “[e]ach 
department and commission shall include in its annual report to the Mayor all activities 
undertaken in compliance with this executive order.”24 With this executive order, the city 
officially made a break with past practices, took a stand against discrimination, and 
furthered the cause of civil rights. 
 Sources do not reveal the number of African Americans that Detroit employed in 
public sector work. We can assume that their representation and treatment improved 
during Cavanagh's tenure as mayor.25 Their growing numbers are reflected in the 
concerns expressed by Michigan Representative James Bradley. He was partially 
motivated to work on behalf of the Public Employees Relations Act because of the 
number of African Americans who served as public sector workers.26 
 In addition to formally advancing the idea and practice of non discrimination, 
Cavanagh’s support of a labor relations bureau evidenced his willingness to embrace 
change. To head up the new bureau, Cavanagh appointed Al Leggat, who had served as a 
consultant on committees concerned with public sector labor relations. There were few 
people better equipped to lead the Detroit Bureau of Labor Relations than Leggat. Having 
started work at Ford when he was 13, Leggat remained with the company for years before 
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assuming increasingly responsible positions within the UAW leadership. He eventually 
became Local 24 president. Much of his interest remained in the area of labor journalism 
and public relations. During the 1940s and 1950s, he served in editorial positions on the 
Willow Run Bombadier,27 the Michigan CIO,28 and the Auto Worker, and became 
publicity director for the UAW Political Action Committee. He also had experience as a 
business agent and editor for the AFL in the hotel restaurant field.29 In the late 1940s and 
early 1950s, Leggat expanded his career by becoming Redford Township Supervisor, a 
position that he sought when he found corruption in the township government. His 
success in getting elected to that position was due, in part, to his activity in the Young 
Democratic Organization in Michigan, starting in 1932, an organization for which he 
became state chairman.30  
 The importance of Leggat’s political and union experience aside, his appointment 
by Cavanagh to the position of director of the Bureau of Labor Relations resulted from 
his role in persuading a Detroit company to remain in the city after a dispute with the 
Teamsters over wages. As reported in the Detroit News in June of 1962, “Legatt called in 
state mediators, reopened negotiations between the union and management. Just hours 
before the company was to complete final arrangements for leaving Detroit, the employes 
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[sic] voted to accept a three-year agreement and the plant stayed”31 in Detroit. Word of 
Leggat’s work got back to Cavanagh through Allan Chisolm, chairman of the State Labor 
Mediation Board. From this reference, Cavanagh appointed Leggat to the position of 
Bureau of Labor Relations in Detroit. Leggat’s tenure as executive secretary of the 
Michigan State Labor Mediation Board and as a civil service mediator further acquainted 
him with some of the nuts and bolts of what the new position involved.32 His work in 
management positions at Cobo Hall and the Bridgeport Brass Company, complemented 
his work in organized labor. It contributed to Leggat’s ability to see labor-management 
relations from the different perspectives required of the director of the Bureau of Labor 
Relations for Detroit. 
 Once in the position, Legatt attracted positive attention from a number of sources 
that took an interest in the role Cavanagh appointed him to direct. Soon after Legatt 
assumed his new position, Robert Perry of the Industrial Relations Association of 
Chicago asked Legatt to address that body concerning the proposal for legislation in 
Illinois granting collective bargaining rights to its public employees. Several months 
later, the Labor Relations Council of one Chamber of Commerce asked Cavanagh to 
allow Leggat to address its annual meeting in Indianapolis in June. In addition to 
acknowledging Leggat’s success in this new position, these requests also say something 
of the growing importance of providing public employees with collective bargaining 
rights. It would have been unimaginable for any Chamber of Commerce to have 
considered inviting someone like Leggat to one of its functions ten years before. The year 
                                                 
31
“Anthony Ripley, “Legatt’s Labor Role Praised by Mayor; New Job Sighted,” 
Detroit News, 7 June 1962. 
32Jack W. Skeels Oral History Interview with Al Leggat, 4 December 1959, p. 11 
Relations, ALUA. 
253 
 
1965, however, represented a moment in history where the idea had attained increasing 
acceptance.33 
 Under Leggat’s leadership, the Bureau’s first order of business was to establish a 
representation policy that would determine which organization would represent which 
body of employees. According to the December 21, 1965, document, 
the Labor Relations Bureau and the Office of the 
Corporation Counsel favored the recognition of the largest 
possible unit that will represent the greatest community of 
interest while giving proper consideration to the 
jurisdictional claims of recognized skilled trades and crafts, 
professional and technical association and recognized 
supervisory personnel. 
The policy was sound enough, but recognizing labor organizations proved difficult. 
Recognition of these organizations also had far reaching implications. When it came to 
such employees as the police and fire fighters, there would not be many, if any, 
challenges, since the Detroit Police Officers Association and Fire Fighters had 
represented those employees for many years. The representation of other city units or 
classes of workers, however, had been divided among different unions. Since PERA 
mandated that, with some exceptions, each unit and/or class of employee was to be 
represented by one organization, often several unions sought to become that exclusive 
bargaining agent. AFSCME Council 77, the Teamsters, and to a lesser extent, SEIU’s 
Council M entered the fray in an attempt to win over city employees to their side.34 As 
there were some 25,000 people employed by the city, the stakes were high. The end result 
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of efforts to represent segments of this work force ended in the near complete elimination 
of particular labor organizations from representing Detroit city employees. Indeed, this 
became SEIU’s fate, as AFSCME all but decimated that international’s Detroit-based 
Council M in this winner-take-all contest.35 
 Jurisdictional disputes between AFSCME and SEIU were not the only ones that 
the Labor Relations Bureau had to address. Other examples of jurisdictional disputes 
involved those between the Detroit City Hospital Employees Union and AFSCME 
Council 77 over practical nurses, medical attendants, institutional attendants, and other 
non-professional employees.36 In his January 18, 1966, letter to Cavanagh and the 
Common Council, Leggat refers to jurisdictional struggles between other employee 
representatives. Leggat maintained that the Labor Relations Bureau would seek to 
support an outcome that would be fair and reflect the interests of the city in its ongoing 
relationship with its employees. However, it must have caused Leggatt some anxiety as to 
which outcome would be most fair to the interests of the employees and the city alike.  
 One of the reasons that unions scrambled to obtain recognition from the Labor 
Relations Bureau and the State Labor Mediation Board was because negotiations for the 
1966-1967 budget were to occur soon after the Labor Relations Bureau was established. 
The ability of labor organizations to secure wages, benefits, and working conditions 
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beneficial to their members was contingent upon their standing in relation to their 
members, the city and state, as the city determined the budget. The Utility Workers of 
America and Local 447 of the Laborers and Hod Carriers Union, both of whom 
represented certain segments of the Detroit Water Department, demonstrated this 
concern. These unions expressed concern that their petition for exclusive bargaining 
status may be considered after commencement of the 1966-1967 budget or not enough 
time to engage in collective bargaining relations with the city in time for that budget. 
Barring recognition as an exclusive bargaining representative, unions were hampered 
during the negotiation process.37  
 The challenges to the Labor Relations Bureau was partially demonstrated by the 
forty-five unions that represented city employees.38 Cavanagh invited representatives of 
these unions to discuss the 1966-1967 budget in the auditorium of the City-County 
Building.39 Similar meetings had taken place between Cavanagh and labor 
representatives in years past. Unlike those earlier encounters, state law now pressed 
Detroit and other Michigan cities to engage in a process more approaching a good faith 
effort to bargain collectively over issues of wages and work conditions. 
 Even as the Labor Relations Bureau was traversing new ground with employees, 
their unions, and the departments wherein they worked, it had to deal with issues that 
others had to deal with in previous years when no such city division existed. In a letter to 
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Cavanagh, Clem Lewis, Regional Director of the Utility Workers of America, noted 
Cavanagh’s budget projections reported in the media and took exception with what he 
deemed to be the continual policy of providing disproportionately high wages to the 
police and fire department personnel compared to others.40 
 Still another issue confronted the Labor Relations Bureau. There were challenges 
to the authority of the new bureau over relations between the city and its employees. The 
DSR Commission, for example, argued that, “the ordinance governing the DSR is not 
subject to the new Labor Relations Bureau provisions.” AFSCME Council 77 also 
challenged the Bureau’s authority in May 1966. A seemingly exasperated Leggat 
expressed concern over challenges to the Labor Relation Bureau’s authority and other 
matters that impacted its effectiveness, in a May 18, 1966 letter to Cavanagh, in which he 
sought guidance and direction from the Common Council. He addressed demands for a 
union shop, compulsory arbitration, full scope of PERA vis-à-vis other legislation and 
Civil Service Commission practices, renegotiation of wages and benefits between 
budgets, bookkeeping costs associated with dues check-offs, and a growing disregard for 
the anti-strike prohibition within the law.41 
 The advisory role of Detroit's corporation counsel, City controller, secretary-chief 
examiner of the Civil Service Commission, and their respective assistants contributed to 
the confusion. As Spero and Capozzola argued,  
The role of this advisory committee in the bargaining 
process, as management and civic leaders had predicted, 
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proved a source of frustrating confusion. It trapped the 
Labor Relations Bureau and its Director in a crossfire of 
legal ambiguities, legislative-executive competition 
between the Mayor and the Common Council, and 
bureaucratic rivalries within the city administration.42 
The challenges facing the Labor Relations Bureau required concerted action to resolve. In 
conjunction with the members of the Labor Relations Advisory Board, Leggat proposed 
that Detroit, Wayne State University, the University of Michigan labor-management 
departments, the Michigan Municipal League, and the National League of Cities convene 
a high-level seminar to resolve issues that cities in Michigan faced in the management of 
public employees. “We would benefit greatly from the experience of cities who have 
dealt with municipal unions in the last ten years and they in turn would benefit from new 
demands we are all facing in today’s highly organized drives,” he wrote Cavanagh in the 
late spring of 1966.43 
 Some believed that the bureau’s establishment was premature. Indeed, less than a 
month before the ordinance went into effect, Detroit’s Mayor Cavanagh, in commenting 
on a state law considered for Illinois similar to the Public Employee Relations Act, said 
he hoped that the Illinois law would not be given immediate effect and “would allow for 
the much needed time to properly prepare for its operation.” Moreover, a little over three 
months after assuming the position of Director of the Labor Relations Bureau, Leggat 
commented that, “It soon became apparent that this hastily processed legislation [i.e., 
Ordinance 140-G or PERA] should not have been given immediate effect.” Hastily 
processed or not, the creation of a labor relations bureau for public employees was not 
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deterred by those who had second thoughts. The force of history simply would not give 
way to pressure from other quarters.44 
 There would be opportunities to approach a resolution on some of these matters, 
but it was not likely that they would be achieved during the Bureau’s first year of 
existence. Whatever the case, the events leading up to and including the Labor Relations 
Bureau’s first year were tumultuous, to be sure. Given the contentious forces that 
motivated them into existence, it would have been surprising had they been anything less. 
Given the tone of the 1960s, with its mobilization of African Americans and other 
marginalized segments of the society, it is logical that public employees would both draw 
from, and contribute to, that spirit as they sought empowerment following years of what 
they considered to be “collective begging” and demeaning treatment as ‘public servants.' 
 In 1965, formal and legally required collective bargaining rights and procedures 
constituted new waters for governments to navigate. This was surely why Legatt was 
asked to speak to various gatherings about this subject, even though he himself was still 
new at it. Those requesting his advice sought to learn what he had done correctly and/or 
avoid the mistakes he had made along the way. Whatever the case, one thing remained 
clear: Leggat, with his background and range of experiences, was thrown into a position 
that anyone would have struggled with managing. 
The Continuing Impact of the Civil Rights Movement 
 
 The civil rights-inspired fervor among public sector workers did not end with the 
enactment of either the Public Employee Relations Act in 1965 or Detroit Ordinance 140-
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G. The momentum from this movement also found its way into the success of AFSCME 
Council 77’s organizing campaign and its first contract with the city in October 1967. 
Historian Robert Shaffer attributes the growing energy of the public sector to “the civil 
rights movement, the student movement, the feminist movement and the questioning of 
the established order normally associated with the 1960s.”45 Writing less than a decade 
following the enactment of PERA, Arnold Zack explained the militancy of public sector 
workers in similar terms. One of the main reasons for this activism, he argued, comprised 
“[t]he demonstrated power of rising civil disobedience in the civil rights and draft resister 
movements, anti-poverty campaigns and war protests, which convinced militant public 
employees of the viability of protesting against the 'establishment' to bring about 
change.” Zack lists seven other reasons for the attention received by and militancy of 
public sector workers in the mid 1960s, including the relationship between it and the 
Civil Rights movement.46 Historian Joseph McCartin observed that, “as government 
workers' unions became more diverse in their membership, they made racial and gender 
justice issues more central to their agendas.”47 The connection between social movements 
for civil rights and campaigns for the rights of workers was stronger in the public sector. 
 The fertile ground created by the Civil Rights Movement prompted advocates of 
public sector empowerment to seek protections “afforded private sector employees by the 
National Labor Relations Act,” and included in Kennedy's Executive Order 10988 
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granting collective bargaining rights to federal employees. The headline-grabbing 
attention given to illegal strikes among transit workers in New York City and school 
teachers throughout the country also contributed to the sense of empowerment among 
public sector workers.48  In addition, Jerry Wurf's biographer refers to the 'one-man, one-
vote decisions handed down by the Supreme Court and the “massive infusion of federal 
monies into state and city governments under President Lyndon Johnson's Great Society 
programs”49 as contributing to the empowerment of public sector workers beginning in 
the mid 1960s. It is hard to imagine any of these phenomena existing twenty years before, 
when the country was emerging from World War II and entering the Cold War era. In 
this context, it is easy to see how and why the Detroit railway strike of 1951 met with 
failure and why a 1966 strike of transit workers in New York City met with success.50 
While many trace the inception and roots of the civil rights movement to World War II, 
the full impact of the war’s language about rights was not felt until the 1960s.51 “Rights 
consciousness transcended most of the usual demographic and occupational barriers,” 
Nelson Lichtenstein argues when he discusses public sector workers. “It spread to almost 
every segment of society, to just about every interest group and faction,” he continues.52 
In this context it is not so unusual that public sector workers sought their own set of 
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rights. 
 As discussed in chapter four, African Americans commonly bristled over “second 
class citizenship” when voicing their complaints against discrimination during the 1960s. 
Advocates of increased organization, representation of, and collective bargaining for 
public sector workers used this same language to motivate them to demand the same legal 
rights that private sector workers enjoyed under the National Labor Relations Act. When 
AFSCME Council 77 organized workers (both its members and non-members) to walk 
off their jobs early in order to voice their frustrations to Detroit officials in 1966, they 
appropriated the language of the Civil Rights movement to do so. The flyer the Council 
produced for the occasion explained that the Council intended “to secure first class 
employment citizenship!!!!!!”53 
 In 1966, Council 77 repeated the arguments made in the course of pressing for the 
Public Employees Relations Act. The Council sought parity with those in the private 
sector. “For fifteen years the city employee has been sadd[l]ed with a law banning them 
from their constitutional right to fight for better working conditions and wages 
compatible with those enjoyed by private industry,” one observer wrote. The Michigan 
AFL-CIO News – Detroit Labor News Edition editorialized the same point when arguing, 
“that the public – as an employer – has failed to keep pace with the private sector.” The 
strength and relevance of this argument is reflected in how the discussion helped to shape 
the contract negotiations with AFSCME. By making reference to “constitutional rights,” 
advocates of public sector empowerment relied on language and a tactic used by those 
within the Civil Rights movement. On some level, after all, it was the Constitution that 
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was the basis for most of the claims made by proponents of civil rights and of unions. 
An Organizing Drive Commences 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the Civil Rights movement played a large part in 
generating the momentum in Michigan politics required for the passage of the Public 
Employee Relations Act. With a promise to provide public sector workers with rights 
similar to those found in the private sector, the law sought to address some of the 
inequities in the work force. Similarly, it is in the context of the Civil Rights movement 
that the organizing drive among public sector employees took on meaning. The continued 
fervor following the enactment of the Public Employees Relations Act energized 
AFSCME Council 77 and Detroit-area public sector workers more generally to pursue an 
organizing drive to further solidify their influence among Detroit's public sector workers. 
The organizing drive began shortly following PERA's enactment. 
 On August 1, 1965, only nine days after Michigan's Governor George Romney 
signed the Public Employees Relations Act into law, the Detroit News ran a front page 
article with the title, “Teamsters' New Target: 250,000 Public Workers.”54 An article by 
long-time labor journalist Asher Lauren was subtitled, “5 Other Unions in Drive Spurred 
by Michigan Law,”55 making reference to the Public Employees Relations Act. No 
corresponding article appeared in the pages of the Detroit Labor News, probably because 
the Teamsters were not members of the Michigan AFL-CIO. Michigan AFL-CIO 
Executive Vice President alluded to the Teamsters and/or organizations like them when 
he complained that, “there could be unions who made no contribution to the joint AFL-
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CIO effort responsible for enactment of the legislation who would now feel it would be 
advantageous to organize in the public employe [sic] field.”56 Acknowledging the 
Teamsters in the context of the Public Employees Relations Act only would provide 
publicity to an organization poised to compete with Michigan AFL-CIO-affiliated unions 
organizing public sector workers.57 Whatever the case, the tone of the article was similar 
to the period following the enactment of the National Labor Relations Act in 1935, albeit 
on a statewide scale. As with that earlier federal legislation, many believed that the new 
state law opened the door for mass organizing drives in the public sector. It is little 
wonder, then, that many referred to PERA, as the little Wagner Act.58 
 Later in the month, AFSCME Council 77 made a concerted effort to launch a 
comparable organizing drive. A Local 542 columnist reported that,  
[t]he opening gun was fired last Saturday at the EMBASSY 
HOTEL for a vast organization drive for PUBLIC 
EMPLOYEES. Top Organizers from the 
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INTERNATIONAL, STATE, COUNTY, AND CITY 
levels were on hand to spell out the methods necessary to 
insure the success of this drive. Regardless of the help from 
the higher level it is still the duty of the rank and file of 
each individual local to aid and support with all their 
energies this effort.59 (Capitalization included in the 
original). 
It is not surprising that public sector unions immediately pursued a massive organizing 
drive after the passage of the Public Employee Relations Act. Organizing new members, 
after all, is often considered the life-blood of unions. In the months before the Michigan 
Legislature passed PERA, one local affiliated with AFSCME Council 77 made this point 
in a Detroit Labor News column: “This is the most important part of any Union activity,” 
this observer said of labor organizing. “Without it you simply don't have a strong Union. 
It cannot be over stressed.”60 The other matter of importance for these locals concerns 
what occurs when unions fail to engage in successful organizing efforts. Other unions 
target the same workers. For these reasons, organizing must be a never-ending process. 
 AFSCME Council 77s organizing drive was part of a larger effort. Nationally, 
AFSCME grew significantly during the 1950s and 1960s, significantly outpacing that of 
most other unions. Unions organizing public sector workers over all grew substantially. 
Indeed, one of the arguments used to justify the importance of studying public sector 
unionism in the period is this growth, which contrasted significantly with the fate of 
many unions that limited their organizing to workers in the private sector during that 
same period and beyond.61  
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 In an effort to rally its members, AFSCME Council 77, the locals affiliated with 
it, and those who supported it, convened union meetings, conferences, conventions, mass 
rallies, and demonstrations with the purpose of organizing unrepresented Detroit city 
workers. They held gatherings in union halls, hotels, before the city council, and in the 
street. Admittedly, the organizers had additional concerns on their minds when soliciting 
support for the representation of city workers. They may have sought to educate their 
members about the benefits of union membership or directly press city officials to 
increase wages or benefits. They may also have organized these gathering to clarify the 
benefits of the Public Employee Relations Act. Even gatherings convened for these 
purposes had the goal of impressing upon city workers the importance of joining locals 
affiliated with AFSCME Council 77 and the formal collective bargaining relationship 
that the new law made possible. 
 AFSCME Regional Director Tom Fitzpatrick attended many of these gatherings. 
As with the efforts to push for the enactment of the Public Employees Relations Act, 
Fitzpatrick fought hard to ensure that locals affiliated with AFSCME Council 77 received 
formal recognition and a contract worthy of the name. Described as “dynamic” in a 
column for AFSCME Local 542 members, Fitzpatrick praised the local “for the fine 
organizational work” it was doing. “This will motivate us to work harder to get the other 
per cent of the unsigned to sign up with AFSCME.”62 One observer was more forceful in 
his assessment. “Any member or non-member who had the opportunity or foresight to 
attend the first Mass Meeting of Local 236, November 18, 1965, without a doubt received 
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an education,” this observer noted. “One has to be present to feel the total impact of the 
message delivered by International Representative Tom Fitzpatrick” (Italics included in 
the original).63 The next week Fitzpatrick was on hand at the AFSCME Public Employees 
Council 77 convention, where he continued to spread the word about the potential in 
collective bargaining following the enactment of PERA.64 When Fitzpatrick spoke before 
members and officers of Local 229, representing DPW Street Maintenance & 
Construction employees, one commentator wrote: 
The meeting was well attended by the rank and file who 
were held spellbound by the eloquence of Tom Fitzpatrick, 
AFSCME International Representative. He brought out 
many points of issue that were both edifying and 
enlightening to those of us who had thought, up until now, 
that the formulation of a contract was a comparatively 
simple matter.65 
Fitzpatrick also called a collective bargaining conference in Detroit in December 1965. 
Six hundred people attended this event. Notwithstanding the conference's focus on 
collective bargaining, its participants discussed the importance of organizing as well.  
Now with the new Law #379 [i.e., PERA] there is only one 
job left to do – get out and sign up all government 
employes [sic]. Since Council 77 and its affiliated locals 
have carried the ball so well in the long fight, their 
experience and desire to the [sic] their members receive the 
best in the past, certainly are entitled to everyone's 
support.66 
                                                 
63
“Local 236, Public Lighting Commission Employes [sic],” Detroit Labor News, 
2 December 1965, 6. 
64
“Public Employes [sic] Convention Dec. 11,” Detroit Labor News, 9 December 
1965, 15. 
65
“Local 229, DPW Street Maintenance & Construction,” Detroit Labor News, 9 
December 1965, 8. 
66
“Local 207, Detroit Water Board Employees,” Detroit Labor News, 20 January 
1966, 8; see also Billings and Greenya, Power to the Public Worker, 151-152. 
267 
 
An observer from Local 542 commented that,  
[t]he organizing and Collective Bargaining meeting held 
Sat., January 15, 1966 at the Pick-Fort Shelby Hotel was a 
huge success. Inspiring talks by labor leaders in City, 
County and State government should have an 
overwhelming effect on all our members. To those who 
missed this important conference, we urge you to attend the 
next big one to be held in the near future. The time to be 
announced later.67   
 
It is clear that in the immediate months following the enactment of PERA, Fitzpatrick led 
the drive to organize eligible city workers into AFSCME Council 77.68 
 Tom Fitzpatrick's importance to AFSCME Council 77's development 
notwithstanding, organized labor more broadly pushed the idea of public sector 
empowerment through the Public Employees Relations Act. As an author suggested in a 
Detroit Labor News column, the successful fight to amend the Hutchinson Act, as 
important as that was, was not intended to be an end in itself: 
Brothers and Sisters we don't want to be too critical, but 
there is still too much complacency shown in some areas of 
our organizational drive. We have fought hard to get the 
Hutchenson [sic] Act amended so why not take advantage 
of your gains? Let no one assume that we have won. We 
still have to stay in and fight just a little harder. Come to 
your union meetings and find out what you can do for your 
union.69 
It was an important point, as the strength of a law is dependent upon vigilant people 
ensuring its effective enforcement. This columnist sought to push public sector union 
members to be those vigilant people.  
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In announcing a two-day convention of AFSCME Council 77 in Detroit, the 
Detroit Labor News anticipated it to be “the biggest convention ever held...[T]he unity 
that presently exists among affiliated locals,” the article continued, “promises to bring 
forth tremendous progress.”70 According to one observer, the convention lived up to 
expectations. “I have attended numerous conventions, big and small, but I must say, this 
one was second to none,” the observor noted. “It was studded with many qualified 
individuals, who have been an asset to organized labor,” the observor continued.71 
 The Detroit Labor News included an article from one local requesting members to 
attend a meeting, where those in attendance could learn about the public sector collective 
bargaining bills enacted by the legislature and governor. “[A]ll employees of the House 
of Correction are invited to attend as there will be a complete explanation of the new laws 
2953-54 by International Representatives on how public employees can be back in the 
classification of FIRST CLASS CITIZENS, if they will make the effort to see that it is 
done.”72 AFSCME locals 26, 229, 327 and 1220 scheduled mass meetings to orient their 
members in the changes as well.73 As with the effort to press for the Public Employees 
Relations Act, advocates of public sector unionization used the language of rights 
consciousness to motivate their members to action. 
 The staff and leadership of AFSCME Council 77 and its affiliated locals 
understood that they could not fully organize otherwise unrepresented members into their 
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fold by themselves. They continually encouraged members to take on the work of 
organizing as well. Those already organized were more likely to understand the benefits 
of organization and could see the common plight of fellow co-workers. Additionally, 
those already organized were more likely to have befriended unorganized fellow workers. 
With these friendships, members were in an ideal position to convince their comrades to 
consider union membership. 
 A column for members of Local 23, representing the Detroit Housing 
Commission, also publicized the need to motivate members to organize others.  
The challenge to us as union members is to follow up the 
passage of this bill with an intensive campaign of signing 
up the unsigned. This means personally contacting your 
fellow workers who are not members of your local and 
acquaint them with the gains that we have made and 
inviting them to help us become 100% organized.74 
Representatives of Local 236 representing the Detroit Public Lighting Commission 
Employees argued that, “[e]ach of us must reach out to our unorganized breathern [sic] 
and point out the gains made by and the advantages of belonging to the American 
Federation off State, County and Municipal Employees – the only Union for Public 
Employees.”75  
 Local 23 made a point of naming the union members who took time to and 
interest in organizing fellow workers. As reported in the Detroit Labor News, “George 
Shannon, Darlene Weston and Roosevelt Segars are three members [of Local 23 
representing employees of the Detroit Housing Commission], who have been doing a 
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good job in organizing some of our members.”76 Member organizing took place at the 
Detroit Water Board as well, where Local 207 represented many of the employees within 
that city agency. There, “Brother Hatcher at Sewage Treatment and Brother Orey from 
Central Maintenance are leading the pack in organizing and the rest are not far behind. 
What a job has been done so far and by all appearance they have plenty of steam left.”77 
The tactic of naming member-organizers had the potential of motivating them to continue 
that work while hopefully inspiring others to do likewise. 
 Local 542 joined the effort to encourage members to organize the unorganized. 
“Our organization committee have been doing a yoeman [sic] job in distributing bulletins 
and signing people up, but this does not stop any member from asking his or her working 
companion to join and give the Committee a helping hand.”78  A Detroit Labor News 
column concerning the same local reinforced this point the following week. “This job of 
organizing the unorganized is such a big task that we could certainly use many more 
hands.” “Many hands make work light and this is true especially in this particular 
field.”79 In addition to making ‘work light,’ involvement of a larger number of members 
empowers those unions.  
 The leadership of Detroit-area AFSCME affiliates, always encouraged their 
members to attend and maintain some level of involvement in local affairs. The desire for 
member involvement remained intact following the enactment of PERA and AFSCME 
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leadership used PERA, as the reason for why members should be involved. “All meetings 
now are very important as with the new Laws covering Collective Bargaining and a 
Contract it is very important that every member attend if you desire to have anything to 
say as what goes in the CONTRACT.”80 
 As part of the effort to motivate public sector workers, union staff sought to 
ensure members that their voices would be heard throughout the entire process from 
organizational drives to representation elections and contract agreements. AFSCME 
Local 542 representatives understood the importance of this incentive when it told its 
members to begin writing their thoughts down as to how to improve the relationship 
between employee and employer in anticipation of contracts. “While waiting for this 
meeting to be held, why not write down your ideas and give them to your Vice Pres. who 
will file them away for use at our meet[ing],”81 one union official asked. Officials 
affiliated with other locals encouraged their members to do the same.82 Local 542 asked 
that its members “[c]ontinue to submit your proposals and ideas you wish embodied in 
our first contract. Please don't get impatient because of the delay in recognition, it has to 
come and when it does we will be ready to bargain with the administration. So turn in all 
your ideas, preferably in writing to your district Vice President.”83 Again, seeking 
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enhanced member involvement could only benefits the union as a whole as it approached 
its first formal contract negotiations. 
AFSCME Council 77 Fends Off SEIU and Other Competitors 
 While the Civil Rights movement played an important role in the organizing 
campaign conducted by the public sector, other issues factored significantly into the 
intensity of the campaign. Competition for members represented a force that both 
energized the intensity of these drives, but also detracted from longer range efforts to 
present unified fronts during contract negotiations. Competition for members had 
devastating consequences for some unions while it solidified the power base of others. 
This competition reflected and heightened divisions among public sector unions, and it 
weakened their collective efforts to win favorable contracts. The results of the struggle 
undermined the enthusiasm and hope with which advocates welcomed the Public 
Employees Relations Act. Indeed, one may reasonably speculate that the Public 
Employees Relations Act promised favorable consequences for all Michigan-based 
public employee organizational drives. With the enactment of PERA, after all, AFSCME 
Council 77 and other public sector unions, recognition leading to collective bargaining 
relations elevated them to a position similar to what private sector unions had with 
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The enactment of PERA pitted public sector 
unions against one another in pursuit of the same members, a phenomenon similar to 
what happened among private sector unions after the passage of NLRA. 
 Even prior to PERA's enactment, AFSCME Council 77 faced competition for 
members and recognition from the Service Employees International Union. Indeed, much 
of SEIU’s publicity suggested that the PERA legislation was more than a little desirable. 
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Roy Berger, SEIU’s first Michgan-based public employee organizer and representative, 
spent a good deal of his time cultivating relationships with public officials. As far back as 
1958, for example, Berger met with “State Representatives Joseph G. O’Connor, and 
William Copeland to discuss legislation pertaining to public employees that is scheduled 
to come up on the new session of the State Legislature.”84 In his 1966 letter to SEIU 
International President David Sullivan, SEIU's Phelmon Saunders expressed hope in the 
influence of PERA on the efforts of his local to successfully organize in Detroit. 
Saunders was hopelessly naïve. Most of SEIU officials operating in Detroit understood 
that the legislation would have devastating affects on their prospects of eclipsing 
AFSCME or even of remaining in the running.85 
 Before Governor Romney signed the bill into law, SEIU Organizing Director 
Milton Murray informed SEIU President David Sullivan that, “My efforts are 
concentrated on getting this very favorable bill adopted sometime in 1968 when we 
should have majority positions in at least a few more units.”86 Herein lies the concern of 
Murray and other SEIU officials seeking to establish a stronghold of public employee 
locals in Detroit: That PERA favored unions that had ‘majority positions” in state, 
county, and municipal units. With but a few exceptions, SEIU did not have these 
majorities. Locals affiliated with AFSCME Council 77 did. This meant that each unit in 
which SEIU organized less than 30 percent of the work force, could not legitimately 
challenge the union that possessed a majority. In those units that AFSCME possessed 
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majorities, SEIU would be forced to determine another course of action. Anticipating the 
adverse effects of this legislation, Murray reported to Sullivan that, 
I have just received belated word that the public employee 
recognition bill that I was quietly trying to sabotage in 
Michigan has been passed and will be signed by the 
governor. The bill provides for exclusive bargaining 
elections. Tommy Flowers estimates that within two years 
most of our 3,000 membership in Detroit and Wayne 
County will be wiped out. Flowers will get his executive 
board together to map a defense campaign to salvage as 
much as possible and I will keep in close touch by 
telephone.87 
The stakes were high. 
With the odds set against it, SEIU's Council M, a counterpart to AFSCME's 
Council 77, mapped out a defense that reflected its desperation. Part of the plan called for 
a campaign designed to influence the membership to question the merits of the new law. 
“Although the Governor and the Michigan State Legislature saw fit to sign bill #2953 
into law,” Tommie Flowers wrote in a “Fact Sheet” distributed to the Council M 
membership, “neither one of these offices took the time to appropriate the necessary 
funds needed to establish a State Mediation Board large enough to determine the various 
units for voting purposes throughout the whole state of Michigan.” Maintaining that the 
new law permitted other unions to engage in a “legalized public employee raid,” Flowers 
suggests that “The Public Employee Bill #2953 still grants you the personal right to select 
whomever you may choose to represent you in the settlement of your grievance. This is 
your right and no one can take that away from you.”88 Later in August, the Detroit Labor 
News published an article by Flowers reiterating these same points, and reinforcing 
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comments he made earlier in the month.89 
The reality was that this alleged “right” had been taken away. The language of 
PERA makes this clear: “Representatives designated or selected for purposes of 
collective bargaining by the majority of the public employees in a unit appropriate for 
such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the public employees in such a 
unit.”90 SEIU’s leadership sought clarification on the implications of the act before 
conceding. When it directed its attorney Lester Asher to check into the matter, the 
response confirmed what SEIU probably already knew. “…an individual may present his 
own grievance, or his exclusive bargaining representative may present his grievance, but 
not another union.”91 The evidence on which Detroit’s Chief Assistant Corporation 
Counsel based his decision when determining the exclusive bargaining representative was 
payroll deduction.92 In contested bargaining units, the director of the state labor 
mediation board found that AFSCME members possessed a majority. 
A portion of SEIU’s plan that was more tangible than the words in “Fact Sheets” 
was its decision to join forces with the controversial Teamsters. It was a curious move. 
Teamsters President James R. Hoffa had been convicted of jury tampering and fraud in 
two separate trials two years before, crimes for which he would serve a lengthy prison 
sentence beginning in 1967. Council M must have had a certain ambivalence about the 
association, especially given Hoffa’s strong affiliation with the Teamster local in question 
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and its alleged connection with organized crime.93  
Still, the Teamsters, bad image and all, was a powerful union and SEIU hoped to 
take a truck ride on its coat tails. “Teamsters Local 299 and Council M last month filed a 
joint petition to represent all employes [sic] in two departments,” wrote Jim Crellin, of 
the Detroit News on March 9, 1966. According to Crellin, Joseph Valenti of the 
Teamsters maintained that his Teamsters joined forces with SEIU so that the two 
organizations would have more strength at the bargaining table.94 Not mentioned in the 
article was Council M’s determination to undermine AFSCME’s efforts at all costs. This 
was how many perceived the collaboration between Council M and the Teamsters. 
AFSCME produced and distributed a flyer that reinforced this thought. “The Teamsters 
were expelled from the AFL-CIO for corrupt practices,” the flyer stated. “Read the daily 
papers and see how many Teamster Bosses are in jail for stealing from the worker or 
selling him out to management…This is the outfit that Building Service95 has sold you 
out to.”96 As for the final outcome of these efforts, Council M did not win the right to 
represent DPW workers when it joined forces with the Teamsters. Rather, the truckers 
union won the right to represent its truck drivers.97 
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Despite the propaganda for Council M members and the coalition formed with 
Teamsters, Council M could not withstand the forces set into motion by the Public 
Employees Relations Act. Indeed, two years after the legislation went into effect, Flowers 
conceded to Sullivan that, “it is impossible for even a die-hard such as myself to pretend 
that I cannot see that which is inevitable.”98 As predicted earlier, Council M was wiped 
out.99 
Circumstances consistently worked against Council M until it became apparent 
that no hope existed. The International regrouped and drew up a less ambitious program 
for the organization of metropolitan Detroit public employees. With Council M’s 
dissolution, Local 505M merged into 808M and several locals continued to operate on an 
individual basis. The International saw enough promise in two of them to subsidize 
efforts that it hoped would take them into and beyond the next decade. No other plan 
seemed viable. Given the circumstances, focusing on these two locals seemed 
reasonable.100 Fights for members broke out elsewhere following the enactment of PERA, 
but the fight between AFSCME Council 77 and SEIU Council M had particularly 
devastating consequences for AFSCME’s competitor.101 
 To combat SEIU, the Teamsters, and other unions vying for members among 
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public workers, AFSCME pushed forward with a program designed to convince 
unorganized public employees to join their ranks. The new program involved, in part, 
how the labor union marketed itself. AFSCME, it emphasized, only organized and 
represented those in the public sector, as its name suggested. Neither the Teamsters, 
SEIU, nor the utility workers, could say as much. Local 207 made this point when it 
suggested that prospective members ask themselves if they would rather “belong to an 
organization that deals with Government all the time and with 250,000 members” as 
opposed to another union that does not specialize in public sector matters. Public sector 
employment was its domain, AFSCME argued, and no other labor organization of its size 
had a mission that focused solely on workers in state and local government. 
 Closely tied to the density of public sector workers in AFSCME Council 77 was 
the density of members in the specific government units that AFSCME sought to 
organize. For AFSCME, as with many other unions, the objective was to organize 
complete units. The power and force that workers of any given unit could exert was 
limited by whether it could command the loyalty of its workforce. “We still have a big 
job ahead of us in uniting our forces into 100% before we start negotiating for a 
contract,” a representative with Local 542 maintained. “[S]o whether we are happy about 
the results or a little disgruntled lets all band together in this big job of organizing THE 
UNORGANIZED.”102 
 Further, AFSCME argued that there were additional benefits when large numbers 
of public sector workers joined one union, rather than being represented by multiple 
unions: 
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Fifteen years ago there were about 40 unions representing 
the public employee. Imagine the confusion and 
consternation that evolved from such a status when 
bargaining time rolled around! The Mayor, Common 
Council and everyone else concerned had the public  
employee right where they wanted him – disunited, 
confused and fighting himself! This resulted in poor 
working conditions, poor wages, second-class citizenship 
and an apologetic mein [sic] for just being a public 
employee!103 
 
Beyond referring to the 'second-class citizenship' that public employees had long 
endured, the Detroit Labor News column illustrated the unity required to achieve the first 
class citizenship public workers demanded. Fortunately for Council 77, the law required 
that units receive representation from one union, a position that made for union strength. 
Forces Waged Against AFSCME Council 77 
 
 In its campaign, AFSCME Council 77 positioned itself for success at the 
bargaining table. With its history representing a large percentage of Detroit’s public 
sector workers and given the conferences, meetings and well-attended demonstrations it 
arranged, few could argue with its position. That it received the support of prominent 
politicians and labor leaders also bode well for its success. Council 77 also knew, 
however, that success did not come without a struggle. Delaying tactics, a negatively 
changing political climate, the realities of the economy and a few ill-conceived tactics all 
worked to significantly thwart the hopes that AFSCME Council 77 had for its affiliated 
locals, which were to attain contracts favorable to its members. 
 In the months following the enactment of PERA, AFSCME demonstrated in 
protest against the pace at which the city was implementing its provisions. For example, 
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the Detroit Labor News reported that in September 1965, AFSCME Council 7, 
representing state employees in Lansing, came to Detroit with 3,000 members to protest 
the city's delays.104 The next month, following a leadership conference AFSCME 
convened at a Detroit hotel, the union held a demonstration against the city government, 
where the union charged it with “'dragging their feet' in implementing the Public 
Employees Act, passed in July 1965.”105 Others voiced concerns about the slow pace at 
which the city agreed to sit down for negotiations. Some of those affiliated with Local 
542, representing Parks, Recreation, Zoo & Historical Museum, complained that “[w]e 
are being delayed until our city fathers finalize their budget.”106 What Council 77 
considered delays in negotiations heightened the level of frustration experienced by 
AFSCME and other Detroit-area public sector unions.107 
 In addition to the city’s slowness in recognizing locals affiliated with AFSCME, 
forces were at work that made it difficult for AFSCME Council 77 to secure a favorable 
agreement in October 1967. One particular “force” operated at the state level, but it grew 
out of national concerns and had implications for public sector workers and their 
representatives in Detroit. One such “force” came in the form of the Governor's Advisory 
Committee on Public Employee Relations. 
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 States throughout the country began expressing their reservations about the 'rights' 
that public sector workers had begun to receive in the mid-1960s. Many even wondered if 
some of those rights should have been limited more strongly to inhibit public employees 
from striking. To this end, the National Governors’ Conference sought to reconcile the 
'rights' of public sector workers to engage in collective bargaining with what they 
considered as the rights of citizens to receive public services without interruption due to 
the threat of strikes or other job actions.  It did not take long for states to exhibit these 
concerns. In 1967, the National Governors’ Conference issued its Report of Task Force 
on State and Local Government Relations. Published by the Public Personnel 
Association, which had a stake in its findings, the 101-page report fleshed out many of 
the issues in states with active public sector unions. Independent of this report, governors, 
school systems, and a board of supervisors from seven states, stretching from Connecticut 
to California, sought some means of limiting the power of public sector workers to strike 
and perform other job actions not countenanced a decade before.  These reports, written 
in a three-year period ending in 1968, pressed the same need to limit workers’ job 
actions, although they conceded that no easy answer existed.108 
 In July 1966, Michigan made its own contribution to the effort to improve labor 
relations between state and local governments and their employees. On July 29, Governor 
Romney established the Advisory Committee on Public Employee Relations. In his 
charge to the five-member committee, Romney noted the positive qualities of the Public 
Employees Relations Act of the previous year, affirming that public sector workers 
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should have “the right to join unions or other organizations for the purpose of collective 
negotiations free from interference or infringement by public employers.” For Romney, 
the Act “was an important, progressive step...” He did, however, express important 
concerns, which is why he established the committee in the first place. Both employees 
and employers had taken liberties not outlined in the act, Romney argued, which was 
indicative of a period of transition. In this environment, Romney sought advice as to any 
statutory changes in the law or policy and procedural changes that the times necessitated. 
For Romney, public employees utilizing the strike weapon constituted the most serious 
reason to establish the committee.109 
 The five-member committee echoed Romney's general approval with the 1965 
Public Employee Relations Act. It maintained that public sector workers should have the 
right to join and engage in collective bargaining. With that, the committee made a 
number of recommendations related to the act, including applying the law to university 
and state civil service employees, a budget increase for the State Labor Mediation Board 
to coincide with its increased responsibilities, and the unionization of supervisors while 
ensuring their exclusion from unions representing non-supervisory employees. The bulk 
of the recommendations, however, concerned a means of strengthening the current law to 
ensure that public sector workers would not resort to strikes even while they retained the 
right to collective bargaining.  
For the committee, it was a tall order. The Committee clearly struggled with the 
issue of strikes among public sector workers. While the committee concluded that it had 
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“not yet reached a point where this 'ultimate issue' has to be or can realistically be 
decided,” the report tepidly argued that, “[t]o say as some do that there cannot be 
effective collective bargaining without the right to strike is to suggest the conclusion 
either that such right should be recognized or that public policy does not provide for 
effective collective bargaining in the public sector.”  
The Committee clearly struggled to arrive at meaningful recommendations about 
how to resolve otherwise intractable disputes within the public sector. In order to forestall 
strikes or other “interruptions” in the services public sector workers provided, the 
Committee recommended binding arbitration by a third party in the case of disputes 
involving police and firefighters and court-ordered mandatory injunctions for those 
public sector workers who utilized the strike before exhausting other means to resolve 
disputes. Those “other means” included an option of establishing more stringent 
“statutory mediation and fact finding” procedures and the governor's appointment of a 
12-member panel authorized to conduct hearings involving disputes. 
 The Detroit Labor News argued that Romney's support of this report was part of 
an effort to boost his campaign for the Republican nomination for president.110 However, 
there is some indication that Romney was loath to make any major recommendations 
stemming from the recommendations of the committee. After all, Romney believed that 
issues surrounding public sector labor relations were inherently controversial. It might 
require using the type of political capital that he could ill-afford to expend during the 
upcoming election year. The strikes that inspired this committee in the first place affected 
a wide range of the public, received media attention, and inspired no easily-agreed upon 
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solutions. Public sector workers and their unions were, moreover, increasingly aware of 
their power over politicians.111 Writing some years later, James Mortimer made the 
observation that public sector employees and their representatives, by virtue of their 
existence as voters and employees, get to “'sit on both sides of the bargaining table.'”112 
In this context, Romney was right to be concerned that any position he took on public 
sector labor relations would damage his chances of becoming president. Unlike either 
Coolidge or Dewey, whose presidential candidacies were enhanced by their tough stand 
on public sector workers, Romney probably perceived the new public sector unionism as 
a distraction capable of derailing his chances. One way to sidestep the issue was to 
appoint a committee with no decision-making authority. Nonetheless, the committee's 
purpose and Romney's presidential hopes aside, the conflicts that gave rise to the report 
and the report itself revealed that many questioned the scope and impact of the Public 
Employees Relations Act. This questioning did not help the cause of AFSCME Council 
77's efforts to win a favorable contract in October 1967. 
Republicans Dominate 1967-1968 Michigan Legislature 
 
 At the time that public sector workers and their representatives sought collective 
bargaining rights, metropolitan Detroit was experiencing a demographic shift that 
compromised the ability of public sector workers to gain improvements. The civil 
disturbance that occurred in July 1967, greatly exacerbated the exodus of white residents, 
which had begun in the previous decade. The resulting population decline and 
deindustrialization drained the city’s tax base and inhibited the ability of public sector 
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workers to obtain improvements in wages and benefits. Historian Thomas Sugrue in his 
book, The Origins of the Urban Crises: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit argues 
that [I]ndustrial and population flight…drained the city of resources necessary to 
maintain infrastructure.”113 Public sector workers were an important part of that 
infrastructure. Statistics give credence to Sugrue’s argument. While Detroit's population 
grew rapidly for many decades, its growth rate changed after 1950. In 1950 its population 
grew to 1,849,568, an increase of over 200,000 from 1940. By 1960, its population 
declined by 179,424 people. During the 1960s, it lost even more residents, as its 
population dropped to about 1.5 million. Those declines continued in subsequent decades. 
With the decline in population came a coinciding decline in tax revenue used to provide 
public sector workers the pay raises and improved benefits they desired. The hard 
numbers representing the flight of residents to the suburbs illustrates the extent of the 
demographic shift and suggests the affect on Detroit’s public sector workers. Combined 
Livonia, Southfield, Troy St. Clair Shores and Warren, gained over 200,000 during the 
1960s. This is to say nothing of other suburbs that also made population gains.114  
 With a majority in both houses, Republicans revisited the Public Employee 
Relations Act. No one had had time to evaluate its effect, given that it had been on the 
books for less than two years.115 Even the Director of the Michigan Department of Labor 
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thought it premature to amend the law.116 Republican legislators, however, with the 
support of Detroit's Labor Relations Bureau, were determined to make changes. 
Resistance to the growing or perceived power of public sector unions and fear of the 
consequences of public employee strikes fueled the desire to reestablish limits on the 
public sector. The proposed changes came in the form of House Bill 3254. 
 This bill not only forbade labor organizations from calling or instigating strikes by 
public sector workers, but it went further in requiring organizations to seek to end any 
strike when called on to do so. The bill mandated that the appropriate circuit court grant 
injunctive relief if it was determined that a strike had taken place. Additionally, the bill 
allowed for new procedures that did not exist in previous legislation, namely “case 
panels” whose purpose it was to resolve disputes that the labor mediation board could not 
and establish a process for fact finding. The bill also created a commission on public 
employee relations to continuously examine PERA and recommend needed changes. 
Particularly burdensome to public sector unions was the measure prohibiting public 
employees from being “represented for the purposes of collective bargaining, under the 
provisions of this act by any labor organization which asserts the right to strike against 
government or is affiliated with any labor organization which asserts the right to strike 
against government.”  Similarly, the measure prohibited public employees from striking 
when confronted with what they considered unfair labor practices. While the bill allowed 
for agency shop when called for in units where a union represented the employees, most 
union officials argued that the negatives associated with the bill far outweighed the 
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positives and actively lobbied against it.117 
 In the end, the House Bill 3254 was narrowly defeated by a vote of 53 to 49. That 
the measure failed suggested that its punitive elements were too much for some 
Republicans to stomach.118 
 The death of House Bill 3254 did not mean the end of the influence that 
Republican’s held over public sector workers. In fact, Republicans threatened to revisit 
the legislation if public sector workers went on strike or otherwise used coercive means 
to gain pay increases and benefits. Advocates of PERA feared that Republicans might 
deem any action as coercive. Whatever the case, it might not have taken much for 
Republicans to garner the necessary votes to pass a similar measure, given the right 
conditions.119 State Senator Sander Levin, who helped shepherd the Public Employee 
Relations Act through the legislature in 1965, warned that if HB 3254 is passed the 
legislature would be guilty of fomenting a series of work stoppages.120 Levin's 
counterpart in the Michigan House referred to the measure as “'one of the most punitive 
anti-labor bills ever introduced in the Legislature.” Another observer characterized the 
bill as a “vicious union-busting measure.”121 
 Advocates of House Bill 3254, however, contended that they had to do something 
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to stem the tide of strikes among public sector workers, particularly teachers, whose job 
actions grabbed headlines. Some of these advocates supported collective bargaining for 
public sector workers, but they argued the need for modifications to the Public Employee 
Relations Act.122 More than anything else, the introduction of House Bill 3254 set a tone 
that undermined the efforts of public sector workers. The tone set by the bill aside, 
declining tax revenues had a more devastating impact on a Detroit-based public sector 
seeking improvements. 
The Adverse Impact of a Constitutionally-Mandated Tax Reassessment  
 
 When Mayor Cavanagh ran for re-election in 1965, his popularity resulted in a 
“crushing 69% of the vote.” During his first term, Cavanagh successfully fought for the 
right of the city to tax residents who worked in the city at a rate of 1.0 percent and non-
residents who worked in the city at 0.5 percent. These new revenues allowed Cavanagh to 
retire the 19 million dollar deficit that he faced when he entered the mayor’s office. The 
year following Cavanagh’s reelection, for example,  
he became the first mayor simultaneously to head both the  
United States Conference of Mayors and the National 
League of Cities. His advice was sought by the White 
House, he came to be seen as a presidential possibility 
himself and he relished the idea.123 
In other words, his star was rising both locally and nationally. With the revenue generated 
by new taxes, the Cavanagh administration amassed a $9 million surplus by March 
1967.124 In this context, the prospects for the city were bright, or were they?  
 In March 1967, Detroit Budget Director Walter I. Stecher raised anxieties about 
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“the seriousness of the budget problem,” a problem that did not exist earlier in 
Cavanagh's first term as Mayor.125 Contributions made by the City to debt service, social 
security, hospitalization, and life insurance together offset the increased revenues 
generated by any and all taxes received. “The current year [i.e., 1967] may close with a 
budget deficit of $14 million or more,” Strecher explained to Cavanagh. With this 
projection in mind, the city was not inclined to entertain the possibility of wage and 
benefit increases for its employees. In fact, Strecher recommended that “City operations 
be cut back,”126 which might easily have been translated as cuts in pay and benefits for 
city employees or an increased work load, due to the need to trim city payrolls. 
 Detroit's financial problems caused difficulties in other ways, which had 
devastating consequences for the ability of the Cavanagh administration to conduct 
business. Even as Cavanagh established programs that brought millions of federal funds 
into the city that fueled the war on poverty, the City simultaneously lost millions of 
dollars due to constitutionally-mandated provisions over which neither Cavanagh nor 
anyone else had any immediate control. Prior to the 1961-1962 Michigan Constitutional 
Convention, and the ratification vote in 1963, the state assessed property at its cash value. 
In analyzing the then-proposed constitution, the Citizens Research Council of Michigan 
(CRCM) observed that “[t]he uniform assessments of such property shall not exceed 50 
per cent of its true cash value after January 1, 1966.”127 It is little wonder that the CRCM 
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referred to this revision as “a major change.”128 That this constitutional change did not go 
into effect until January 1966, says something about why the Cavanagh administration 
struggled to balance the city's books after that time. These provisions also made it 
difficult for Detroit city government to provide the wage and benefit packages desired by 
public employees. The Michigan AFL-CIO News said it best: 
Detroit city employes [sic] will probably find their wage 
package affected this year by a provision in the state's 
revised Constitution. Detroit Mayor Cavanagh pointed this 
out at a press conference last Friday in which he 
commented on a range of subjects. Cavanagh said that the 
Constitution requires all communities in the state to do a 
total reassessment of property. The effect of such a 
reassessment is to lower taxes on business and generally 
drop over all valuation of real estate property and the tax 
income received by the community. Cavanagh said this will 
limit the city's ability to grant an adequate pay increase 
package.129  
 
The Michigan AFL-CIO News repeated the concern about property assessments and the 
shifting of taxes from businesses to people in February 1967. In an editorial that month, it 
argued that the constitutional convention, whose membership was dominated by 
Republicans and based on a malapportioned legislature, put the tax reassessment into 
effect as part of the state constitution, despite strong objections from Democrats and a 
few Republicans. The end result? A weakened tax base made it much harder for the city 
to grant pay and benefit increases to their workers.130 Despite these circumstances, public 
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sector workers continued to push for improvements to their wages, benefits and working 
conditions. 
AFSCME Council 77 Suffers From the Misteps of Tom Fitzpatrick 
Added to the challenges AFSCME Council 77 confronted, yet another was how 
AFSCME regional director Tom Fitzpatrick argued on behalf of the Council. By many 
accounts, Tom Fitzpatrick played an important role in garnering support for formal 
recognition of AFSCME to pursue collective bargaining for Detroit public workers. 
However, Fitzpatrick was less successful in his efforts to convince the city to grant 
improvements in pay to city workers. His methods seemed to have been 
counterproductive and, in fact, a liability to the overall effort. Fitzpatrick may have been 
overzealous and abrasive when the moment required more pragmatism and diplomacy 
than he was able to muster. While the Detroit Labor News always portrayed him in a 
positive light, other sources describe him differently. In a February 1966 letter to Leggat, 
Fitzpatrick complained of what he saw as the “confusion which permeates your office,” 
stemming from a misdirected letter and a “past history” indicating that Leggat's office did 
not pass on information to the City Council. For that reason, Fitzpatrick bluntly “reserved 
the right to present orally and/or in writing our position to the Common Council” to 
ensure that that body receive it.131 
 During the early budget discussions in February and March 1966, AFSCME 
Council 77 sought an increase in a total package of forty million dollars, twenty-one 
million of which the labor organization demanded for wages and the balance for benefits 
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and improved working conditions. In the course of making its plea for the package 
covering Detroit-based public sector employees in 1966, Fitzpatrick argued that, “'[w]e 
want once more to challenge the mayor to submit our disputes over wages to a public 
panel of fact-finders since it appears that no realistic attempt is being made to seriously 
consider the demands of city employes [sic].'”132 With a minimum $6,447 annual wage, 
the requested wage increase included 15 cents across the board, and an increase of from 
anywhere from 45 cents for unskilled labor, to 70 cents for skilled labor, for wages to 
keep pace with workers in the private sector.133 Thus, organized labor continued to seek 
certain rights to wages achieved by those in the private sector. At least one City official 
considered the demand typical of a labor organization seeking the best for their members 
without expecting exactly what they have requested. City Controller Richard Strichartz, 
for example, maintained that, “'Historically, employe [sic] unions have always presented 
packages they did not expect to gain in one year.'”134  
 As the City and AFSCME Council 77 entered budget discussions in February and 
March 1966 regarding the 1966-1967 fiscal year budget, the union stopped short of 
threatening a strike, but only because its president, Jack Kaufman, did not use the word. 
According to a Detroit News editorial, “...Kaufman was quoted as noting the union could 
close down public services not only to the general public but also to schools, hospitals 
and similar institutions through its control of the Water Board, Public Lighting 
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Commission and hospitals.”135 A belief in the right to receive comparable wages with 
private sector employees accompanied by a belief in a strike as a means of securing those 
wages. These tactics coincided with and grew out of the rights consciousness of the era. 
 Fitzpatrick did not soften his approach during budget discussions of the next year. 
Some city employees and union representatives, however, understood the financial straits 
in which the city found itself throughout 1967. In an April 1967 memo from Labor 
Relations Bureau's Al Leggat to Cavanagh, the former argued that city employees 
generally understood that the city could not provide the increases sought. After citing 
“the unfortunate financial plight of the City,” Leggatt explained how he believed its 
employees would negotiate contracts given this situation. “I have reason to hope that the 
employees are resigned to acceptance of whatever minimum the City can bear financially 
provided they are treated alike to the extent possible. Some of them have expressed these 
sentiments,” he wrote Cavanagh.136  
AFSCME Council 77 represented “some” of these stakeholders. Michigan 
AFSCME Regional Director Tom Fitzpatrick took exception with the characterization. 
“We are at a complete loss to understand how you could make recommendations dealing 
with the bread and butter of 20,000 city employees with absolutely no consultation on 
economic matters with our organization, which represents more City of Detroit 
employees than all other organizations combined.”  After listing inadequate wages, 
“intolerable working conditions,” lack of equity, and the need of the city to conform to 
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the strictures of the Public Employees Relations Act, Fitzpatrick complained of Leggat's 
mischaracterization of public sector workers as understanding that “substantial 
adjustments are an economic impossibility at present.” Fitzpatrick further stated that, 
“[y]our statements are your own and we are aware of no such thing.”137  
Indeed, Fitzpatrick took the argument a step further and noted a 5 million dollar 
windfall that the city could have used to pay city employees and suggested that the 
money for one expensive junket could have been similarly used. What Leggat 
characterized as a decision to go without filling vacancies was seen by Fitzpatrick as a 
“wage cut,” as it meant that, “unfilled vacancies will be absorbed by the present work 
force.”138 Fitzpatrick ended his missive as boldly and bluntly as he began it. “We reject 
your recommendations to the Mayor and the political expediency which prompted them, 
and demand that your office fulfill its legal and moral responsibility inherent in the 
Act...”139 
 WWJ-TV aired Fitzpatrick's wage demands, which Leggat believed backfired on 
Fitzpatrick. According to Leggat, Fitzpatrick “just went on, and on, and some of the 
demands bordered on the ridiculous,” a point that, Leggat believed, the public would 
recognize as such. As historian Joseph Slater argues, public perception factors 
significantly into how negotiations proceed between public sector unions and the 
government. For this reason, Leggat saw Fitpatrick's comments as benefiting the city's 
position.140  
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The role of public opinion affected public employers in the same way, which is 
why they had to be cautious in the way they treated their workers during times of 
negotiations. To underscore this point, President Lyndon Johnson warned both public 
employers and their employees to “[n]ever forget that the public occupies a third seat at 
the bargaining table.”141 Leggat did not indicate to Cavanagh which “demands bordered 
on the ridiculous,” but he may have been referring to hourly across the board wage 
increases of 35 cents for unskilled workers and 70 cents for those who performed skilled 
work or an increase in the $6,912 minimum wage.  
 Following the enactment of PERA, AFSCME Council 77 began a concerted 
campaign to organize workers. If coverage in the Detroit Labor News about the public 
sector reflects the activities (or lack thereof) in the area of educational efforts directed 
toward organizing the public sector, then we must ask why these activities seem to have 
stopped shortly after early 1966. The Detroit Labor News did not report much in the way 
of educational efforts about organizing after this period. We must consider two possible 
reasons. The first concerns the Detroit Labor News. As the voice of the Michigan AFL-
CIO, which sought to foster cooperation between labor unions, it may have avoided 
writing about conflicts between its affiliated groups. After all, the conflict between 
AFSCME and SEIU surfaced in internal memoranda and not the pages of the Detroit 
Labor News.  
The second possibility concerns problems internal to AFSCME Council 77 and its 
Local 26. During the period from the enactment of PERA through the agreement 
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negotiated between Council 77 and the city, these AFSCME affiliates became the subject 
of trusteeships by AFSCME international. The imposition of a trusteeship meant that the 
international gained full control of these affiliates and ousted their officers, in this case 
because of allegations of fiscal mismanagement. The dissension associated with 
trusteeships could have disrupted organizing activities during a crucial period in the 
union's development. Indeed, AFSCME international eventually saw fit to dissolve 
Council 77. As with the conflict between AFSCME and SEIU, it is conceivable that the 
Detroit Labor News wanted no part of covering these internal problems within its pages.  
Whatever internal or external problems AFSCME Council 77 confronted in the more than 
two years preceding the agreement it negotiated with Detroit, those problems did not stop 
it from garnering the strength it needed to follow through with that negotiated 
agreement.142 
AFSCME Council 77 Wins a Contract in October 1967 
 
The economic straits in which the City found itself in 1967 compelled it to seek 
agreements with unions that did not provide for any wage increases. The City entered 
into one of these agreements with the Detroit City Hospital Employees Union, Local No. 
1 in August 1967 and with the International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 547 the 
next month.143 An agreement with AFSCME Council 77 came in October of 1967. 
 Following the enactment of the Public Employees Relations Act, AFSCME 
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Council 77 fought hard to organize new members and receive recognition from the city 
while combating similar efforts by competing unions. It also pressured the city 
government to engage in legally-mandated collective bargaining. In October 1967, 17 
locals represented by AFSCME Council 77 engaged in negotiations leading to a formal 
collective bargaining agreement. The Council sought to place the agreement in a 
favorable light, but it confronted a city government that had suffered economically in 
previous years and was simply unable to accommodate the demands that union leaders 
sought for their members. “Because of economic difficulties, the city was unable to 
afford a pay raise for its employees,”144 AFSCME's Public Employee conceded.  
 The conciliatory tone of these words coming from AFSCME’s Public Employee 
may have resulted from the knowledge that the city had lost significant revenue from a 
shrinking tax base. The residents and business that had begun migrating to the suburbs 
coupled with the reassessment of property taxes meant that the city had few resources to 
support raises of its employees. Most devastating, though, was the civil disturbance that 
had taken place just a few months before. Considered a rebellion by some, a riot by 
others and a civil disorder by those seeking some modicum of calm, the events of July 
1967 found expression within the black community but revealed bitter social, political 
and economic antagonisms of heightened racial and class dimensions.145 In the context of 
the contract that AFSCME Council 77 negotiated with Detroit in October 1967, this was 
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not the moment to expect much. It was, however, something.  
What the agreement did provide for was “seniority protection on layoffs, transfer, 
and promotion, binding arbitration, grievance procedures, and a clause that gives the city 
and the union the right to cancel the entire contract on 10 days' notice during the budget 
closing session in April of each year.” The agreement, covering 27 bargaining units 
within 16 agencies and departments, “including water, health, lighting, buildings and 
safety, engineering, parks and recreation, house of corrections and police civilian 
employees” provided for union security, dues check off, a grievance procedure, seniority, 
transfers and promotions and health benefits, amongst other provisions.146 It was, by no 
means, an ideal agreement from the perspective of organized labor in Detroit and, in fact, 
the Detroit Labor News did not even bother to report it. Similarly, neither of the two local 
Detroit-based daily newspapers said anything of it in the week following the conclusion 
of the negotiations.  
Conclusion 
History is comprised of a series of shifting transitions. Even as one period 
embodies a certain overarching idea it often comprises elements associated with some 
previous or subsequent period. The Civil Rights movement, with its boycotts, land mark 
Supreme Court decisions and protest marches is reflective of this idea. One could argue 
that the rise of public sector unions, which coincided with the Civil Rights movement and 
as reflected by laws, organizing drives, and calls for collective bargaining, also embodied 
these elements. Soon after the 1965 Public Employees Relations Act passed, Republican 
legislators pursued efforts to modify it in light of high profile teacher strikes that captured 
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headlines and angered citizens. The irony is that AFSCME Council 77 did not pursue any 
strikes of note and yet its members were penalized for these strikes by lawmakers bent on 
pursuing legislation inhibiting their efforts to secure wage increases and improved 
benefits. It did not help matters for Council 77 that the governor appointed a committee 
that sought to rescind some of the power that Council 77 and other public sector unions 
received in PERA. Most damaging to its efforts to increase compensation packages were 
internal problems associated with Council 77, the constitutionally-mandated property tax 
reassessments and flight of people and businesses from the city, all of which inhibited the 
city from providing wage increases that city workers desired. Those would have to come 
on another day. In October 1967, however, AFSCME Council 77 would have to settle for 
an agreement that contained no such benefits.  
Great hope and expectations surrounded the enactment of the 1965 Public 
Employee Relations Act. The law’s measures softening the penalties for striking and its 
provisions assuring collective bargaining over a wide range of issues are responsible for 
the expectations that public sector workers and their unions had in the law. In reviewing 
the difficulties that AFSCME Council 77 had in gaining recognition and pursuing a 
collective bargaining agreement, it becomes apparent that the law by itself is no panacea 
for the ills suffered by its members. This reality is reflected in the agreement negotiated 
between Detroit and AFSCME Council 77 in October 1967. Ending this study with that 
moment in history reveals the limitations in the law even given the build up in pursuit of 
it. 
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Conclusion 
Detroit’s Public Sector: 
Current Realities Reflected in the Past 
Viewing public sector workers through the prism of history, one is immediately 
struck by the tenuous position they have held. Prohibited from striking, they have not 
always effectively engaged in collective bargaining. Strikes, after all, generally pressure 
all parties to resolve conflicts. For most public sector workers, however, strikes violate 
the rule of law, that sacred pillar upon which the American democratic structure of 
government rests. Are we not a government of laws and not of men and women? For 
many, those are abstract ideas that have limited meaning in the lives of people who are 
driven by other realities. For public sector workers, those realities come in the form of 
their desire for rights: the right to bargain collectively for pay, benefits and working 
conditions comparable to what their counterparts in the private sector receive. Some may 
dismiss such claims but only at their peril. The competing realities and agenda of public 
sector workers on the one hand, and the governments under which they work on the 
other, leads us to conclude that public sector workers and their unions exist within an 
occasionally precarious position. These competing realities and their implications play 
out in remarkably similar ways today in Detroit, just as they did in the twenty-year period 
beginning in 1947. 
Striking poses certain risks for public sector workers. In 1947, teachers in Detroit 
and East Detroit benefited from the strike and threatened strike that they conducted. Their 
was no specific law banning them, the community largely supported their cause, and the 
strike wave taking place among other public school teachers throughout the country 
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provided them with the momentum that ended in their success, as pay raises followed. 
Not so with the Detroit Street Railway workers in 1951. For that event, the administration 
of Detroit Mayor Albert Cobo used the Hutchinson Act, a public sector anti-strike law, to 
cripple the efforts of these workers. In addition, the public stood solidly behind Cobo, 
and together with him, chastised the streetcar workers.1 Because of the differing ways in 
which strikes are perceived by the public and officials charged to manage public services, 
any job action threatened by Detroit’s public sector workers in 2010 would require 
serious thought as well as contingency plans. As late as September 2009, however, the 
AFSCME Local 207 Organizer, the union newsletter of the Public Utility Employees of 
the City of Detroit, sounded the alarm for a possible strike. In making reference to second 
class treatment and using the word “strike,” as a possibility, the newsletter stated that, 
“all actions to defend our schools, city services, jobs, wages and benefits should be 
supported as blows struck against [Mayor Dave] Bing & [Emergency Manager of the 
Detroit Public Schools Robert] Bobb’s corporate agenda, including pickets, rallies, mass 
meetings, student walkouts, etc.”2 Time will tell whether the union will back up these 
words with actions. 
These are difficult economic times for the city and its workers. In February of 
2010, the city confronted a $325 million deficit. Pay cuts, furlough days, and fringe 
benefits are all proposed areas in which the new mayor, David Bing, is demanding 
concessions. While the union says it understands that concessions are necessary, they also 
argue that, “the city hasn’t made a case for many of the fringe benefit changes they want, 
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including changes in vacation, sick time and health care.”3 Needless to say, the city did 
not arrive at this economic moment over night. Signs appeared in decades past, although 
only the most astute observers could have foreseen what the current generation is 
experiencing. 
As much of a struggle as it was for Detroit in 1960, when the population dipped to 
1,670,144 after achieving a high of 1,849,568 ten years before, the population has 
dropped every decade since. Indeed, the city lost over 300,000 residents during the 1970s 
alone; and in 2000, its population descended to 951,270, almost half the population it had 
in 1950.4 A number of factors have combined to produce this demographic shift. 
According to historian Thomas Sugrue, “The ‘excesses’ of Black Power and the rise of 
affirmative action fueled the white suburbanization and justified a newfound white 
backlash against urban poor.”5 A federally-funded highway system that allowed home 
owners to migrate to the suburbs, and federally-funded and locally administered home 
loans that allowed whites to relocate to segregated suburbs ensured that the postwar era in 
Detroit was characterized by white flight.6  
As white residents left the city for the suburbs, so did manufacturing enterprises. 
Those residents who left the city, took their tax dollars with them. Many of those who 
remained, as Sugrue explains, “live beneath the poverty line, many concentrated in 
                                                 
3
 Christine MacDonald, “Bing on Unions: ‘Either They Can’t Read, They Can’t 
Add or They Can’t Comprehend,’” Detroit News, 25 February 2010, accessed at: 
http://detnews.com/article/20100225/METRO/2250445 on 14 March 2010. 
4
 Peter Gavrilovich and Bill McGraw, The Detroit Almanac: 300 Years of Life in 
the Motor City (Detroit: Detroit Free Press, 2000), 289. 
5
 Thomas Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in 
Postwar Detroit (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 4. 
6
 Ibid., 6-8. 
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neighborhoods where a majority of their neighbors are also poor.7 They are left to pay the 
higher taxes needed to keep the city going. Taxation policies motivated many 
corporations to relocate in the first place.8 Given Sugrue’s emphasis on issues of race and 
inequality, he concludes, “that capitalism generates economic inequality and that African 
Americans have disproportionately borne the impact of that inequality.”9 A political shift 
coincided with this population shift as communities in suburban Detroit came to enjoy an 
increasing number of state legislators to coincide with their growing numbers.  
As recently as September 2009, Detroit-area demographer, Kurt Metzger, 
provided a more current analysis of the phenomenon that Sugrue revealed. “The Detroit 
region suffers from some of the worst racial segregation in its housing and schools in the 
nation,” Metzger contends. “Analysis of trends in segregation during recent decades 
indicates that these trends have improved slightly, but generally the region has remained 
extremely segregated by race in its neighborhoods and its classrooms.”10 Likewise, many 
Detroiters are segregated into low-paying service jobs. As with the analysis offered by 
Sugrue, these patterns have huge implications for a city seeking to provide its residents 
with public services. For unions seeking to improve the wages of their members or even 
tread water during difficult times, the implications have loomed large as well. 
 While Detroit’s population and tax base has decreased, it still has the same 
number of streets, sewage lines, street lights, sidewalks, and communities to maintain and 
patrol. This means that there are far fewer dollars to maintain an infrastructure that has 
                                                 
7
 Ibid., 3. 
8
 Ibid., 3-14. 
9
 Ibid., 5. 
10
 Kurt Metzger, “Post 3: Social Equity Must Be Our Goal! How Do We Develop 
Neighborhoods of Opportunity,” 8 September 2009 accessed at 
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remained unchanged. Because Detroit is now an older city than it was sixty years ago, its 
infrastructure also has aged and requires a higher level of maintenance than that 
following World War II. Who physically maintains this infrastructure? Public Sector 
workers, of course. Even given the number of libraries and schools the city has closed, as 
well as cutbacks in other city services, Detroit struggles to keep above budget deficits 
while it continues to employ a large labor force.11  
In this context, strikes require more thought than ever, as they may not only 
engender legal consequences for those who push for them, but they may prompt the type 
of negative backlash from residents and politicians that historian Joseph Slater warns 
could prove disastrous.12 It is not unreasonable to speculate that Detroiters might react 
negatively to a public sector pushing the envelope with this force and in this direction in 
2010. The public sector, after all, has suffered a number of debilitating setbacks in recent 
years, largely a product of the conservative times in which we live. Besides, the gains that 
many public sector workers began making in the 1960s, largely a result of their 
unionization and empowerment, has translated into contracts with high wages and 
favorable benefits. In this context, it will be difficult for public sector workers to garner 
much sympathy from others struggling with their own financial woes. 
The public sector that began exhibiting increasing amounts of empowerment 
following World War II reached its height by the middle of the 1970s.13 By that time, 
several dozen states had enacted legislation providing for public sector collective 
                                                 
11
 MacDonald, “Bing on Unions,” accessed at 
http://detnews.com/article/20100225/METRO/2250445 on 25 February 2010. 
12
 Slater, Public Workers, 119-120. 
13
 Joseph McCartin, “Unexpected Convergence: Values, Assumptions, and the 
Right to Strike in Public and Private Sectors, 1945-2005,” Buffalo Law Review 57 (May, 
2009): 747-750. 
305 
 
bargaining. While public sector unions often disavowed strikes in the first half of the 
twentieth century, by the late 1960 and into the 1970s, they came to endorse them. At 
least one prominent mediator and a few judges accepted their inevitability. Even the 
National Council of Churches came to support the idea of public sector strikes.14  
These ideas gained the support necessary to advance a National Public Employee 
Relations Act in the mid-1970s comparable to what private sector workers enjoyed with 
the National Labor Relations Act. However, the NPERA bill never came to a vote. The 
Public Service Research Council (PSRC) and the Americans Against Union Control of 
Government (AAUCG) sounded an alarm against a federal law for public sector 
collective bargaining, arguing that it would lead to debilitating strikes for which the 
American voters would have to pay.15 Advocates of this collective bargaining law even 
lost support among natural allies. As McCartin reveals,  
Democratic political leaders, once allied with labor, 
grasped this shifting sentiment as they struggled to 
reconcile growing budget deficits on one hand with 
insistent union leaders who sought increased wages and 
benefits for their inflation-pressed members on the other.16 
It even came to the point where politicians of both parties scored political points by 
standing up to public sector labor leaders seeking wage and other improvements with 
strikes. Strikes may have proven effective during portions of the mid-1970s, but that 
would not last for long, McCartin explains. The PATCO strike made sure of that. “It 
provided the largest and most public stage imaginable upon which to enact a strike-
breaking drama. The symbolic importance of the event is hard to imagine.”17 With this 
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 Ibid., 747-748. 
16
 Ibid., 751. 
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trajectory, organized labor lost the leverage it had previously used to win concessions. 
In the context of this history, it is not surprising that Detroit officials would hold 
their ground against public sector workers. Both Detroit and AFSCME Council 25 are 
currently in fact-finding mode, a process that could end in July 2010. It is too soon to tell 
whether or not Detroit Mayor Dave Bing or the unions will win this battle, but the lines 
have been drawn. Bing has complained that, “[e]ither they [AFSCME Council 25 leaders] 
can’t read, they can’t add or they can’t comprehend.”18 Council 25 shot back, arguing 
that, “[t]he laws of our state provide for fact finding in bargaining disputes. Fact-finding 
is in progress. The Mayor skips the session in order to claim he is ready to impose a 
contract – something he cannot legally do at this time.’”19 Leaders of AFSCME Local 
207, an affiliate of Council 25, also have complained that they have in the past 
accommodated demands of previous administrations. However, “Bing’s concession 
demands are much more serious than those imposed by [Coleman] Young and [Kwame] 
Kilpatrick.”20 For these reasons, the local has entertained the idea of pursuing a strike 
against the city.  
On some level, however, the issue is not about strikes. It concerns the ability of 
unions to make reasonable demands that their employers can meet. Needless to say, 
strikes are a method of accomplishing that end. The strikes by public sector workers in 
                                                 
18
 Christine MacDonald, “Bing on Unions: ‘Either They Can’t Read, They Can’t 
Add or They Can’t Comprehend,” Detroit News, 25 February 2010, accessed at 
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19
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20
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Detroit, however, have had mixed success.  The tenuous position of public sector workers 
using strikes make it a risk demanding serious thought. For these reasons, Detroit’s 
public sector unions will have to remain vigilant for opportunities to press for wage and 
benefit improvements without either alienating the public, whose support they require, or 
their members, who look to those unions for support and protection. It is a tall order that 
will require creative tactics and leadership for the foreseeable future. 
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Degree:  Doctor of Philosophy 
In 1947, the Michigan Legislature passed into law the Hutchinson Act banning 
strikes of state and local workers. The law provided for the termination of striking public 
sector workers but did not require state and local agencies to bargain with public 
employees or their representatives. It even allowed for fines and prison sentences for non 
public sector workers who influenced public sector workers to strike. The law forced 
public sector unions into an untenable state of “collective begging.” Indeed, it was often 
referred to as punitive and draconian. 18 years later, the Michigan Legislature passed and 
the governor signed into law the Public Employees Relations Act. This 1965 law did not 
allow for public sector strikes in Michigan, but neither did it mandate harsh penalties to 
those violating the striking ban. Most importantly, the law required state and local 
agencies to engage in collective bargaining with their employees or their representatives 
when called upon to do so. The public sector welcomed the new law, often referring to it 
as the ‘Little Wagner Act,’ in recognition of the 1935 Wagner Act granting many private 
sector workers rights to unionization and collective bargaining. The purpose of this 
dissertation is to illustrate how the growth and concentration of Detroit-area public sector 
workers coupled with rights consciousness of the postwar period, combined to empower 
public sector workers and the Michigan legislature to successfully fight for the Public 
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Employees Relations Act and pursue collective bargaining thereafter.
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